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Abstract 
The provision of statements of service performance (SSPs) by local government 
in New Zealand is a product of the economic reforms carried out in the late 1980s.  
A statement of service performance is regarded as an important document of New 
Zealand local government reporting.  It is statutorily required by the Local 
Government Act 2002 and complemented by accounting guidance provided by the 
New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants (NZICA), with the objective of 
strengthening accountability obligations (Local Government Act 2002, s. 98; 
NZICA, 2002). 
In spite of twenty years‟ experience in preparing statements of service 
performance, the Office of the Auditor-General (OAG) (2008) criticised that the 
quality of SSPs prepared by local authorities (and other public-sector entities) was 
poor.  A fundamental problem of statements of service performance reporting is 
the lack of comprehensive authoritative requirements on their preparation and 
presentation (Office of the Auditor-General, 2008).  Arguably, the present 
authoritative requirements have been written to cater for the needs of large, profit-
oriented entities in the private-sector rather than for the public-sector‟s specific 
needs for performance reporting and pitched at a higher or more conceptual level 
than is typically required for financial reporting standards (Office of the Auditor-
General, 2008, Webster, 2007).  This may be due to the fact that the current 
authoritative requirements, developed in early 1990s, have been influenced by the 
economic framework highlighting the decision-usefulness purpose of private-
sector reporting, which is not suitable for public-sector reporting (Mack, 2003; 
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Parker & Gould, 1999).  Responding to the need for more adequate guidance for 
non-financial performance reporting of public-sector entities, the OAG and the 
International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB) are working 
on improving accounting guidance applicable for the preparation for SSP 
reporting by public-sector entities (Office of the Auditor-General, 2010; 
International Public Sector Accounting Standard Board, 2010). 
Pallot (1992) points out that accountability is the preferred purpose for public-
sector reporting since the nature of the relationship between providers and users of 
government is non-voluntary.  Past theoretical literature has attempted to define 
the possible components of accountability that would be suitable for public-sector 
entities to adequately discharge their accountability.  Among them, Stewart (1984) 
has developed accountability bases, which provide a platform for understanding 
accountability expectations and, hence desirable characteristics of any 
accountability documents provided by public-sector entities for the public.  It is 
possible that accountability documents pertaining to these accountability 
expectations will enable the public-sector entities to adequately discharge their 
accountability. 
New Zealand local government is the important second tier of New Zealand 
government sector.  Among the wide range of community services provided by 
New Zealand local authorities, wastewater services represent one of the most 
crucial services.  New Zealand constituents could be expected to be concerned not 
only about the performance of wastewater services provided by their local 
authorities, but also with the disclosures about that performance.  However, the 
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research on SSP wastewater disclosures by New Zealand local authorities is 
limited (Smith & Coy, 2000).  Given the criticism on the usefulness of 
authoritative requirements for SSP reporting and the recognition of accountability 
expectations by the literature, the first two objectives of this study are to examine 
the consistency of SSP disclosures, regarding wastewater services provided by 
New Zealand local authorities, with the existing authoritative requirements, and 
the accountability expectations, using the disclosure index as a measurement tool.  
To understand possible explanations for the cross-sectional differences on the 
extent of disclosures, according to the authoritative requirements and 
accountability expectations, the third objective of this study is to examine the 
influential factors of the disclosures, using multiple regression analysis.  
The study finds that the performance disclosures made by the local authorities 
have low levels of correspondence with the index that is based on the authoritative 
requirements.  The result also provides evidence that the current authoritative 
requirements are focused on financial information reporting and pitched at a high 
conceptual level.  This supports the view that the existing authoritative 
pronouncements are not providing sufficient guidance for local authorities.  The 
index based on accountability expectations has relatively greater correspondence 
with the disclosures made.  This identifies that local authorities are providing 
information consistent with accountability expectations.  The study suggests that 
accountability expectations provide a model suitable for SSP reporting guidance.  
According to the multiple regression analysis, the result shows that only size is 
significantly related to the extent of the disclosures.  Larger local authorities 
report more corresponding information.   
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The findings of this study provide three immediate implications which should be 
useful to: (i) accounting standard-setters for their current work on improving 
accounting guidance for SSP reporting; (ii) the Office of the Auditor-General for 
providing more insightful comments in the audit statement for SSP reporting; and 
(iii) regulators for increased attention on some special local authorities.  By doing 
so, it is expected that New Zealand local authorities may lead the world in 
providing comprehensive SSPs, which enable them to adequately discharge their 
accountability and, hence in reaching a reform principle for greater accountability. 
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Chapter1: Introduction 
1.1 Study motivations, objectives, and contribution 
The provision of service performance information by local government in New 
Zealand is a product of the economic reforms carried out in the late 1980s.  The 
New Zealand public-sector has been subject to extensive reforms since 1985.  
These reforms, commonly referred to as New Public Management (NPM)
1
 (Pallot, 
1998; Whitecombe, 2008), are similar to reforms undertaken in the United 
Kingdom, Australia, and many other Western European countries (Olson, Guthrie, 
& Humphery, 1998; Parker & Gould, 1999).  Adoption of private-sector practices, 
pursuit of efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery, and development of 
explicit performance targets and measures, thereby leading to greater 
accountability to consumers, are the three major principles of NPM (Glynn & 
Perkins, 1997; Parker & Gould, 1999).  As a result, commercialisation, 
privatisation, outsourcing, and downsizing characterised the pattern of reforms 
(Parker & Gould, 1999).  Performance measurement in the public-sector, which 
had traditionally focused on inputs, shifted to outputs and outcomes (J. Dixon, 
Kouzmin, & Korac-Kakabadse, 1998).  Today, public-sector entities are formally 
held accountable for outputs (Parker & Gould, 1999). 
New Zealand embraced the reforms suggested by NPM paradigm, within an 
economic framework primarily based on agency theory and public choice to 
develop principles that were used to guide wide reaching public-sector reform in 
                                                 
1 In Western democracies, these reform efforts have also been referred to as managerialism and 
marketisation (Guthrie & Parker, 1998; Ryan, Stanley, & Nelson, 2002). 
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New Zealand (Pallot, 1998).  Based on an economic notion of accountability, 
those principles were enhanced transparency, distancing of politicians from day-
to-day administration, performance specification and monitoring, and devolution 
of activities from central government to local government, Crown entities or the 
private-sector (Pallot, 1998).  In the area of performance specification and 
monitoring, New Zealand public-sector entities led the world in producing output 
performance reporting statements, known as “statements of service performance” 
(SSPs) (Neale & Pallot, 2001).  SSPs present non-financial information about the 
performance of entities in providing goods and services (outputs), with the stated 
objective of strengthening accountability to the public (Local Government Act 
2002, s. 98; NZICA, 2002, para 1.10; 2004, para. 126.2).  Statements of service 
performance provide a comparison between actual service performances and the 
targets of service performance (as set out in the plan), with reasons given for any 
significant variances (Local Government Act 2002, Schedule 10; Public Finance 
Act 1989, s. 45A).  They need to be prepared in compliance with generally 
accepted accounting practice (GAAP)
2
 and audited by the Auditor-General (Local 
Government Act 2002, s. 99; Public Finance Act 1989, s. 45D). 
Parallel with the reform, accounting guidance for SSP reporting was developed 
and devolved with insignificant change over time with prevailing economic 
emphasis.  The current GAAP relevant to SSP reporting comprises the New 
                                                 
2
 In the context of local authorities‟ financial reports (which may contain both financial and non-
financial information) GAAP refers to financial reporting standards approved by the Accounting 
Standards Review Board.  For matters where there is no approved financial reporting standard, 
GAAP requires compliance with accounting standards promulgated by the New Zealand Institute 
of Chartered Accountants (NZICA) and international financial reporting standards that are 
appropriate and have authoritative support within New Zealand (Local Government Act 2002, s. 
5). 
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Zealand Equivalent to International Accounting Standard 1: Presentation of 
Financial Statements (NZ IAS 1),
3
 the New Zealand Equivalent to the 
International Accounting Standard Board Framework for the Preparation and 
Presentation of Financial Statements (NZ Framework)
4
, and Technical Practice 
Aid No. 9 (TPA-9): Service Performance Reporting
5
.  
In spite of twenty years‟ experience in preparing statements of service 
performance, SSP reporting by the New Zealand public-sector, as well as its 
accountability to the public, have been criticised as poor.  The Office of the 
Auditor-General (OAG) (2008) expressed its disappointment in the quality of the 
reports and their discharge of accountability obligations to the public. 
The Office of the Auditor-General (2008) pointed out that a fundamental problem 
of SSP reporting is the lack of comprehensive standards for their preparation and 
presentation. Webster (2007) contends that the authoritative requirements for 
service performance reporting have been based on a higher or more conceptual 
level than is typical for financial reporting standards.  In particular, the Office of 
                                                 
3
 NZ IAS 1 sets out the basis for the presentation of general purpose financial reports, which 
include financial statements, SSPs and supplementary information.  This standard was prepared by 
NZICA and approved by the Accounting Standards Review Board in November 2004; it 
supersedes Financial Reporting Standard No.2: Presentation of Financial Reports (FRS-2) (1994); 
and Financial Reporting Standard No.9: Information to be Disclosed in Financial Statements 
(FRS-9) (1995).  New Zealand entities must apply NZ IAS 1 for annual accounting periods 
commencing on or after 1 January 2007 (NZICA, 2004). 
4
 The NZ Framework provides concepts that underlie the preparation and presentation of general 
purpose financial reports.  This standard was prepared by NZICA and approved by the Accounting 
Standards Review Board in June 2005; it supersedes the Statement of Concepts for General 
Purpose Financial Reporting (1993).  New Zealand entities must apply the NZ Framework for 
annual accounting periods commencing on or after 1 January 2007 (NZICA, 2005). 
5
 TPA-9 provides guidelines on the preparation of SSPs in order to promote the provision of high 
quality information to users.  It was prepared by NZICA in November 2002.  Although it is based 
on the Statement of Concepts for General Purpose Financial Reporting and FRS-2: Presentation 
of Financial Reports, which have been superseded by NZ Framework and NZ IAS 1, TPA-9 
remains the best guidance in New Zealand on SSP reporting.  It was re-endorsed by the Financial 
Reporting Standards Board and included in the 2007 Member‟s Handbook and the 2007 Annual 
Accounting Standards publication (NZICA, 2007a). TPA-9 (2002) underwent a limited revision in 
2007, including the recognition of NZ IAS 1 and NZ Framework. 
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the Auditor-General (2008) adds that New Zealand Equivalents to International 
Financial Reporting Standards (including NZ IAS 1, NZ Framework) are written 
to cater for the needs of large, profit-oriented entities in the private-sector rather 
than for the public-sector‟s specific needs for performance reporting.  It is 
possible that the economic framework based on decision-usefulness purpose of 
private-sector‟s reports is not suitable for public-sector reporting (Mack, 2003; 
Parker & Gould, 1999).  It seems that the current authoritative requirements – 
legislation and GAAP – for the New Zealand public-sector‟s SSP reporting 
provide inadequate guidance on the preparation of SSPs; however, limited 
empirical study has been carried out to specifically investigate the usefulness of 
the authoritative requirements for SSP reporting by public-sector entities in New 
Zealand. 
The OAG seemingly responded to the call for more adequate guidance on SSP 
reporting.  In 2010, the OAG issued the discussion paper – Local Government 
Examples of Better Practice in Setting Local Authorities’ Performance Measures 
– with the stated purpose of improving 2011/2012 performance information 
(Office of the Auditor-General, 2010).  The paper provides examples of 
performance measures for each of the core services (for example, wastewater 
services) provided by New Zealand local authorities.  In addition, the 
International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB) is in the 
process (Exposure Draft) of issuing Conceptual Framework for General Purpose 
Financial Reporting by Public Sector Entities (International Public Sector 
Accounting Standard Board, 2010) which the New Zealand Accounting Standards 
Review Board intends to adopt once it becomes effective (Accounting Standards 
 5 
 
Review Board, 2011).  This new conceptual framework includes the 
accountability purpose for public-sector‟s reporting.   
Researchers have also been similarly critical of the New Zealand public-sector‟s 
SSPs and their role in the discharge of accountability to the public (Coy, Tower, 
& Dixon, 1994; Thompson, 1995).  Most research examining the SSPs of New 
Zealand public-sector entities tends to focus on the education sector (for example, 
Alves, Dunmore, & Dunstan, 2005; Coy, et al., 1994; K. Dixon, Coy, & Tower, 
1991) rather than government entities.  With only a few existing research studies 
of government entities‟ SSPs, the research on central government is more up-to-
date (Lonti & Gregory, 2007).  However, for local government, the most recent 
study was Smith and Coy (2000).  Further, in Smith and Coy‟s (2000) study, 
while SSP disclosures were considered, they were one part of the whole annual 
report disclosures being studied, and thus the analysis of the SSP disclosures was 
scant.   
Local government is the important second tier of the New Zealand government 
sector.
6
  Local authorities have coercive powers to tax, rate, or levy their local 
communities (including tax/rate payers) to obtain public funds.  Their roles are to 
use the funds raised to provide the majority of community services including, 
wastewater services.  Without opportunities to choose between alternative service 
providers, local communities are reliant on the services provided by their local 
                                                 
6
 New Zealand government is modelled on the British system and is referred to as Westminster-
style government (Scott, 1996).  It comprises two complementary and independent legal entities: 
local government and central government (McLintock, 1966).  While local government‟s role 
focuses on urban and rural services, paid for from property taxes, central government‟s role is 
largely restricted to economic policy and to controlling all government spending on health, 
education, and welfare (Scott, 1996). 
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authorities (Ives, 1987).  Further, local communities also rely on service 
performance information to be able to make informed judgements about the 
performance of their local authorities and understand how their monies were spent 
(Mack & Ryan, 2006).  Service performance information is the necessary means 
by which local authorities attempt to discharge their accountability to the public 
(Barton, 1999; Boyne & Law, 1991; R. Gray, Owen, & Adams, 1996; Hyndman 
& Anderson, 1995).     
Among the wide range of community services provided by local authorities, 
wastewater services are one of the most crucial services.  Traditionally, all 
city/district councils have been statutorily responsible for providing wastewater 
services (Bush, 1995; Local Government Act 2002, s. 130), which accounts for 
one of the major items of expenditure (nine percent of total expenditure) by local 
authorities (The Department of Internal Affairs, 2010).  Wastewater contributes 
the largest volume of waste in New Zealand (approximately 1.5 billion litres are 
discharged daily) and can have a wide impact on human health and the physical 
environment, as well as having potential long-term consequences if not properly 
managed (Ministry for the Environment, 2010b).  Consequently, New Zealand 
constituents could be expected to be concerned not only with the performance of 
wastewater services provided by their local authorities but also with their 
disclosures in SSPs about the service performance. 
In view of criticisms by the OAG and researchers of SSP reporting, and the 
limited evidence on the usefulness of the current authoritative requirements, the 
first objective of this study is to examine the consistency of SSP disclosures, 
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regarding wastewater services provided by New Zealand local authorities, with 
the existing authoritative requirements.  This result will provide evidence on the 
correspondence of the report to the authoritative requirements and may identify 
the applicability (or otherwise) of the existing accounting framework for SSP 
reporting.  This may offer suggestions for consideration to accounting standard-
setters for the current improvement of SSP accounting guidance. 
Some researchers have been critical about the manner in which public-sector 
reforms have addressed the need for accountability.  Parker and Gould (1999) 
contend that reform models applying accountability through an economic lens and 
based on private-sector practice did not fully embrace the complexities of true 
public-sector accountability.  There is vast public-sector literature addressing the 
multi-facets of accountability in the public-sector.  This has attempted to define 
the possible characteristics of suitable information for public-sector entities so as 
to adequately discharge their accountability obligations.  Among them, Stewart 
(1984) identifies four normative bases of accountability for public-sector entities, 
which provide a platform for understanding accountability expectations applicable 
for wastewater disclosures.  They are probity, legality, process/efficiency, 
performance/programme/effectiveness accountability.  It is possible that SSPs 
pertaining to these accountability expectations would ensure the adequacy of local 
authorities‟ discharging their accountability to the public.  The second objective of 
this research is to examine the consistency of wastewater service disclosures in 
SSPs provided by New Zealand local authorities with these normative 
accountability expectations as derived from the literature.  The results of this 
measurement will provide evidence of whether SSPs by New Zealand local 
 8 
 
authorities are disclosed in a manner which is suitable for evaluating the 
performance in accordance with the accountability framework.  Hence, the result 
may support (or otherwise) the suitability of accountability expectations derived 
from the literature, as a model for the current improvement of SSP reporting 
guidance, which may be useful for accounting standard-setters. 
The consistency of SSP disclosures with authoritative requirements and 
accountability expectations may vary within and/or among local authorities 
depending on various factors.  Some prior research on public-sector reporting 
(Baber, 1983; Baber & Sen, 1984; Boyne & Law, 1991; Evan & Patton, 1987; 
Giroux, 1989; Ingram, 1984; Laswad, Fisher, & Oyelere, 2005; Zimmerman, 
1997) discusses disclosure incentives and uses various influential factors of 
disclosures to examine their relationships with the disclosures.  Such research 
provides some understanding of possible explanations for cross-sectional 
differences in disclosures.  The third objective of this research is to examine the 
influential factors that may explain cross-sectional differences of wastewater 
disclosures in SSPs made by local authorities, as measured according to the 
authoritative requirements and accountability expectations.  The findings may 
identify the influential factors affecting SSP disclosures and provide suggestions 
to regulators for the ways to improve the SSP reporting by local authorities in 
New Zealand. 
1.2 Research methods 
Wastewater disclosures will be extracted from SSPs presented in the 2007/2008 
annual reports of all 73 local authorities in New Zealand.  In order to 
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quantitatively measure the consistency of SSP disclosures with the authoritative 
requirements and accountability expectations, two separate disclosure indices will 
be developed. The first index is the authoritative requirement (AR) index, 
measuring the consistency between wastewater disclosures and authoritative 
requirements; and the second index is the accountability expectation (AE) index, 
measuring the consistency between wastewater disclosures and accountability 
expectations. 
Size of constituency, sophistication of constituents, staff availability, staff 
attributes, financial resources availability, and political visibility will be 
investigated as potential factors that influence the extent of consistency of the 
disclosures with authoritative requirements and accountability expectations.  
Multiple regression analysis will be used to examine the relationships. 
While wastewater disclosures represent only a small sample study of a subset of 
the responsibilities of local government, they provide the opportunity to use a 
method of analysis which may be useful to future researchers in addressing 
similar questions.  Further, the study‟s results may provide a base-line for any 
future research investigating the impact of the accounting guidance.   
1.3 Structure of the study 
Chapter 2 outlines the background to the statements of service performance 
requirements and wastewater services for New Zealand local authorities.  In 
essence it identifies the current authoritative requirements for SSPs reporting, 
according to legislation and relevant generally accepted accounting practice.  An 
analysis of the accountability concept as the theoretical foundation to SSP 
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reporting is provided in chapter 3.  Drawing from accountability literature, 
accountability expectations for wastewater disclosures are developed.  Chapter 4 
reviews the empirical work on service performance reporting, and identifies 
disclosure incentives as well as their influential factors applicable to wastewater 
disclosures by New Zealand local authorities. 
The methodology used for measuring the consistency of wastewater disclosures 
with the authoritative requirements and accountability expectations, and for 
investigating the association of influential factors with SSPs is outlined in chapter 
5.  The independent variables of influential factors are also identified in chapter 5.  
Chapter 6 discusses results from the measurement of the consistency of 
disclosures with authoritative requirements and accountability expectations.  
Chapter 7 reports on results of the multiple regression analysis undertaken to 
investigate the relationships between influential factors and wastewater 
disclosures.  The thesis concludes with chapter 8 which summarises the findings, 
implications and limitations of the study, and future research possibilities. 
 
 11 
 
Chapter 2: Service Performance Reporting Requirements for  
New Zealand Local Authorities 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides background to the statements of service performance 
requirements and wastewater services for New Zealand local authorities.  Section 
2.2 reviews the reforms which gave rise to the requirements.  The current 
structure of local government and its financial management are outlined in 
sections 2.3 and 2.4.  Section 2.5 discusses the operation of wastewater services 
and the related regulatory requirements for local authorities in providing the 
services.  Section 2.6 discusses the accountability mechanisms faced by local 
authorities.  Sections 2.7 identifies the authoritative requirements from the 
statutory requirements and generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP), 
relevant to SSP reporting; and current issues of service performance reporting are 
discussed in section 2.8.  A summary of the chapter is provided in section 2.9. 
2.2 Reforms of the public-sector 
The requirement for local government in New Zealand to provide SSPs is a 
product of economic reforms carried out in the 1980s.  In 1984, New Zealand 
faced an economic crisis of slow economic growth, high fiscal deficit, and high 
debt (McCulloch & Ball, 1992; Scott, 1996).  The public-sector, in particular the 
government sector, was seen as a major contributor to problems, with government 
expenditure amounting to 40 percent of gross domestic product (McCulloch & 
Ball, 1992; Scott, Ball, & Dale, 1997; Scott & Gorringe, 1989).  Such problems 
 12 
 
focused attention on the need to improve performance, in terms of efficiency, 
effectiveness, and accountability of the government sector (Coy & Pratt, 1998; 
McCulloch & Ball, 1992; Scott, et al., 1997).  The programme of reforms included 
transferring activities producing private goods from government units to 
corporations owned by the government; restructuring government organisations; 
giving more power to chief executives; adopting accrual accounting, defining 
performance and performance measurement by focusing on outputs and outcomes, 
and introducing ex ante and ex post financial and non-financial service 
performance reporting (Scott, et al., 1997; Scott & Gorringe, 1989).  The 
extensive reforms of the New Zealand public-sector began with the central 
government, which set the model used for the local government reforms (Pallot, 
2001c). 
2.2.1 Central government reforms  
Central government departments owned and operated many of the country‟s core 
infrastructure businesses in 1984, for example, banking, postal, 
telecommunications, a steel mill, a shipping company, production forests, electric 
power, and a large highway construction business (Bale & Dale, 1998).  The 
majority of these activities were nearly all run at a loss and required tax-payer 
support (Bale & Dale, 1998).  Departments were criticised for being too large, 
inefficient, and poorly managed, with a lack of transparency and accountability 
(Bale & Dale, 1998; Office of the Auditor-General, 1978; Pallot, 2001b; Scott, et 
al., 1997; Scott & Gorringe, 1989).  Budgets were exceeded, unused balances 
were spent in sprees at year-end, creative accounting was used to give the 
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appearance of good performance, and assets and cash were not managed 
systematically (Bale & Dale, 1998).  In addition, some departments were seen as 
unresponsive to politicians (Bale & Dale, 1998).  The accountability of 
government departments to Parliament had long been criticised as inadequate by 
the Office of the Auditor-General, as highlighted in its 1978 report Financial 
Management and Control in Administrative Government Departments 1978 
(known as the “Shailes Report”) (Office of the Auditor-General, 1978, para 2.5).7 
The government adopted a model based on agency theory and public choice 
theory as the basis for reforms with which to tackle the accumulation of problems 
in central government administration (Scott & Gorringe, 1989).  The changes 
began by separating activities that government departments should provide from 
the trading activities that were to be provided by corporatised, state-owned 
enterprises (Bale & Dale, 1998; Scott & Gorringe, 1989).
8
  The second step was 
to reorganise the structure and management of the remaining departments (Bale & 
Dale, 1998; Scott & Gorringe, 1989).  Chief executives (formerly known as heads 
of departments) are today appointed by the State Services Commission
9
 and 
negotiate their performance agreement with the minister responsible, who can 
allocate rewards or impose penalties for their performance, according to those 
                                                 
7
 In particular, the report criticised that the Estimates and departmental reports contained 
insufficient information on programme objectives, achievements, and full costs involved (Office of 
the Auditor-General, 1978, para 2.5).  The report included recommendations for the development 
of quantitative measures of the achievements (para 4.1), and an emphasis in the Estimates on 
activities (para 9.7), and reporting to parliament on activities and achievement of objectives (para 
9.8). 
8
 Such state-owned enterprises are managed and operated similarly to firms in the private-sector, 
but their stock cannot be publicly traded (Bale & Dale, 1998; Scott & Gorringe, 1989) 
9
 The State Services Commission is the government‟s principal advisor on New Zealand‟s public 
management system.  It works with government entities to ensure that the New Zealand 
government operates efficiently and effectively.  Additionally, it also recommends departmental 
chief executive appointments and reviews chief executive performances (State Services 
Commission, 2002; The Treasury, 1996). 
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agreements (Bale & Dale, 1998).  In turn, chief executives can hire and fire 
department staff, set staff salaries, and negotiate conditions of their employment 
(Bale & Dale, 1998; Scott, 1996; Scott & Gorringe, 1989). 
While the chief executive of a department can be seen as a service deliverer, the 
minister of the department can be seen as an owner of the department (similar to a 
shareholder of a firm) and purchaser (like a customer of that firm) of the 
department‟s services (McCulloch & Ball, 1992).  As owner of the resources of a 
government department, a minister would wish to ensure that capital assets are 
used efficiently and that the department maintains a capacity to provide services 
efficiently in the future (The Treasury, 1996).  Hence, a minister would be 
interested in financial reporting (for example, expenditure, using full accrual 
accounting)  (McCulloch & Ball, 1992; The Treasury, 1996).  As a purchaser of 
services, a minister would need services to be provided at specified quantities and 
quality for the lowest prices, whether buying them from his/her department or 
from other sources.  Therefore, the purchase agreement was introduced, similar to 
a sale contract from the chief executive to the minister, who is likely to require 
information regarding quantity, quality, time and place of service-delivery, and 
price (McCulloch & Ball, 1992).  Chief executives must now provide and report 
on services delivered for which they are accountable (The Treasury, 1996).   The 
reforms emphasised that chief executives are service providers contracted by their 
ministers through purchase agreements.  Consequently, chief executives are today 
held accountable for their services (outputs) delivered. 
 15 
 
It may be seen from the above that while chief executives are responsible for 
producing specified outputs from their departments, ministers are responsible for 
the choice of outputs and, by implication, for outcomes (Bale & Dale, 1998; 
McCulloch & Ball, 1992).  Outputs are goods and services produced by 
departments; outcomes are the impact of those outputs on the community (Scott, 
1996).  Arguably, outcomes cannot be controlled by the chief executive and are 
influenced by many different factors; therefore, the chief executive should not be 
held accountable for outcomes.  However, outcomes are measures of 
governmental success and the purpose of government activities (Scott, 1996; 
Scott, et al., 1997).  Chief executives can control outputs and thus be held 
accountable for them (Bale & Dale, 1998).  They set out the detail of outputs to be 
delivered ex ante in the purchase agreement, which are later approved by Cabinet 
and appropriated by Parliament (Bale & Dale, 1998; McCulloch & Ball, 1992; 
Scott, et al., 1997).  Once approved and appropriated, outputs and related costs 
become the basis for assessing the department‟s performance (Scott, et al., 1997). 
To facilitate changes, the new system of financial management was introduced 
which included the adoption of accrual accounting, development of performance 
measurement, focusing on outputs, and the reporting and monitoring of 
performance (Scott & Gorringe, 1989).  Accrual accounting now provides the 
fundamental basis for appropriation in budget and financial reporting.  The 
appropriations by Parliament were changed to funding for departmental outputs 
(previously inputs), based on an accrual accounting of inputs, and chief executives 
have the freedom to choose inputs from any provider (Scott & Gorringe, 1989).  
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Information about the full costs (including cost of assets, liabilities, and returns, as 
well as cost of outputs) is needed for performance evaluation of the department. 
At the end of the period the department must present, ex post, full financial 
statements, as well as statements of service performance (SSPs), which provide 
details of the actual delivery of outputs against the specifications agreed to and 
approved ex ante.  These ex post financial statements and SSPs are required to be 
prepared so as to be consistent with generally accepted accounting practice, and to 
be audited (McCulloch & Ball, 1992).  These reports provide the basis for a 
Parliamentary committee to review the department‟s performance (Scott, et al., 
1997) and to improve the quality of performance of departments (Scott & 
Gorringe, 1989). 
The reforms of central government have brought about different levels of changes: 
in the structure of the relationship between ministers and chief executives, to the 
roles of ministers and chief executives, and to reporting.  To give effect to these 
changes in central government, the State Sector Act of 1988, and the Public 
Finance Act of 1989 were passed (McCulloch & Ball, 1992). 
2.2.2 Local government reforms 
The reforms of local government closely followed central government reforms, 
and were equally dramatic (Pallot, 2001c).  As in central government reforms the 
1989 local government reforms included organisational restructuring, 
corporatisation, separation of policy advice and service delivery, increased powers 
for chief executives, adoption of accrual accounting, and the introduction of 
reporting, ex ante and ex post, including SSPs. 
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The problems of New Zealand local government management could be traced to 
the late nineteenth
.
 century.  After the abolition of provinces in 1876, New 
Zealand had a local government system which was modelled almost entirely on 
the British system (McLintock, 1966; Pallot, 2001b; Scott, 1979).  There were two 
main types of local authorities: general-purpose local authorities and special-
purpose (or ad hoc) authorities.  General-purpose local authorities consisted of 
county councils,
10
 cities and boroughs,
11
 town districts,
12
 and road districts.
13
  
Special-purpose authorities were responsible for only one major function, for 
example, fire authorities, harbour boards, hospital boards, land drainage boards, 
milk boards, rabbit boards, river boards (McLintock, 1966).  The number of local 
authorities and special purpose authorities had greatly increased over the years 
(McLintock, 1966);  by 1974, there were 991 local authorities, comprising 357 
general purpose local authorities and 634 special-purpose authorities (Scott, 
1979). 
This proliferation of local authorities caused much dissatisfaction, as their 
functions often overlapped (McLintock, 1966).  In particular, there was confusion 
between the roles of councillors and senior management, inefficient service 
provision, conflict between commercial and non-commercial activities, inefficient 
use of resources, and poor accountability by local authorities to their 
                                                 
10
  County councils primarily administer rural areas.  However, some county councils administered 
urban areas containing more than 200 persons, and were known as county towns (McLintock, 
1966). 
11  City is another name for boroughs which have population more than 20,000.  Generally, 
boroughs would have a population of more than 1,500.  Both boroughs and cities had the same 
powers and functions (McLintock, 1966). 
12  Town districts could be independent and dependent of county control.  Independent town 
districts were like small boroughs so far as functions and powers were concerned (McLintock, 
1966).   
13  Road districts were responsible for district roading (McLintock, 1966). 
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constituencies (McKinlay, 1998).  Reform of the Local Government Act 1974 
attempted to reduce the numerous local authorities and the problems referred to 
above.  However, as the amalgamation of local authorities was neither mandatory 
nor effective, it has been argued that the problems of local authorities continued 
(Palmer, 1993). 
In 1987, the Minister of Local Government
14
 announced a comprehensive 
programme of reforms based on three main principles: (i) local authorities should 
have clear, non-conflicting objectives, including a clear separation between 
regulatory and service delivery functions; (ii) trade-offs between objectives 
should be made explicit and in a transparent manner; (iii) clear and strong 
accountability mechanisms should be encouraged (Pallot, 2001b).  The Local 
Government Amendment Act 1989 (a successive amendment to the Local 
Government Act 1974) set out changes to the fundamental system of local 
government in the history of local government that were significant (McKinlay, 
1998). 
Overnight the number of local authorities was reduced from 991 to 87 local 
authorities, comprising principally 13 regional councils and 74 territorial 
authorities (cities and districts councils) (Bush, 1995; Wallis & Dollery, 2000).  
Regional councils and territorial authorities were to be regarded as separate bodies 
but with complementary functions, rather than as two levels of sub-national 
government (Pallot, 2001b).  In general, the core functions of regional councils 
were to be in the area of environmental management, regulated by environmental 
law.  By contrast, the functions of territorial authorities included a wide range of 
                                                 
14
 Dr Michael Bassett was the Minister of Local Government (Wallis & Dollery, 2000). 
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social, economic, and infrastructure development roles for their communities 
(Bush, 1995; Wallis & Dollery, 2000).  The core services provided by territorial 
authorities related to water supply, wastewater systems, stormwater, and land 
drainage.  Local authorities were encouraged to corporatise their commercial 
activities (such as refuse collection and disposal, commercial forestry) with the 
establishment of Local Authority Trading Enterprises (LATES), similar to the 
establishment of state-owned enterprises of central government (Pallot, 2001b).
15
 
Elected councillors were separated from day-to-day management (such as 
community service delivery) in order to focus on policy setting, and to review the 
chief executive‟s performance in implementing policy (McKinlay, 1998; Pallot, 
2001b).  Elected councillors appointed the chief executive (formerly known as the 
senior administrator with permanent tenure) to manage day-to-day operations for 
fixed terms of up to five years, renewable for another three years, depending on 
the performance agreement negotiated with councilors (Wallis & Dollery, 2000).  
The chief executive could in turn appoint employees of the council and negotiate 
their employment contracts (McKinlay, 1998; Pallot, 2001b; Wallis & Dollery, 
2000). 
In terms of financial management, each local authority was required to be 
financially autonomous.  Apart from grants for road construction and 
maintenance, local authorities were to receive very little funding from central 
government.  Their revenue was to come primarily from property taxes (rates) and 
user-charges (Pallot, 2001b).  Consequently, local authorities were expected to be 
                                                 
15
 Local Authority Trading Enterprises are now known as council-controlled organisations 
introduced under sections 6 and 7 of the Local Government Act 2002. 
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more accountable to their citizens (the electorate or ratepayers), who were viewed 
as consumers, while also remaining accountable to Parliament (Neale & 
Anderson, 2000; Pallot, 2001b). 
Consistent with the new system of financial management in central government, 
the 1989 Amendment Act also moved financial systems to accrual accounting and 
reporting by the requirement to adopt generally accepted accounting practice 
(GAAP) recognised by the New Zealand accounting profession (Local 
Government Act 1974, s. 223E; McKinlay, 1998).  The Amendment Act 
introduced requirements for local authorities to publish ex ante and ex post 
document – annual plans and annual reports.  Annual plans set out their intended 
significant policies and objectives to be achieved, significant activities to be 
undertaken, performance targets for each service or output, budgeted costs, and 
resources (Local Government Act 1974, s. 223D), providing the bases for judging 
performance.  The annual plan focuses on the coming year (commencing 1 July) 
in particular terms, and for the next two in general terms; it must be audited and 
can only be adopted through the special consultative procedure
16
 (Local 
Government Act 1974, s. 716A; McKinlay, 1998; Pallot, 2001b). 
The annual report is an assessment of the local authority‟s performance against 
the matters provided in the annual plan (McKinlay, 1998).  The annual report is 
required to explain the performance of the local authority against the planned 
policies, objectives, activities, performance targets, budgeted costs, and source of 
funds as set out in the annual plan (Local Government Act 1974, s. 223 E).  
                                                 
16
 Special consultative procedure is introduced in the Local Government Act 1989.  It ensures the 
availability of draft plan and the opportunity for the public to make submissions (Pallot, 2001b). 
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Specifically, the annual report must include both financial as well as non-financial 
service performance information which must be audited by the Controller and 
Auditor- General (Local Government Act 1974, s. 223E).  The (non-financial) 
service performance information within annual reports is the statement of service 
performance (SSPs) as also introduced in the central government reform.  The 
Amendment Act requires that statement to provide a comparison between the 
actual performance of the local authority and the projected performance as set out 
in the plan (Local Government Act 1974, s. 223E). 
The next wave of the reforms included the Local Government Amendment Act 
1996, which built on the 1989 reforms.  In essence it included new financial 
management and borrowing provisions for local government (Pallot, 2001b).  
Every three years, commencing from 1998, local authorities had to adopt (through 
the special consultative procedure) a long-term financial strategy (LTFS) for a 
period of the next ten years or more.  The long-term strategy covered operating 
and capital expenditures, revenue, cash-flow projections, asset management, and 
borrowing requirements (Pallot, 2001b; Wilson, Salter, & Grierson, 2003). 
Although the Local Government Act 1974 and subsequent amendments had 
improved the management and accountability of local government, the Act was 
highly prescriptive in detailing what local authorities could do (Wilson, et al., 
2003).  It was criticised as being too detailed, confusing, and archaic (Wilson, et 
al., 2003).  The Act had inherent limitations on a local government‟s effectiveness 
to meet community needs and to promote sustainable local development (The 
Department of Internal Affairs, 2001).  In December 2002, the Local Government 
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Act 2002 repealed much of the Local Government Act 1974 and subsequent 
amendments, and remains effective to date (Wilson, et al., 2003). 
The Local Government Act 2002 removed much of the prescriptive detail and 
conferred a generalised power on all local authorities, giving them full control to 
perform their roles to promote the purpose of local government and to perform 
their duties, as conferred by the Local Government Act 2002 and other 
enactments17 (Local Government Act 2002, ss. 11, 12).  Regardless of many 
changes, the requirement for SSP reporting remained the same. 
2.3 Structure of local authorities 
At present, there are 85 local authorities, comprising 12 regional councils and 73 
territorial authorities in New Zealand (including five unitary authorities
18
) (The 
Department of Internal Affairs, 2007a).  Of the territorial authorities, 16 are city 
councils (CCs), and 57 are district councils (DCs).
19
 
The boundaries of regional councils are mainly based on river catchments and 
statistical meshblock
20
 areas determined by Statistics New Zealand, while those of 
territorial authorities are based on the boundaries of regional councils and 
statistical meshblock areas (Local Government Act 2002, Schedule 3, s. 4).  Most 
                                                 
17  For example, Building Act 2004, Civil Defence Act 1983, Land Transport Act 1998, Local 
Electoral Act 2001, Local Government (Rating) Act 2002, Health Act 1956, and Resource 
Management Act 1991. 
18
 A unitary authority is a territorial authority that has the additional responsibilities, duties, and 
powers of a regional council (Local Government Act 2002, s. 5).  The five are Gisborne DC, 
Nelson CC, Tasman DC, Marlborough DC and Chatham Islands Council.   
19
 A territorial authority with a population in excess of 50,000, which is predominantly urban and a 
major centre of activity within the region, is designated a city council (Local Government Act 
2002, Schedule 3, s. 7).   
20
  Meshblocks are the geographic frame which identifies small units of variable geographical area.  
Each unit is made up of approximately 100 households (Thornley, 2007). 
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territorial authorities are located within the boundaries of one regional council; 
however, five local councils
21
 fall within the boundaries of more than one regional 
council.  Given such boundaries, regional councils or territorial authorities vary 
greatly from one another in terms of land area, population, and population median 
income.  (See Appendix A for the area, population, median income of local 
authorities in New Zealand.) 
In relation to staffing, each local authority comprises elected members and 
appointed employees.  While territorial authority mayors and all councillors are 
elected by the public, regional council chairpersons are elected for a three-year 
term by the elected regional councillors (Local Government Act 2002, s. 
41(1)(b)).  Generally, mayors and chairpersons are the leaders and public voices 
of their local authorities.  Councillors are community leaders and representatives; 
their primary responsibilities are to set policy, make decisions, and review the 
local authority‟s performance (The Department of Internal Affairs, 2007b).  A 
local authority‟s elected members appoint the council‟s chief executive officer, for 
up to a five-year term (Local Government Act 2002, schedule 7, clause 43(1)), to 
manage the authority‟s operations.  The chief executive officer, in turn, employs 
council staff to carry out day-to-day functions of the local authority (Local 
Government Act 2002, ss. 41, 42).  (See Appendix A for number of staff of local 
authorities.)  Local authorities may also establish committees to carry out primary 
functions, such as environmental planning, regulatory services, and resource 
consents (Local Government Act 2002, schedule 7, clause 30).  In addition, local 
                                                 
21
 They are Waitaki District Council, Stratford District Council, Rangitikei District Council, Taupo 
District Council, Rotorua District Council, and Franklin District Council. 
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authorities may contract specialist entities on their behalf, or form other entities
22
 
to provide services to their communities (for example, wastewater services, 
roading, and rubbish disposal) (Local Government Act 2002, s. 6; The 
Department of Internal Affairs, 2007a). 
2.3.1 Functions of local authorities 
The Local Government Act 2002 and other enactments specify the functions of 
regional councils and territorial authorities.  The primary functions of regional 
councils, with their relevant enactments, include:  
 managing natural and physical resources – quality of water, soil, air, 
coastal planning (under the Resource Management Act 1991); 
 controlling plant and animal pests (under Biosecurity Act 1993); 
 preventing damage from soil erosion and floods (under Soil Conservation 
and Rivers Control Act 1945); 
 providing civil defence, for example, natural disasters, and marine oil 
spills (under Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002); and 
 planning and contracting land transport, such as buses and trains (under 
Land Transport Act 1998); and 
 setting by-laws on, for example, matters related to forests, parks, reserves, 
floods, and water supply (if managed and controlled by regional councils) 
(under Local Government Act 2002). 
                                                 
22
 For example, council-controlled organisations in which one or more local authorities own at 
least 50 percent of the voting rights or have the right to appoint at least 50 percent of the directors 
(Local Government Act 2002, s. 6).   
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The primary functions of territorial authorities include: 
 promoting the community‟s economic development, for example, by 
providing car parks, tourism campaigns and visitor information centres 
(under Local Government Act 2002);  
 promoting public health and safety including building control, and civil 
defence, (under the Health Act 1956, Building Act 2004, Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Act 2002);  
 providing the community‟s services, for example, footpaths, roads, street 
lighting, parks, libraries, art galleries, swimming pools, waste 
management, water supply, stormwater, and wastewater services (under 
Local Government Act 2002, Land Transport Act 1998); 
 administering resource management in particular to control local land-use 
and development (under the Resource Management Act 1991); and 
 setting by-laws related to, for example, public health and safety, offensive 
behaviour, on-site wastewater disposal systems, waste management, and 
trade wastes (under Local Government Act 2002). 
In general, the functions of regional councils and territorial authorities are distinct.  
Regional councils are primarily involved with environmental management and 
public transport, while those of territorial authorities focus on various community 
services relating to community well-being, development, environmental health 
and safety, infrastructure, recreation and culture, and land-use management.  
There is also a certain degree of co-operation between regional councils and 
territorial authorities.  The Local Government Act 2002 (s. 15) provides for 
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regional and territorial authorities within each region to make an agreement to 
communicate and co-ordinate their activities after each triennial general election.  
For example, the regional council and its territorial authorities may establish a 
joint committee, with representatives from both the regional council and all the 
relevant territorial authorities, to provide for civil defence in the case of natural 
disaster.  Some functions of territorial authorities require supervision and 
monitoring by the relevant regional council.  For example, a territorial authority‟s 
wastewater services must be operated in compliance with the resource consent 
conditions and monitored by the regional council under the Resource 
Management Act 1991. 
Both regional councils and territorial authorities are responsible for establishing a 
process for identifying community outcomes every six years.  This process 
enables the community to discuss its desired outcomes, expressed in terms of 
present and future social, economic, environmental, and cultural well-being 
criteria, and the priorities for those outcomes (if this is desired); measurements to 
be adopted to assess progress towards achievement of outcomes are also 
discussed.  Local authorities must also identify and collaborate with other 
organisations or groups
23
 which may help to achieve the community outcomes 
(Local Government Act 2002, s. 91).  Once community outcomes have been 
identified, the local authority must decide on its contribution (through activities) 
towards the achievement of those outcomes.  Every three years, the local authority 
is required to evaluate and report on progress towards achievement of the 
identified community outcomes (Local Government Act 2002, s. 92). 
                                                 
23
 These groups may include iwi, the police, and social welfare agencies. 
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The Local Government Act 2002 and other legislation provide for local 
authorities to prepare policies and plans relating to the performance of their 
functions, and these policies and plans provide the bases for decision-making.  For 
example, the Local Government Act 2002 requires local authorities to develop 
policies and plans for their community services (groups of activities), funding and 
financial management, asset management,
24
 water and sanitary services 
assessment,
25
 and waste management.  In addition, each local authority has to 
prepare a policy on matters that are significant to its jurisdiction.
26
  Before 
deciding on these matters, local authorities are required to consult with their 
communities (Local Government Act 2002, ss. 76-81).  For certain decisions 
(such as the adoption of by-laws, policies and plans), the Act requires the use of 
the special consultative procedure.
27
 
2.3.2 Relationships with other agencies 
Local authorities are also overseen by and associated with a number of central 
government agencies and other bodies.  These include: 
                                                 
24
 An asset management plan is a typically prepared to meet the statutory requirements in Schedule 
10 [Part 1, Clause 2(1)(d)].  Basically, such plans provide details of: how local authorities will 
maintain current and future services by the assets currently held; additional assets which may be 
required; and the cost of, and funding for, maintaining the current assets or investing in new ones. 
25
 Water supply, wastewater, stormwater drainage, and sanitary works are major expenditures and 
significant community services provided by local authorities.  The assessment provides details of: 
the current demand for, and capacity of, the water supply, sewerage, and wastewater treatment; 
assessment of the quality of drinking water and discharged water; and assessment of future 
demands and the authority‟s capacity to supply the services (Local Government Act 2002, s. 126).  
26
 Generally, significant matters have an impact on: the current and future social, environmental, 
economic, and cultural well-being of a district or region; any persons who are likely to be affected 
by a matter; and the capacity of the local authority to perform its functions (Local Government Act 
2002, s. 5). 
27
 A special consultative procedure involves local authorities making publicly available a 
statement of proposal (including description of the consultative process to be undertaken), and 
ensuring that any person making a submission is given an opportunity to be heard (Local 
Government Act 2002, s. 83).   
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The Minister of Local Government – who is primarily responsible for legislation 
relating to local government and also for the performance of local government.  
However, the Minister cannot intervene in decisions of local authorities.  In the 
case where a local authority fails to perform in accordance with the Local 
Government Act 2002 or other relevant enactment, the Minister may appoint a 
review authority, or a commissioner to perform the local authority‟s duties, or a 
person to act on behalf of the local authority (Local Government Act 2002, ss. 
254-256). 
The Department of Internal Affairs – which provides the Minister of Local 
Government with advice concerning local government, and information to the 
public about local government (The Department of Internal Affairs, 2011). 
The Local Government Commission – which has primary responsibility for 
defining local authorities‟ boundaries (Local Government Act 2002, s. 26).  The 
Commission must also review and report on the operation of Local Government 
Act 2002 and the Local Government Electoral Act 2001 (Local Government Act 
2002, s. 32). 
The Controller and Auditor-General – who is an independent Officer of 
Parliament.  He/she primarily provides Parliament with independent assurance 
about the performance of, and information about, public-sector organisations 
(Office of the Auditor-General, 2007b).  In particular, the Auditor-General 
provides audit reports on local authorities‟ compliance with the requirements of 
the Local Government Act 2002 (Local Government Act 2002, ss. 94, 99). 
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The Ombudsmen
28
 – who are independent staff of Parliament.  Their primary 
function is to investigate complaints from the public about governmental bodies 
(including local government) (Office of the Ombudsmen, 2011). 
The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment – is an independent Officer 
of Parliament.  The Commissioner‟s primary function is to investigate, and make 
recommendations to local authorities about, environmental management. 
The Department of Conservation is primarily responsible for conserving New 
Zealand‟s land and all other natural and historic resources (Department of 
Conservation, 2004).  Under the Resource Management Act 1991, the Department 
of Conservation jointly administers the coastal marine area with regional councils. 
The Ministry for the Environment has its primary functions, as set out in the 
Environment Act 1986 (s. 31), to advise the government (including local 
government) on all aspects of environmental administration (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2007a). The Resource Management Amendment Act 2005 (No 5, 
ss. 24A, 25A, 27) further empowers the Ministry to review the performance of, 
and make recommendations to, local authorities; and to direct a local authority to 
prepare or change its regional or district/city plan in order to address resource 
management issues.  In addition to these formal responsibilities the Ministry for 
the Environment provides strategic direction,
29
 best practice guides and 
                                                 
28
 Presently, there are two Ombudsmen: Beverley Wakem and David McGee (Office of the 
Ombudsmen, 2011). 
29
 An example of a direction is the New Zealand Waste Strategy: Towards Zero Waste and a 
Sustainable New Zealand (Ministry for the Environment, 2007b). 
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guidelines,
30
 and technical reports for specific aspects of environmental 
management.
31
 
There are also other local government advocate organisations (such as Local 
Government New Zealand and the Society of Local Government Managers) 
which engage with local authorities to assist in carrying out their functions. 
2.4 Financial management of local authorities 
Local authorities are also responsible for managing their funding.  Each local 
authority is able to decide its own funding and financial policies, providing that 
policies promote the current and future interests of the community.  They include 
policies, for revenue and financing,
32
 borrowing;
33
 investment;
34
 development and 
financial contributions under the Resource Management Act 1991;
35
 partnerships 
with private-sector entities, and rate reductions and exemptions (Local 
Government Act, ss. 102-110).  Adoption of the council‟s funding and financial 
policies is subject to the special consultative procedure. 
                                                 
30
 An example of a guideline is the Wastewater Monitoring Guidelines (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2007b).  
31
 An example of a technical report is the assessment of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Waste 
Disposal as a Result of Implementation of the Proposed New Zealand Waste Strategy (Ministry for 
the Environment, 2007b). 
32
 Revenue and financing policies set out why and how operating and capital expenditures are to 
be funded from different sources, such as from rates, fees and charges, interest and dividends from 
investments, grants and subsidies, borrowing, proceeds from sales of asset, development 
contributions, and financial contributions under the Resource Management Act 1991 (Local 
Government Act 2002, s. 103). 
33
 Local authorities are permitted to borrow from any sources but only in New Zealand currency 
(Local Government Act 2002, s. 113).  The borrowing policies include matters such as interest rate 
exposure policy, liquidity policy, and policies on security (Local Government Act 2002, s. 104). 
34
 Investment policy includes matters such as objectives in managing investments, and how risks 
are managed (Local Government Act 2002, s. 105). 
35
 The development/financial contributions policy includes the capital expenditure (for example, 
network infrastructure) to be funded by the contributions, the amount of capital expenditure to be 
funded by the contributions and other sources, the reasons for choosing the funding from 
contributions, activities to be funded by contributions, and the total amount of funding required 
from contributions (Local Government Act 2002, s. 106).   
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Further, each local authority is required to prepare a funding impact statement, 
which details the revenue and financing mechanisms to be used (including the 
rating system),
36
 the amount to be raised by each mechanism, and the activities to 
be funded from that revenue (Local Government Act 2002, Schedule 10, Part 1, 
Clause 10).  The statement is an integral part of the long-term council community 
plan (see section 2.6.1). 
In 2007/2008 and 2008/2009, local authorities in New Zealand received operating 
revenue amounting to $6.2 and $6.3 billion; their operating expenditure amounted 
to $5.6 and $6.7 billion, respectively (The Department of Internal Affairs, 2009b, 
2010).  Table 2.1 provides a summary of local authorities‟ sources of operating 
revenue and their operating expenditure, by percentage, for the years 2007/2008 
and 2008/2009. 
From Table 2.1, local authorities derive their operating revenue primarily from 
locally imposed rates (property taxes).  Other operating revenue is obtained from 
sales of goods and services, central government grants and subsidies, investments, 
and regulatory sanctions (fees and fines).  Roading and transport; culture, 
recreation and sport; governance; wastewater, and regulation planning account for 
the major share of operating expenditure. 
 
                                                 
36
 The rating system consists primarily of several types of rates such as general rates and targeted 
rates.  General rates are paid by ratepayers and land owners, based on the value of individual 
properties and the particular formula the authority applies.  Targeted rates are charged to fund a 
particular activity or function (for example, water supply, or wastewater treatment).  The local 
authority may base its rates calculation on factors such as floor space or number of water 
connections (The Department of Internal Affairs, 2007b).  
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Table 2.1: Sources of operating revenue and items of operating expenditure 
of local authorities by percentage for the years 2007/2008 and 2008/2009 
Operating revenue 
sources  
2007/2008 
(%) 
2008/2009 
(%) 
Operating 
expenditure items  
2007/2008 
(%) 
2008/2009 
(%) 
Rates 58.4 61.1 Roading and 
transport 
27.5 26 
Sales of goods and 
services, and all 
other revenue 
17.1 16.43 Culture, recreation 
and sport 
16.9 15 
Government grants 
and subsidies 
12.9 10.96 Governance and 
council support 
services 
16.5 18 
Regulatory 6.1 7.73 Wastewater 9.4 9 
Investment 5.5 4.78 Regulation planning 9.1 7 
   Water supply 6.7 6 
   Environmental 
protection 
5.1 4 
   Solid waste 4.8 4 
   Property forestry, 
agriculture and 
other 
3.4 10 
   Emergency 
management 
.6 1 
(The Department of Internal Affairs, 2009b, 2010) 
As of June 2008 and 2009, the local authorities in New Zealand owned total assets 
of $94.9, $98.75 billion and had liabilities of $6.23, $7.5 billion, respectively. 
(See Appendix A for local authorities‟ operating revenue, operating expenditure, 
total assets, and liabilities.) 
2.5 Wastewater services 
Among wide-ranging community services provided by local authorities, 
wastewater services are one of the most crucial services provided by New Zealand 
local authorities.  Territorial authorities have traditionally been statutorily 
responsible for their provision (Bush, 1995; Local Government Act 2002, s. 130).  
Wastewater services represent one of the major items of expenditure (9 percent of 
total expenditure) by local authorities (The Department of Internal Affairs, 2010).  
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Wastewater contributes the largest volume of waste in New Zealand (with 
approximately 1.5 billion litres of daily discharge), and can potentially have a 
wide and immediate impact on human health and the physical environment as 
well as long-term consequences if not properly managed (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2010b).  Any substandard treated water discharged, can cause 
blockages or overflowing, and can be harmful for swimming, gathering seafood, 
marine farming and affect the quality of drinking water (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2010a).  The primary purpose of wastewater services provided by 
local authorities is to minimise health risks from wastewater, and the secondary 
purpose is to protect the environment (Office of the Auditor-General, 2010).  The 
key pieces of legislation governing the local authorities‟ provision of wastewater 
services are the Resource Management Act 1991 and the Health Act 1956. 
Wastewater (commonly known as sewage) services encompass sewer systems 
(sewerage), wastewater treatment, and wastewater disposal.  Sewer systems 
include wastewater collection and delivery to a wastewater treatment plant 
through pipelines (reticulation).  Wastewater treatment is a process that removes 
contaminants and produces a liquid effluent and sludge (solid waste) that are 
disposed of to an outfall (for example, a marine area, river, and wetland) or a 
landfill, respectively.
37
 
                                                 
37
 Wastewater or sewage is the liquid waste collected through pipes from the baths, showers, 
kitchens and toilets of homes, restaurants, office buildings, and factories.  As wastewater pollutes 
the environment, it must be treated before being discharged into lakes, oceans, rivers or streams.  
The conventional wastewater treatment system in most cities involves three stages: primary 
treatment, secondary treatment, and tertiary treatment.  In brief, primary treatment takes out the 
heaviest solid material from the wastewater.  Secondary treatment removes the dissolved and 
emulsified biological content of the wastewater which can be dried for use as fertilizer.  The 
tertiary treatment aims to produce more pure effluent that is safe to the receiving environment.  
Tertiary treatment methods include filtration over activated carbon to remove residual toxin, 
 34 
 
Under the Resource Management Act 1991, unless expressly permitted or 
prohibited by the relevant regional, district or city plan
38
, any activity that 
involves the use, development and/or protection of natural and physical resources, 
and has adverse environmental effects,
39
 requires resource consent to be granted 
by the relevant local authority (usually a regional council).  Wastewater activities 
pollute primarily air (odour), land (sludge) and water (wastewater discharged).  
Therefore, a territorial authority must be granted resource consent from its 
regional council to operate a wastewater system.  Due to the different 
environmental spheres affected by a wastewater system, different types of 
resource consents are required.  For example, the New Plymouth Wastewater 
Treatment Plant
40
 holds five resource consents granted by the Taranaki Regional 
Council, as follows (Taranaki Regional Council, 2004): 
1. a coastal permit for the discharge of treated water into the Tasman Sea 
(granted by the Department of Conservation in conjunction with Taranaki 
Regional Council);  
2. a coastal permit for its outfall structure in the coastal marine area;  
3. a discharge permit for the discharge of liquid waste from the sludge lagoon 
into groundwater in the vicinity of the Waiwhakaiho River; 
                                                                                                                                     
lagooning, biological nutrient removal, nitrogen removal, phosphorus removal, and radiation 
treatment (WorldBook, 2003). 
38
 A „plan‟ may be a regional plan, regional coastal plan or a district or city plan.  Generally, the 
plans address resource management issues, objectives to be achieved, policies to achieve the 
objectives, methods for implementing those policies, and rules (Resource Management Act 1991, 
ss. 73, 75). 
39
 Effects can be positive or negative, temporary or permanent, past, present or future, cumulative, 
of high probability, of low probability but high impact. (Resource Management Act 1991, s. 3) 
Adverse environmental effects may include increases in traffic, soil erosion, changes to the 
character of a street or landscape, decreases in water quality or quantity, and odour.   
40
 The plant is situated in the Waiwhakaiho catchment (Taranaki Regional Council, 2004). 
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4. a discharge permit for sludge disposal on to land; and  
5. a discharge permit for the discharge of deodorised air from the treatment 
plant. 
Invariably conditions are attached to resource consents; these may be in the form 
of terms, standards, restrictions, prohibitions and requirements with which 
consent-holders must comply (Resource Management Act 1991, s. 2).  To ensure 
that resource consent conditions are met, consent-granting authorities
41
 are 
required to monitor and keep records of consent-holders‟ compliance with those 
conditions (Resource Management Act 1991, s. 35).  Compliance monitoring 
involves evaluating the performance of consent-holders and the environmental 
effects of consented activities.  In addition to regular self-inspection by a 
territorial authority consent-holder of a wastewater operation, the resource-
granting regional council undertakes site inspections, sampling, and analysis of 
physical and chemical parameters of discharged treated wastewater, groundwater 
and surface water, and reviews both its laboratory results and the self-inspection 
data recorded by a territorial authority (Taranaki Regional Council, 2004). 
When consent-holders comply with their resource consent conditions, they are 
assessed as displaying good compliance by the relevant regional council and their 
resource consents are likely to be renewed if, and when, they are sought.  
However, where instances of non-compliance are encountered, the relevant 
consent-granting authority can apply enforcement mechanisms.  These may range 
from informal means (for example, educational supervision or a verbal warning) 
                                                 
41
 For coastal permits granted by the Department of Conservation, the relevant regional councils 
monitor compliance of the consent holders on behalf of the Minister. 
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to statutory enforcement (for example, abatement notice or prosecution).  The 
enforcement mechanisms vary according to the severity of the non-compliance 
and the particular authority‟s judgement of the significance of the environmental 
impact resulting from the non-compliance. 
While the Resource Management Act 1991 sets out the details applicable for 
wastewater management, the Health Act 1956 broadly requires territorial 
authorities to provide sanitary works, which include all reticulation, treatment, 
and disposal systems of the wastewater (Health Act 1956, s. 25).  Accordingly, 
territorial authorities are expected to ensure that the wastewater services are 
reliable (no overflows or blockages) and that authorities are responsive to 
incidents. 
Territorial authorities may subcontract their wastewater services to other entities 
(for example, council-controlled organisation).  However, they still need to be in 
control over the management of the service and undertake performance 
monitoring of that entity (Local Government Act 2002, ss. 136, 65).  Currently, 
two territorial authorities (Auckland CC and Manukau CC) use their council-
controlled organisations (Metrowater Ltd and Manukau Water Ltd, respectively) 
and two other authorities (Papakura DC and Wellington CC) contract a company 
(United Water International Pty Ltd) to run their wastewater services. 
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2.6 Accountability mechanisms for local authorities 
Planning and reporting of performance are important mechanisms of 
accountability (Boyne, Gould-Williams, Law, & Richard, 2002).  The Local 
Government Act 2002 requires local authorities to prepare planning documents in 
the form of a long-term council community plan (LTCCP) and an annual plan.  
These provide the long-term and short-term focus in financial and non-financial 
terms respectively, as well as co-ordinating the authorities‟ various policies and 
plans.  In addition, the results of local authorities‟ implementation of plans during 
a year, in terms of financial and non-financial performance, must also be reported 
on in an annual report.  The purpose and the content of these reports are specified 
in the Local Government Act 2002, sections 93, 95, 98 and Schedule 10, as 
summarised in Table 2.2.  Local authorities‟ LTCCP, annual plans and annual 
reports must be prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
practice (GAAP)
42
 (Local Government Act 2002, S. 111). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42
 The Accounting Standards Review Board announced its decision that New Zealand entities 
producing general purpose financial statements would have to adopt New Zealand equivalents to 
International Financial Reporting Standards (NZ IFRS) for the period beginning on or after 1 
January 2007 (NZICA, 2004, 2005).  However, entities were given the option to adopt NZ IFRS 
from the period beginning on or after 1 January 2005(Office of the Auditor-General, 2007a).  
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Table 2.2: Purpose and content of long-term council community plans, 
annual plans, and annual reports 
Reports Purposes Contents 
(i)LTCCP i.   To describe the local authority‟s 
activities; 
ii.  to describe the community 
outcomes of the local authority‟s 
district or region; 
iii. to provide a basis for integrated 
decision-making and co-
ordination of the local 
authority‟s resources; 
iv. to provide a long-term focus 
when making decision;  
v.  to provide a basis on which the 
community can hold the local 
authority accountable for its 
actions; and 
vi.  to provide an opportunity for 
public participation in decision-
making. 
 
i.     The community outcomes of the local authority‟s 
district or region; 
ii.    groups of activities planned to be undertaken by 
the local authority; 
iii.   a summary of water supply, wastewater and 
sanitary service assessments and waste 
management plans;  
iv.   information about council-controlled 
organisations; 
v.     development of Maori capacity in the decision-
making process; 
vi.   a summary of local authorities‟ policy on 
determining significance under the Local 
Government Act 2002 
vii.   funding and financial policies; 
viii. forecast financial statements43 for at least the 
next 10 years; 
ix.   statement concerning balancing of budget 
x.    funding impact statement for at least the next 10 
years; 
xi.   significant forecasting assumptions. 
(ii)Annual 
plans 
i.   To detail the annual budget and 
funding impact statement for the 
year; 
ii.  to identify any variation from 
the funding and financial 
information as stated in the 
LTCCP for that year; 
iii. to support the LTCCP; 
iv. to contribute to the local 
authority‟s accountability; and 
v.  to extend the opportunity for 
public participation in decision-
making particularly on costs and 
funding.  
i.     forecast financial statements for the next 
financial year;  
ii.    funding impact statement for the next financial 
year; 
 
(iii)Annual 
reports 
i.  To compare activities undertaken 
and results achieved with 
forecasts in the long-term 
council community plan and 
annual plan;  
ii. to promote accountability to the 
community for the local 
authority‟s decisions made 
during the previous year. 
 
i.    Information about groups of activities taken by 
the local authority;44 
ii.  annual financial statements; 
iii.  remuneration of the mayor, council    
      members, and the council‟s chief   
      executive;  
iv.  severance payments to employees;  
v.   council-controlled organisations; 
vi.  statement of compliance with the Local  
      Government Act 2002 
 
                                                 
43
 Financial statements usually include a statement of financial position, a statement of financial 
performance, a statement of cash flows and a statement of movements in equity, and those notes 
and other statements and explanatory material (NZICA, 2005, para 7). 
44
 Groups of activities are one or more related activities.  Activities, in the context of Local 
Government Act 2002, are goods or services provided by a local authority.  They include the 
provision of facilities and amenities, the making of grants, and the performance of functions 
(Local Government Act 2002, s. 5). 
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2.6.1 Long-term council community plans  
A LTCCP replaces a long-term financial strategy (introduced in the Local 
Government Amendment 1996).  All local authorities had to prepare and adopt a 
LTCCP from the period beginning 1 July 2006 (Local Government Act 2002, 
s.280).  A new LTCCP must be prepared every three years – covering at least the 
following 10 years (Local Government Act 2002, s.93).  These plans constitute 
the fundamental strategic planning tools of councils, and are subject to the special 
consultative procedure, as are any amendments to the LTCCP (Local Government 
Act 2002, s. 95).
45 
The Local Government Act 2002 requires LTCCPs to disclose the identified 
community outcomes, the relationship between the community outcomes and 
other plans (such as district plans), other agencies involved in achievement of the 
outcomes, and the measurements to be used to assess progress towards 
achievement of the outcomes.   
Local authorities‟ LTCCPs must also include the councils‟ funding and financing 
policies, a funding impact statement, and forecast financial statements for each 
year covered by the LTCCP. 
The core section of a LTCCP relates to groups of activities to be undertaken by 
the local authority.  It includes the following information: 
 
                                                 
45
 Local authorities may amend their LTCCPs at any time.  Significant changes in level of service 
or the other decisions described in section 97 are subject to the special consultative procedure 
(Local Government Act 2002, s. 88). 
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 the activities to be carried out; 
 reasons why these activities are to be undertaken; 
 the contribution of activities to the achievement of identified community 
outcomes; 
 any significant negative effects of the activities on the community‟s well-
being; 
 asset management plans for the service provision; 
 performance measures, and performance targets46 for each activity; and 
 estimated revenues and expenditures required for the performance of the 
activities.  
Provided that wastewater services represent a significant activity of a local 
authority, it is most likely that wastewater services would be included in the 
LTCCP.  Consequently, the appropriateness of their performance measures and 
targets would be provided. 
 2.6.2 Annual plans 
Annual plans are prepared in each year that a LTCCP is not prepared (Local 
Government Act 2002, s. 95(4)).  They consist primarily of forecast financial 
statements and a funding impact statement for the following year.  As well, any 
variation between the annual plan and the LTCCP must be explained in the 
relevant annual plan (Local Government Act 2002, s. 85).  Although not 
statutorily required, most local authorities detail their planned activities, service 
                                                 
46
 Performance targets are levels of service performance that should be delivered or achieved 
within the performance period (usually one year).  Performance targets can be expressed in terms 
of numbers, percentages, ratios, or point estimates (NZICA, 2002). 
 41 
 
levels, performance measures, performance targets, and estimated expenses for 
each activity for the year the plan covers.
47
 
Annual plans, like LTCCPs, are subject to the special consultative procedure 
(Local Government Act 2002, s. 95).  However, they are not required to be 
audited. 
2.6.3 Annual reports 
In contrast to the forward-looking annual plans and LTCCPs, annual reports focus 
on the results of activities undertaken during the previous year.  The Local 
Government Act 2002 (s. 98) requires that local authorities‟ annual reports be 
publicly available by 31 October, following the end of each financial year (30 
June).  The annual report of local authorities for the year ended 30 June 2007 was 
therefore the first report prepared in accordance with New Zealand Equivalents to 
International Financial Reporting Standards (NZ IFRS). 
From Table 2.2 it may be seen that annual reports are required to include financial 
statements for the past year (for example, a statement of financial performance, 
statement of financial position, and statement of cash flows), supplementary 
information (that is, remuneration of the mayor, council members, and chief 
executive; severance payment to employees, council-controlled organisations and 
a statement of compliance with the Local Government Act 2002), and non-
financial information (that is, groups of activities).  „Groups of activities‟ 
(outputs) refers to (i) the activities carried out, (ii) the community outcomes to 
                                                 
47
 Under the Local Government Act 1974, local authorities‟ annual plans were required to provide 
these details about their planned service performance.  The relevant provisions have been omitted 
from the Local Government Act 2002. 
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which the activities contribute, (iii) any identified effects of the activity on the 
community‟s well-being, and (iv) comparison between the actual level of service 
provision of the group of activities and the intended level of service provision, as 
specified in the LTCCP, with any reasons for significant variance (Local 
Government Act, Schedule 10, Part 3, s.15).  Note that information about the 
latter is what is referred to in a Statement of Service Performance under the 1989 
Amendment Act and in this study. 
2.7 Authoritative requirements for SSP reporting 
Authoritative requirements for SSP reporting by New Zealand local authorities are 
derived from the statutory requirements under the Local Government Act 2002, 
and relevant generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP). 
2.7.1 Statutory requirements for SSP reporting 
The Local Government Act 2002 addresses the requirement for SSP reporting in 
Schedule 10, Part 3 (15(e)), which requires audited information on: 
(i) setting out a comparison between the actual levels of service 
provision of that group of activities and the intended levels of 
service provision (as set out in the long-term council 
community plan in respect of that year) of that group of 
activities; and 
(ii) giving the reasons for any significant variance between the 
actual service provision and the expected service provision; 
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Statements of service performance are not standalone reports, but are part of the 
reporting cycle in relation to non-financial service performance information.  
Performance measures and performance targets for each activity stated in the 
LTCCPs are reported against actual achievements in the SSPs in annual reports.  
In addition, explanation of significant variance, if any, must also be provided.  
Therefore, wastewater services performance measures and targets reported in 
LTCCPs are reported against actual achievements in SSPs in annual reports with 
explanation of significant variance, if any. 
As part of annual reports, SSPs need to be prepared in accordance with the 
relevant GAAP (Local Government Act 2002, s. 111).  Note that the Local 
Government Act 2002 does not require SSPs to be audited against GAAP, but 
rather, against Schedule 10, Part 3 (15(e)) of the Act. 
2.7.2 GAAP relevant to SSP reporting 
In 1982 the New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants (previously the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand, and the New Zealand Society 
of Accountants) made a commitment to the development of an accounting 
standard for non-financial performance measures in external reports, for which 
they coined the term “statement of service performance” (Neale & Pallot, 2001). 
In spite of this commitment, when the SSP reporting requirement in 1989 was 
introduced, no standards existed concerning its preparation (Neale & Pallot, 
2001).  In 1990, the OAG developed criteria on the audit of SSPs for internal use, 
which also provided guidance for SSP reporting (Neale & Anderson, 2000; Neale 
& Pallot, 2001).  The guidance discussed the significant dimensions of output 
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(quantity, quality, location, time and cost where applicable), and the reporting of 
actual against planned outputs, and evidence used to verify the data (Neale & 
Pallot, 2001).  Although the audit guidance for SSP reporting was followed, 
almost all local authorities received qualified opinions in the first year 
(1990/1991) of SSP reporting (Neale & Pallot, 2001). 
The first accounting guidance relating to SSPs was released in 1993. The New 
Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants published Statement of Concepts for 
General Purpose Financial Reporting (SOC) which had application to both 
financial statements and non-financial information (including SSPs) of private-
sector and public-sector entities, with the objective of decision usefulness  and 
accountability (NZICA, 1993).  In essence, SOC discusses the qualitative 
characteristics for general purpose financial reports, that is, relevance, reliability, 
comparability, and understandability (NZICA, 1993, para. 4.1).  In 1994, the 
NZICA issued Financial Reporting Standard 2 (FRS-2) Presentation of Financial 
Reports, of which section C deals specifically with the presentation of SSPs.  
Those reporting entities required by legislation to prepare a SSP must report on 
the entity‟s output – if applicable, in terms of quantity, quality, time, location, and 
cost of the output – and present both projected and actual service performance in 
output terms (NZICA, 1994, paras 11.1, 11.3, 11.6). 
During the 1990s, the problems of SSP reporting persisted (Neale & Anderson, 
2000; Neale & Pallot, 2001).  Performance measures which developed in response 
to the statutory reporting requirement and audit guidance were considered reliable 
 45 
 
but at the expense of appropriateness
48
 (Neale & Pallot, 2001).  For example, 
given the auditor‟s insistence on evidence of performance measures, the most 
easily quantified measures (“number of letters to the Minister”) were used.  In 
fact, performance measures were insufficient as they did not cover all significant 
activities (Neale & Pallot, 2001).  They were often not sufficiently relevant so as 
to provide clear links with the goals set (Neale & Pallot, 2001).  Further, 
comparisons between forecast and actual performance were inadequate (Neale & 
Pallot, 2001).  However, an auditor would only qualify the SSPs if those 
performance measures were both significantly and fundamentally misleading or 
not meaningful (Neale & Pallot, 2001). 
To address these reporting problems, Technical Practice Aid No. 9 (TPA-9): 
Service Performance Reporting, which was fundamentally based on SOC and 
FRS-2, was published in 2002.  TPA-9 contains detailed guidelines on the 
preparation of SSPs, including the use of performance measures to express 
different dimensions of outputs (NZICA, 2002).  It is considered highly relevant 
guidance on New Zealand SSP reporting (Office of the Auditor-General, 2008).  
Although not authoritative, compared to a financial reporting standard (Office of 
the Auditor-General, 2008), it was re-endorsed by the Financial Reporting 
Standards Board and included in the 2007 Member‟s Handbook and 2007 Annual 
Accounting Standards publication (NZICA, 2007a).  TPA-9 (2002) underwent a 
limited revision in 2007. 
                                                 
48
 Appropriateness of performance measures was defined as information being relevant, complete 
and understandable (Anderson, 1995). 
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In 2004, FRS-2 was superseded by the New Zealand Equivalent to International 
Accounting Standard 1 (NZ IAS 1): Presentation of Financial Statements, of 
which section 126 deals with SSP reporting (NZICA, 2004).
49
  As in FRS-2, a 
requirement was made for outputs to be reported in relation to, where applicable, 
the five dimensions (quantity, quality, time, location, and cost of output) 
presenting both projected and actual performance remains (NZICA, 2004).  
Similarly, SOC was superseded by the New Zealand Equivalent to the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) Framework for the Preparation 
and Presentation of Financial Statements (NZ Framework), which remains the 
same decision usefulness objective and the qualitative characteristics (relevance, 
reliability, comparability, and understandability) applicable for financial and non-
financial performance information of private-sector and public-sector entities 
(NZICA, 2005).  All New Zealand entities (including local authorities) must apply 
NZ IAS 1 and NZ Framework for annual accounting periods commencing on or 
after 1 January 2007 (NZICA, 2004).  To date, the current GAAP applicable for 
SSP reporting is NZ Framework, NZ IAS 1, and TPA-9 (NZICA, 2007b). 
The IASB is currently in the process of replacing its framework with a revised 
IASB Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting.  However, New Zealand 
has decided to adopt the new framework for profit-oriented entities only.  In the 
Appendix to the NZ Framework it is explained that New Zealand will retain the 
New Zealand Equivalent to the IASB Framework for the Preparation and 
Presentation of Financial Statements for public benefit entities until the IASB has 
finished its consideration of non-for-profit entities and the New Zealand Ministry 
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 This was the requirement for entities adopting NZ IFRS voluntarily from 2005 or who were 
required to adopt from 2007 (NZICA, 2004).  
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of Economic Development and the Accounting Review Board has reviewed this 
work (NZICA, 2010). 
2.7.2.1 NZ IAS 1 
According to NZ IAS 1 (para 126.4), the elements of service performance 
comprise inputs, outputs and outcomes,
50
 however the standard requires entities to 
report only their outputs in SSPs.
51
  It should be noted that the outputs defined by 
NZ IAS 1 are similar to activities, as referred to in the Local Government Act 
2002.  Each output disclosed can include, but is not limited to, the quantity, 
quality, timeliness, location and cost of each service‟s outputs (NZ IAS 1, para 
126.4). 
2.7.2.2 TPA-9  
TPA-9 (NZICA, 2002) defines further the different dimensions of outputs as 
follows:  
 Quantity of outputs relates to how much or how many units of the output 
are delivered (NZICA, 2002, para 5.13); for example, the length 
(kilometres) of pipelines for collecting wastewater, the amount of 
wastewater treated, the amount of treated water discharged to the receiving 
environment.   
                                                 
50
 „Outputs‟ in the current context refers to goods and services provided by local authorities in 
servicing their communities (NZICA, 2002, para 4.2).  Outputs are produced using inputs, which 
are the resources (such as funding, staffing and equipment) used to produce these outputs (NZICA, 
2002, para 4.7). 
51
 However, NZ IAS 1 (para 126.6) does not require them, but encourages the reporting of 
outcome. 
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 Quality of outputs can be related standards to be met, reliability issues, and 
stakeholder satisfaction issues (NZICA, 2002, para 5.22); for example, 
compliance with resource consent conditions, incidence of negative 
incidents, and complaints received or customers‟ satisfaction with 
services.  
 Time of outputs relates to a date when an output is to be delivered, a 
particular response time for an output to be delivered, and time during 
which the services will be available (NZICA, 2002, para 5.33); for 
example, completion date for the maintenance of wastewater mains, 
response time to emergency calls, no loss of service for longer than 12 
hours. 
 Location of outputs is a place where outputs are delivered.  However, it is 
not relevant for many outputs and often not reported (Office of the 
Auditor-General, 2005, para 3.51, and NZICA, 2002, para 5.35).  This 
may reflect the fact that a location is known intuitively by users, for 
example, the location of a local council swimming pool.  However, for 
some other outputs, such as health services, education, boarder control or 
regional development, users are likely to have an interest in the location of 
the delivery of the services where accessibility to the service is a priority 
(NZICA, 2002, para 5.35). 
 Cost of outputs should be calculated on a full accrual accounting basis, 
which requires the allocation of all direct and indirect expenses related to 
the output (NZICA, 2002, para 5.38).  Costing of an output (operating 
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expenditure) and provision of costing information below the aggregated 
output level are recommended (NZICA, 2002, para 5.39). 
To disclose these output dimensions, TPA-9 (para 5.1) recommends the use of 
performance measures and targets
52
 which can enable comparison with current 
performance achievements.   Such a recommendation is consistent with the Act‟s 
2002 requirement (discussed earlier) that each SSP presents both target and actual 
service performance.  Given the wide range of activities or outputs of local 
councils (for example, water supply, wastewater treatment, public health and 
safety), which must be reported in the SSPs, output performance measures are 
most likely to vary for the different dimensions (TPA-9, 2002, para 5.10).  For 
example, performance measures for recreation services would differ from those of 
wastewater services.  Given this study‟s focus on wastewater services, Table 2.3 
provides an example of performance measures and their targets for each 
dimension of wastewater services. 
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 Performance targets (or standards) are precise levels of performance to be achieved within the 
performance period.  Performance targets can be expressed in terms of absolute numbers, 
percentages, ratios, and/or point estimates or as a range (TPA-9, 2002, para 5.4). 
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Table 2.3: Example of performance measures and their targets for each 
dimension of wastewater services 
Output 
dimensions 
(NZ IAS 1) 
Classes for output dimensions  
(TPA-9) 
Example of the performance measures 
and their targets for wastewater services 
Quantity How much or how many units of 
the output are delivered 
 
-200 km of reticulation maintained 
-2.8 million m
3
 of sewerage volume 
treated 
-2 million m
3
 treated wastewater 
discharged to an outfall. 
Quality 
 
  
-Standard met 
 
 
-Reliability of a service  
 
- Customer‟s focus 
-100% compliance with resource consent 
conditions 
 
-Zero blockages, or overflows  
 
-No complaints received  
100% customer satisfaction with the 
service 
Time 
 
 
-Date by which a service is to be 
completed/rendered 
 
-Response time for a service 
 
 
 
 
-Time availability of service 
 
-Completion of reticulation work at … by 
30 June 2007  
 
-Complaints are rectified within 24 hours; 
and 
-Response time to interruptions to service 
is below 24 hours per property per year 
 
-At least 24 hours‟ notice is provided to 
affected parties of planned work that 
disrupts use of property 
Location 
 
-A place in which a service is 
delivered 
-Wastewater treatment plants or 
reticulation work is located at..... 
Cost  -Cost of an output (service) 
 
-Provision of cost below the 
aggregated output level by direct 
and indirect cost 
 
-Provision of cost below the 
aggregated output level by plant 
or system 
-$5,243 budgeted operating expenditure 
 
-$520 budgeted employee salary, $2058 
budgeted depreciation and amortisation, 
$1321 budgeted activity expense; and 
 
-$14,416 budgeted cost of sewage 
collection and disposal, $19,502 budgeted 
cost of sewage treatment   
 
2.7.2.3 NZ Framework 
The NZ Framework (para.s 25-42) discusses four qualitative characteristics – 
relevance, reliability, comparability, and understandability – which underpin 
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general purpose financial reports (including the SSP).  The Office of the Auditor-
General (OAG) has provided supplementary guidance on the qualitative 
characteristics of SSP information in the Auditor-General‟s Observations on the 
Quality of Performance Reporting (2008).  The qualitative characteristics, based 
on the NZ Framework (NZICA, 2005) and the OAG‟s (2008) view in the area of 
SSP reporting, are explained below: 
 To be relevant: information should assist users in their decision-making by 
helping them to evaluate past, present or future events, and to confirm or 
correct their past evaluations (NZICA, 2005, para 26).  The Office of the 
Auditor-General (2008, para 6.5) adds that relevant information should be 
presented in the context of present performance of the reporting year, 
show clear and logical links with an entity‟s objectives, and meet the 
information requirements of stakeholders. 
 To be comparable: information needs to be presented in a manner that 
facilitates its comparison over time for the same entity, and with similar 
information for other entities (NZICA, 2005, para 39).  However, the 
OAG (2008, para 6.56) points out that while comparison of the current 
year‟s performance with other entities may not be appropriate for public-
sector entities, a comparison with targets and present years‟ performance 
is recommended.  The latter is consistent with the Act‟s 2002 requirement 
(Schedule 10, Part 3, 15(e)) for a comparison between actual achievement 
and the target set out in LTCCP.  However, the Act‟s 2002 requirement in 
Schedule 10, Part 3, 15(e) goes a little further to include explanation of 
any significant differences between the current year‟s performance and 
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targets.  In summary, comparable information cannot only compare a 
council‟s achieved performance for the year in question with the present 
period‟s results, but also the targets, with explanation of any significant 
variance. 
 To be understandable: information needs to be readily understood by 
users, assuming those users have a reasonable knowledge and a 
willingness to study the information with reasonable effort (NZICA, 2005, 
para 25).  Further, OAG (2008, para 6.55) points out that reported items 
should be clearly classified, presented in a way that engages the reader (for 
example, through the use of charts, tables, and symbols), and content 
should be easy to read and written in plain English (with adequate 
explanation of acronyms, jargon, and technical terms) (Office of the 
Auditor-General, 2008, para 6.55). 
 To be reliable: information must be free from any material error and bias 
so that users can depend on the actual position being faithfully represented 
(NZICA, 2005, para 31). 
As discussed, the authoritative requirements from the Local Government Act 
2002 and relevant GAAP focus on different aspect of SSP reporting and are 
complementing each other in some way.  Schedule 10, Part 3 (15(e)) of the Act 
provides broad presentation of the statement while NZ IAS 1 and TPA-9 
specifically focus on the items to be presented.  The NZ Framework provides the 
overall characteristics of the information presented.  In relation to wastewater 
services, wastewater disclosures in terms of quantity, quality, location, time, and 
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cost (according to NZ IAS 1 and TPA-9) should be provided in SSPs in such a 
manner that the information is relevant, comparable, understandable, and reliable 
(according to NZ Framework).  Note that, the notion of comparability is further 
reinforced by Schedule 10, Part 3 (15(e)) of the Local Government Act 2002 for 
the provision of explanation of significant variance, if any.  Figure 2.1 presents 
the building blocks to summarise the connection between these components of the 
authoritative requirements in the context of wastewater disclosures. 
From Figure 2.1, the five dimensions of wastewater services (quantity, quality, 
location, time and cost) can be individually presented on their relevance and 
comparability, of which the latter includes the requirement for explanation of any 
significant variance.  All disclosures can then be presented for their 
understandability and reliability. 
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Figure 2.1: Connection of components of authoritative requirements in the context of wastewater disclosures 
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Given the authoritative requirements for SSP reporting from legislation and 
accounting guidance, New Zealand led the world with its requirement for all 
government financial statements to be reported on a full accrual basis, including 
the SSP requirement (Pallot, 2001a).  While the UK and Australia have adopted a 
New Public Management focus and accrual accounting (Guthrie, 1993; 
Humphery, Miller, & Smith, 1998), their emphasis has been on financial reporting 
aspects, moving only gradually towards all government (financial and non-
financial) reporting.  Arguably they have not made explicit achievement with the 
requirement for service performance reporting (Australian Accounting Standards 
Board, 2010). 
Although mandatory requirements and accounting standards for service 
performance reporting in Australia and the United Kingdom have not been made 
concurrently, the reporting of such information is not entirely ignored.  Both 
jurisdictions have addressed some aspects of service performance reporting.  In 
Australia, there are varying degrees of enforcement of the service performance 
reporting requirements for the public-sector across the States.  Not only the 
Australian government agencies but also in a few States (Victoria, Queensland, 
and Western Australia), public-sector entities are statutorily required to provide 
performance information, particularly in the form of performance indicators 
(Australian Accounting Standards Board, 2010).  New South Wales, South 
Australia, Northern Territories and Tasmania public-sector entities were 
encouraged and provided with guidelines for the reporting of performance 
information by their State audit offices or other authoritative bodies (Australian 
Accounting Standards Board, 2010). 
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In spite of the statutory requirement or encouragement for service performance 
reporting, Australian accounting standards for service performance reporting by 
public-sector entities have not yet been formulated (Australian Accounting 
Standards Board, 2010; Lee, 2006).  However, there are some limited suggestions 
for reporting on performance indicators in AAS 27 (Financial Reporting by 
Governments, 1995), AAS 29 (Financial Reporting by Government Departments, 
1996) and AAS 31 (Financial Reporting by Governments, 1996) (Lee, 2006).
53
  
Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the statutory requirements and accounting 
standards for service performance reporting by public-sector entities have not yet 
been made explicit (Australian Accounting Standards Board, 2010; Rutherford, 
2000).  However, the Treasury has provided recommendations for performance 
indicators in the non-mandatory guidance, A Guide to Setting Targets and 
Measuring Performance (Lee, 2006).  Without mandatory requirements and 
accounting guidelines for service performance information, it is possible that the 
reporting of service performance would potentially be less uniform and hence less 
comparable across public-sector entities in both countries. 
2.8 Current issues with SSP reporting  
The objective of SSP reporting is to strengthen public accountability for the 
delivery of outputs (NZICA, 2002, para 1.10).  However, the SSP reporting of 
public-sector entities (including local authorities) has been criticised as poor, thus 
the accountability is also poor and needs improvement. 
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 In February 2008 AASs 27, 29, and 31 were withdrawn (Australian Accounting Standards 
Board, 2008).  However, their requirements have been incorporated into numerous other 
accounting standards which are broader in focus with application to all public benefit entities. 
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The Office of the Auditor-General (2008) expressed its disappointment in the 
quality of reports by public-sector entities (including local authorities) in spite of 
nearly 20 years of public-sector experience in preparing statements of service 
performance, and the development of the relevant GAAP in early 2000s.  The 
Office of the Auditor-General (2008) also sought significant improvement in the 
reports to allow Parliament and the public to hold public entities to be accountable 
for their use of taxes and rates and for the effectiveness of their service delivery. 
Regardless of the OAG‟s disappointment at SSP reporting practice for 2007/2008, 
all 2007/2008 SSP disclosures by local authorities were unqualified.
54
  This may 
be because of the lesser requirement under the Local Government Act 2002 for 
SSPs to be audited only against Schedule 10, Part 3 (15(e)), not GAAP.  In 
addition, the threshold for auditor to qualify the report is high.  An auditor would 
not consider qualifying an audit report unless the disclosures were both 
significantly and fundamentally misleading or not meaningful (Neale & Pallot, 
2001).  This raises the concern on the unqualified statements on SSPs, which are 
not explicit about the non-compliance with the authoritative requirements, if there 
is. 
Given the long-standing criticism of poor SSP reporting, some reasons discussed 
by accounting professionals are as follows: 
1. Lack of demand: It is possible that because SSPs are not well used by the public 
the reporter lacks incentives to produce high quality reports (Office of the 
                                                 
54
 Usually, the unqualified statement for SSPs states: “The service provision information of the 
council… fairly reflects the levels of service provision as measured against the intended levels of 
service provision adopted, as well as the reasons for any significant variances, for the year ended 
on that date.” 
 58 
 
Auditor-General, 2008).  The Office of the Auditor-General (2008) suggests that 
public-sector entities need to be encouraged consistently in the use of 
performance reports, in particular, by exploring the needs and interests of their 
different users, and by reporting information that better meets their different 
needs. 
2. Lack of resources:  Some public entities may not have sufficient resources 
(staff, and system capacity), ability (know-how), and data to prepare the reports 
(Neale & Anderson, 2000). 
3. Avoiding intervention: Chief executives may try to avoid generating reaction 
from media and politicians and therefore do not report more than is required, 
particularly in relation to bad news (Neale & Anderson, 2000). 
4. Lack of comprehensive standards: Guidance by the legislation and accounting 
profession is not helpful enough in the preparation of SSPs (Office of the Auditor-
General, 2008; Webster, 2007).  The Office of the Auditor-General (2008) argues 
that financial reporting standards heavily prescribe financial statements in their 
structure, composition, measurement, and disclosure.  However, no reporting 
standards exist in New Zealand specifically for SSPs.  TPA-9 is highly relevant 
but has limited authority compared to a financial reporting standard (Office of the 
Auditor-General, 2008).
55
  Webster (2007), the Assistant Auditor-General, is 
critical that the authoritative requirements describe the purposes, elements and 
qualitative characteristics of service performance reports, but they have been 
pitched at a higher or more conceptual level than financial reporting standards.  
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 TPA-9 has recently been updated for consistency with New Zealand International Financial 
Reporting Standards and legislative requirements (Office of the Auditor-General, 2008). 
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The Office of the Auditor-General (2008) adds that New Zealand Equivalents to 
International Financial Reporting Standards (including NZ IAS 1, NZ 
Framework) are written to cater the needs of large, profit-oriented entities in the 
private-sector rather than for the public-sector‟s specific needs for performance 
reporting.  Large profit-oriented entities in the private-sector place emphasis on 
financial statement reporting (R. Gray, 1983).  Public-sector entities on the other 
hand highlight their service performance reporting (Boyne & Law, 1991; 
Hyndman & Anderson, 1995).  It is possible that International Financial 
Reporting Standards are based on economic framework highlighting decision-
usefulness objective of private-sector‟s reporting, which is not suitable for public-
sector reporting (Mack, 2003; Parker & Gould, 1999).  In short, the current 
authoritative requirements based on economic framework for the New Zealand 
public-sector‟s SSP reporting provides less than adequate guidance on the 
preparation of SSPs. 
Webster (2007) and the OAG (2008) conclude that the development of standards 
and guidance for service performance reporting needs more attention by the 
accounting profession to improve the current SSP reporting by public-sector 
entities.  The Office of the Auditor-General responded seemingly to the call for 
more guidance on SSP reporting.  In 2010 the OAG issued the discussion paper – 
Local Government Examples of Better practice in Setting Local Authorities’ 
Performance Measures – in an attempt to improve performance information in 
2012-22 LTCCPs (Office of the Auditor-General, 2010).  In essence, the 
discussion paper provides examples of appropriate performance measures 
specifically for local authorities‟ core activities – roading, water supply, 
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wastewater, libraries, and building control.  In particular to wastewater 
disclosures, the performance measures suggested are related to standard met, 
reliability of the service, and response time for a service (Office of the Auditor-
General, 2010) which reflect the quality and time dimension of wastewater 
services.  It is possible that this discussion paper could have an impact on local 
authorities‟ SSP disclosures for the 2012 forward when the performance measures 
are addressed in the LTCCP. 
Further, in the near future, there will be the accounting standard frameworks for 
public-sector entities‟ reporting which embrace the accountability obligation of 
public-sector entities‟ reporting.  Currently, the International Public Sector 
Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB) is in the process (Exposure Draft) of 
issuing Conceptual Framework for General Purpose Financial Reporting by 
Public Sector Entities with the objectives of the financial reporting be both for 
accountability and decision usefulness (International Public Sector Accounting 
Standard Board, 2010).  New Zealand Accounting Standards Review Board, 
which supports the adoption of International Financial Accounting Standards, has 
concluded its intention to adopt the new accounting conceptual framework for 
public-sector entities (Accounting Standards Review Board, 2011).  It is expected 
that the new framework would enable the public-sector entities in New Zealand to 
prepare their SSPs. 
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2.9 Summary 
This chapter provides the background to the statements of service performance 
requirements and wastewater services for New Zealand local authorities.  The 
statement of service performance is a product of the extensive reforms of the 
public-sector in the late 1980s.  The SSP reporting requirement for New Zealand 
local government was first introduced in 1989 and continues to the present under 
the Local Government Act 2002.  Specifically, SSPs present non-financial 
information about the performance of entities in providing goods and services 
(outputs), with the stated objective of strengthening accountability to the public 
(Local Government Act 2002, s. 98; NZICA, 2002, para 1.10; 2004, para. 126.2). 
Given two complementary levels of local authorities (regional councils and 
territorial authorities), regional councils‟ functions primarily focus on 
environmental management and public transport, while those of territorial 
authorities focus on various community services.  Wastewater services are one of 
the most crucial services provided by territorial authorities and are disclosed in 
their SSPs. 
The authoritative requirements of SSPs are from the Local Government Act 2002 
and relevant GAAP.  The Local Government Act 2002 states the SSP requirement 
in Schedule 10, Part 3 (15(e)); specifically requiring a comparison between actual 
service performances and the targets of service performance (as set out in the 
plan), with reasons given for any significant variances.  They need to be prepared 
in compliance with generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP) and audited 
by the Auditor-General (Local Government Act 2002, s. 99).  The relevant GAAP 
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to SSPs is NZ IAS 1, TPA-9, and NZ Framework, which require the report to 
include, but not limit to, quantity, quality, location, time, and cost of the service 
and the disclosures to be relevant, comparable, understandable, and reliable. 
In spite of twenty years‟ experience in preparing statements of service 
performance, the OAG (2008) has been critical of the reporting practice and the 
usefulness of the authoritative requirements.  It is possible that the authoritative 
requirements, based on economic framework highlighting decision-usefulness 
model, are not suitable for public-sector‟s reporting (Mack, 2003; Parker & 
Gould, 1999).  The result of the first objective of the study is expected to provide 
evidence on the applicability (or otherwise) of the current authoritative 
requirements. 
If accountability is the preferred objective of public-sector reporting as suggested 
by authors including Pallot (1992), then it would be important for the authoritative 
requirements to match the needs of those users. There is vast public-sector 
literature addressing the multi-facets of accountability of the public-sector entities.  
The next chapter will explore the literature that address the theoretical concept of 
accountability and different components of accountability, which underpin the 
SSP reporting and sets up the basis for the second objective of the study. 
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Chapter 3: Accountability and Statements of Service Performance 
as an Accountability Tool 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an analysis of accountability concept as the theoretical 
foundation to statements of service performance reporting in order to understand 
the potential role of the statement in discharging accountability obligations, 
regarding wastewater services of New Zealand local authorities. The normative 
accountability expectations for the desirable characteristics of service 
performance information to be disclosed by local authorities will be derived from 
this literature.  Section 3.2 presents the theoretical foundations of accountability 
theory, and section 3.3 discusses different types of accountability.  Section 3.4 
reviews accountability expectations that can be applied to develop a set of desired 
characteristics for wastewater disclosures, and section 3.5 summarises the chapter. 
3.2 Accountability theory 
“Accountability is the corner stone of all financial reporting in government” to 
quote from an address by the Government Accounting Standards Board of the 
United States (GASB, 1987, cited in Pallot, 1992, p. 40).  The public-sector‟s 
accountability obligations derive from the fact that the public is required to pay 
taxes or rates involuntarily, while not having the freedom to choose, and that they 
are reliant on the service providers (Ives, 1987).  They also rely on service 
performance information to be able to make informed judgements about the 
performance of their local authorities and on how their monies were spent (Mack 
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& Ryan, 2006).  A number of researchers (Barton, 1999; Boyne & Law, 1991; R. 
Gray, et al., 1996; Hyndman & Anderson, 1995) support that service performance 
information is a necessary means by which local authorities attempt to discharge 
their accountability to the public.  Pallot (1992) concludes that accountability is 
the preferred purpose for public-sector reporting since the nature of the 
relationship between providers and users of government is non-voluntary.  The 
accountability concept has been incorporated in the official purpose of a statement 
of service performance by the Local Government Act 2002 (s. 98) and NZICA 
(2002, para 1.10). 
Despite the emphasis placed on accountability by the public-sector, there is no 
generally accepted definition or theory of what constitutes accountability.  Table 
3.1 provides a selection of definitions from the Oxford dictionary and the relevant 
literature. 
Table 3.1: Prior researchers’ explanations of the term ‘accountability’ 
Authors Explanation of ‘accountability’ 
Normanton          
(1971, p. 311) 
In its most general sense, accountability means a liability to reveal, to 
explain and to justify what one does; how one discharges 
responsibilities, financial or otherwise, whose several origins may be 
political, constitutional, hierarchical or contractual. 
Jackson             
(1982, p. 220) 
Basically, accountability involves explaining or justifying what has 
been done, what is currently being done and what is planned. 
A. Gray and Jenkins 
(1993, p. 55) 
 
Accountability is an obligation to present an account of, and answer 
for, the execution of responsibilities to those who entrusted those 
responsibilities.  On this obligation depends the allocation of praise and 
blame, reward and sanction so often seen as the hallmarks of 
accountability in action. 
R. Gray, Owen, and 
Adams (1996, p. 38) 
Accountability is the duty to provide an account (by no means 
necessarily a financial account) or reckoning of those actions for which 
one is held responsible. 
Coy, Fischer, and 
Gordon   (2001, p. 7) 
Accountability means the requirement for one party to account to 
another party for its performance over a given period.  
Oxford English 
Dictionary (2006) 
The quality of being accountable; liability to give account of, and 
answer for, discharge of duties or conduct 
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From Table 3.1, it appears that common to all notions of the term „accountability‟ 
is an obligation to explain, account for, and/or justify the performance of a 
responsibility carried out over a given period.  Other researchers have extended 
this basic idea and developed the concept of accountability relationships. 
In simple terms, accountability arises from a relationship between two parties 
whereby one party (the delegator) delegates (explicitly or implicitly) a 
responsibility to another party (the acceptor) (R. Gray, et al., 1996; Ijiri, 1975; 
Jackson, 1982; Mulgan, 1997; Perks, 1993).  The delegators and acceptors may be 
individuals, groups, or organisations (Day & Klein, 1987; R. Gray, et al., 1996; 
Mulgan, 1997; Perks, 1993).  When they are individuals, the relationship between 
the delegator and acceptor tends to be direct and straightforward.  However, when 
groups and organisations are involved, the relationship between the parties is 
frequently complex and may be remote (Day & Klein, 1987).  For example, the 
relationship between a local authority and its various stakeholders is complex (due 
to the number and variety of stakeholders involved) and in some cases also remote 
(for example, the relationship with its local community). 
The responsibility delegated to an acceptor may require the entrusting of 
resources (for example, funds) and/or authority to enable the responsibility to be 
performed.  Similarly, the responsibility may have implicit and/or explicit terms 
and conditions attached.  These may include objectives, expectations, 
requirements, rules, policies, and standards (A. Gray, 1984; Ijiri, 1975; Laughlin, 
1990; Mulgan, 1997; Stewart, 1984). 
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Acceptance of the responsibility gives the delegator the right to call on the 
acceptor to explain how the accepted responsibility has been performed (R. Gray, 
et al., 1996; Laughlin, 1990; Mulgan, 1997).  Once a responsibility has been 
accepted, the acceptor is obliged not only to perform the responsibility in 
accordance with the attached terms and conditions but also to provide an 
explanation (an account or justification) of the performance (Coy, et al., 2001; A. 
Gray & Jenkins, 1993; R. Gray, et al., 1996; Jackson, 1982; Normanton, 1971).  
Day and Klein (1987) referred to such explanation to the public by public-sector 
entities about their performance as “the life blood of accountability” (p.243). 
The explanation or information provided by the acceptor about the performance of 
the responsibility needs to be such that it enables the delegator to evaluate the 
acceptor‟s performance (Day & Klein, 1987; Mulgan, 1997; Stewart, 1984).  The 
discharge of accountability is adequate or inadequate, depending on whether it 
enables the delegator to assess the performance of the acceptor in carrying out 
their responsibility (R. Gray, et al., 1996).  The information can be in different 
languages; for example and/or financial or non-financial, quantitative or 
qualitative (Day & Klein, 1987; R. Gray, et al., 1996; Normanton, 1971; Sinclair, 
1995; Stewart, 1984).  The information may take the form of formal or informal 
communications; be in written, oral or electronic form; and be delivered on a 
routine or ad hoc basis (Coy, et al., 2001).  The information can be distributed 
through many channels (referred to as the means of accountability).  For example, 
it may be through newspaper, radios or television, public consultations, plans, 
budget reports, special purpose reports, audited annual reports (Boyne & Law, 
1991; Coy, et al., 2001; Hyndman & Anderson, 1995; Laswad, et al., 2005; Lee, 
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2008; Milazzo, 1992; Ryan, Dunstan, & Brown, 2002; Ryan, Stanley, et al., 2002; 
Sinclair, 1995; Taylor & Rosair, 2000). 
Based on the delegator‟s informed judgement, the delegator can allocate rewards 
or sanctions as appropriate (Day & Klein, 1987; Mulgan, 1997; Stewart, 1984).  
The delegator‟s evaluation and consequent action on the acceptor is referred to as 
holding to account (Stewart, 1984).  Holding to account is expected to have an 
implication for the quality of the performance offered by the acceptor (Mulgan, 
1997). The awareness of possible rewards or sanctions is a constraint on all 
consequential acts an acceptor undertakes (Tetlock, 1985).  In general, an acceptor 
is motivated to seek rewards from the delegator to whom he/she is accountable 
(Tetlock, 1985).  Rewards and sanctions may be implicit or explicit, and may also 
be subjective or objective. Rewards may range from approval/respect or criticism, 
to something more tangible, such as monetary rewards (Frink & Klimoski, 2004).  
In Table 3.1, A. Gray and Jenkins (1993, p. 55) note that the allocation of praise 
or blame (reward or sanction) is often regarded as one of the „hallmarks‟ of 
accountability. 
Jackson (1982) contends that an accountability relationship involves a set of 
procedures.  Figure 3.1 shows the procedures – delegating responsibility, 
performing responsibility accepted, providing explanations, evaluating 
performance and allocating rewards or sanctions – involved in a simple one-to-
one accountability relationship. 
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Figure 3.1:  Procedures involved in a simple accountability relationship 
Delegating responsibility
Performing responsibility accepted
----------------------------
Providing explanation of performance
Evaluating performance based on explanation
------------------------------
Allocation of rewards or sanctions
Delegator Acceptor
 
                 
In practice, the acceptor may simultaneously have many accountability 
relationships and be accountable to multiple „delegators‟ (Mulgan, 1997; Stewart, 
1984).  Accountability relationships may arise from different social arrangements; 
they may, for example, be created by law, contract, organisational rule, custom, or 
social norm (R. Gray, et al., 1996; Ijiri, 1975; Jackson, 1982; Normanton, 1971).  
However, irrespective of how they arise, the delegator and acceptor should agree 
on the terms and conditions of the performance of the responsibility and on the 
information to be provided about the performance (Day & Klein, 1987; Laughlin, 
1990).  Nevertheless, the terms and conditions and the information to be provided 
may or may not be clearly defined.  When they are not clearly defined, the 
accountability relationship is said to be communal (Laughlin, 1990).  This form of 
accountability relationship can be expected when the accountability relationship 
arises through the operation of custom or social norm, and when there is no 
formal written agreement.  An example of this type of accountability relationship 
is that of a local club secretary; usually neither the responsibility to be performed 
nor the report to be provided about the performance is explicitly specified, but is a 
norm of practice. 
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When the terms and conditions of the responsibility to be performed and the 
information to be provided are clearly and formally defined (usually in writing), 
the accountability relationship is said to be contractual (Laughlin, 1990).  This 
form of accountability relationship can be expected when the relationship arises 
through the operation of the law, a contract, or an organisational rule.  For 
example, the responsibility of local authorities to provide goods and services to 
their local communities is specified in the Local Government Act 2002 and other 
enactments, and the annual reporting requirements concerning their performance 
are prescribed in the Local Government Act 2002 and generally accepted 
accounting practice.  If a local authority outsources, for example, the collection 
and disposal of waste, the responsibility to be performed and the information to be 
provided about that performance are likely to be specified in a contract. 
Nevertheless, Mulgan (1997) points out that even in a contractual accountability 
relationship (whether arising through law, a contract or an organisational rule), 
terms and conditions and/or information requirements specified by a delegator 
cannot identify everything that may need to be done and accounted for by the 
acceptor.  Similarly, R. Gray, et al. (1996) observe that in some accountability 
relationships the terms and conditions of the responsibility to be performed may 
be clearly specified, but the information to be provided about the performance 
may not.  An example of this situation is afforded by local authorities‟ services 
which affect the environment, such as wastewater treatment.  Under the Resource 
Management Act 1991, resource consent conditions granted in respect of such 
services are clearly specified, with details of how the territorial authority needs to 
operate.  However, the Local Government Act 2002 and GAAP requirements, 
 70 
 
relating to local authorities‟ reporting on their service performance, are expressed 
in broad, general terms (Webster, 2007).  This leaves local authorities with 
discretion, to a greater extent, regarding the information they provide about their 
services in SSPs. 
Where a lack of clarity exists about the terms and conditions attached to a 
responsibility accepted and/or the information to be provided by an acceptor, the 
acceptor needs to use his/her judgement, based on past experience, training and 
ethics, when deciding on the appropriate manner of performance and/or reporting 
thereon (A. Gray, 1984).  However, in some circumstances, an acceptor may not 
act appropriately.  For example, when an acceptor has discretionary authority 
regarding accountability information, he/she may distort or bias the information in 
order to avoid possible sanctions or to gain rewards (Fandt & Ferris, 1990; 
Normanton, 1971; Patton, 1992; Perks, 1993).  In such cases, the information may 
not enable the delegator to evaluate properly the performance of the acceptor and, 
as a consequence, the accountability of the acceptor is undermined (Perks, 1993).  
Jackson (1982) contends that the ability of an acceptor to control or influence the 
accountability information provided is a limitation of the accountability 
relationship. 
3.3 Types of accountability  
Various types of accountability have been identified by prior researchers, with 
references based on either „to whom‟ or „for what‟.  Each of these is developed in 
the next two sections. 
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3.3.1 Types of accountability based on ‘to whom’ an acceptor is 
accountable 
In an accountability relationship, a delegator (the public) may delegate functions 
(seeking information, evaluating performance based on explanation, and/or 
allocating rewards or sanctions) to agent(s) (Ombudsmen, Officers of 
Parliament/OAG, and elected representatives) (Mulgan, 1997).  Thus, the acceptor 
may be accountable not only to the delegator but also to the delegator‟s agents.  In 
this study, the term „accountability stakeholder‟ is used to denote both a delegator 
and a delegator‟s agent.  
Prior research outlines different contexts for accountability that result in an 
acceptor being accountable to stakeholder(s), in various directions.  Figure 3.2 
summarises the four directions of accountability which have been discussed by 
prior researchers.  Where the acceptor and accountability stakeholder(s) are in the 
same hierarchical structure, the acceptor may have upwards, downwards, or 
horizontal (lateral) accountability to the accountability stakeholders.  Where the 
acceptor and accountability stakeholder(s) are not in the same hierarchical 
arrangement, the acceptor will have outwards accountability to the stakeholder(s).  
These directional accountabilities of an acceptor are depicted in Figure 3.2 and 
discussed below. 
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Figure 3.2: Directional accountability of an acceptor within and outside a 
hierarchical structure 
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Upwards accountability is the obligation to report to the acceptor‟s superiors up 
the hierarchical structure who tend to have direct influence on the acceptor‟s 
performance and access to the information (Corbett, 1996; Mulgan, 2003; Taylor 
& Rosair, 2000).  In an organisational setting, Patton (1992) and Perks (1993) 
refer to this form of accountability as managerial accountability, such as that 
existing between an employee and employer.  In a public-sector context, 
Normanton (1971), Sinclair (1995) and Mulgan (2003) refer to this form of 
accountability as political accountability; it includes the ministerial and 
parliamentary accountability of department chief executives, who are required to 
report, respectively, to Ministers and Parliament.  In the local government context, 
the chief executive of a local authority has upwards accountability to his/her 
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elected councillors and mayor and, for some, legal obligations to the regional 
council and the courts. 
Downwards accountability requires a hierarchical superior to be accountable to 
his/her subordinate (Corbett, 1996; Mulgan, 2003).  For example, the chief 
executive of a local authority is accountable to the council‟s staff for, inter alia, 
the equitable allocation of work and safe working conditions in conformance with 
the council‟s rules or a public-sector employees‟ union agreement.  Nevertheless, 
this form of accountability may not be specified in any rule and/or may not be 
easily enforced by the subordinates (communal).  In such cases, the accountability 
of the supervisor (acceptor) rests on his/her sense of moral obligation (Corbett, 
1996).  An example of such a circumstance is the obligation of the chief executive 
to inform the council‟s staff about any significant matter that may affect their 
safety and welfare (such as, heath hazards in the workplace) (Corbett, 1996). 
Horizontal (or lateral) accountability arises when an acceptor is accountable to 
accountability stakeholders with equal status in a hierarchy (Mulgan, 2003; 
Munro & Hatherly, 1993).  For example, a local authority is accountable to other 
local authorities in the same region for the provision of civil defence services in 
the event of a natural disaster (such as a severe flood) under the Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Act 2002.  The horizontal stakeholders of a local 
authority can also include an agent in the broader governmental setting (under 
constitutional bindings) who does not have an upward relationship, such as the 
OAG and the ombudsmen. 
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Outwards accountability occurs when an acceptor is accountable to a party 
outside the acceptor‟s hierarchical structure, and no direct relational status exists 
(Corbett, 1996; Mulgan, 2003).  Some prior researchers (for example, Coy, et al., 
2001; Glenn & Murphy, 1996; Normanton, 1971; Perks, 1993; Stewart, 1984) 
refer to the outwards accountability of public-sector entities to the general public 
as public accountability.  In the context of local authorities, „the public‟ comprises 
primarily local communities who are predominantly local authority taxpayers and 
ratepayers and their dependents, who are major recipients of goods and services 
provided by the local authority (Taylor & Rosair, 2000). 
Besides these four directions of accountability, some authors (Corbett, 1996; 
Mulgan, 1997; Sinclair, 1995) add inwards accountability, which requires an 
acceptor to be accountable to his or herself for actions to be in conformity with 
moral standards (Corbett, 1996; Mulgan, 2003).  Arguably, morality is subjective 
for individuals and what appears to be moral to one may not be so for others 
(Corbett, 1996). 
An acceptor may place different importance on different stakeholder relationships.  
Kloot and Martin (2001) surveyed 195 local authority managers across all States 
of Australia to examine perceptions of their relative accountability to their 
multiple stakeholder groups.  Kloot and Martin (2001) found that managers 
accorded equal highest priority to their ratepayers and councillors (outward and 
upward accountability).  In contrast, Steccolini (2004) found that Italian local 
governments perceived councillors and cabinet members (upward accountability) 
as the most important groups to whom they were accountable, while citizens 
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(outward accountability) were the least important.  Under the New Public 
Management, accountability of the public-sector to customers for public-sector 
goods and services has gained increased priority (Parker & Gould, 1999).   In this 
study, the outwards (public) accountability of local authorities to 
customers/taxpayers, who are recipients of wastewater services, are the focal 
stakeholders.  Note that „taxpayers‟ refers to anyone who pays taxes, rates, and 
levies to local authorities. 
3.3.2 Types of accountability based on ‘for what’ an acceptor is 
accountable to the public  
„For what‟ an acceptor is accountable can be related to the type of information an 
acceptor owes to the delegator.  A number of researchers have developed various 
types of accountability based on „for what‟ public-sector entities are accountable 
to the public.  Among them, Stewart (1984) proposed different bases of 
accountability, which provide a platform for understanding accountability 
expectations.  Hence, the desirable characteristics of any accountability 
documents of public-sector entities to the public, which would enable the public 
to assess the performance of the public-sector entities and the pubic-sector entity 
to adequately discharge their public accountability.  Stewart (1984) discusses six 
bases of accountability, which are: accountability for probity; accountability for 
legality; process accountability; performance accountability; programme 
accountability; and policy accountability.  While different terminologies for the 
types of accountability are used by other researchers, their explanations are 
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fundamentally similar to Stewart‟s (1984) taxonomy and can be used to augment 
it. 
Accountability for probity concerns ensuring that funds entrusted to public-sector 
entities to perform delegated responsibilities are used properly, in the manner 
authorised, and that malfeasance is avoided (Stewart, 1984).   Day and Klein 
(1987), Glenn and Murphy (1996), Taylor and Pincus (1999) support this notion, 
specifically that funds must be used in accordance with rules, and use the terms 
fiscal, financial, and fiduciary accountability, respectively to describe this 
obligation. 
In the context of local government in New Zealand, funds for wastewater services 
must be spent in accordance with the budget specified in the LTCCP.  Therefore, 
in order to discharge probity the local authority must disclose the actual funds 
expended compared to the LTCCP budget.  Such disclosures would enable 
taxpayers to know how much of their contributions are actually spent and if they 
were used as planned. 
Accountability for legality requires that public-sector entities exercise their 
delegated authority within the relevant legal and/or regulatory framework 
(Jackson, 1982; Stewart, 1984).  Jackson (1982) terms this as legal accountability.  
Under the Local Government Act 2002, although local authorities are empowered 
with broad authority they still need to comply with many enactments. 
In the case of wastewater operations, local authorities must comply with the 
conditions set by regional councils in their resource consents, issued under the 
Resource Management Act 1991.  In addition, they need to ensure their 
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wastewater systems (reticulation, treatment, and disposal) are provided for in full 
under the Health Act 1956. If local authorities expect to enable taxpayers to assess 
performance for legality, it could be expected that local authorities would disclose 
whether they had complied with the resource consents, as well as the reliability of 
the wastewater services, and response times to any incidents that occurred. 
Process accountability addresses the appropriateness of the procedures employed 
to carry out delegated responsibilities to ensure there is no waste or 
maladministration, which in particular could lead to injustice (Stewart, 1984).  
Similarly, Taylor and Pincus (1999) refer to efficiency accountability, which 
requires the production of better outputs for any given input.  While Stewart‟s 
(1984) procedures focus on the inputs (resources) usage, Taylor and Pincus‟s 
(1999) procedures focus on the outputs produced.  Day and Klein (1987) embrace 
both ideas and use the term process/efficiency accountability that is, “about 
making sure that a given course of action has been carried out, and that value for 
money has been achieved in the use of resources … the appropriate outputs have 
been produced, and that the ratio between inputs and outputs (efficiency) is the 
most favourable possible” (page 27).  A favourable efficiency ratio can be 
achieved by reducing cost of inputs (including eliminating waste) and/or 
increasing quantity of outputs (Perks, 1993). 
In the context of wastewater services provided by local authorities, to enable 
taxpayers to assess the efficiency of wastewater services, local authorities may 
disclose an efficiency ratio relating, for example, the cost of wastewater treatment 
with tonnes of wastewater treated.  A high ratio represents the efficiency of the 
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service; that is, with the amount of expenditure, a large quantity of wastewater 
was treated, or with the amount of wastewater treated, a reasonable cost was 
incurred. 
Performance accountability relates to guaranteeing that the achieved performance 
meets the required standards of performance (Stewart, 1984).  Under the Local 
Government Act 2002, local authorities plan their service performance targets in 
the LTCCP, which are „required standards‟ of performance to be achieved.  
Comparison between the actual levels of service performance and the intended 
levels of service performance (as required by Local Government Act 2002) can 
ensure performance accountability. 
Programme accountability concerns whether the work carried out meets the 
objectives set (Stewart, 1984).  This type of accountability is similar to Taylor and 
Pincus‟ (1999) effectiveness accountability and Day and Klein‟s (1987) 
programme/effectiveness accountability. 
Laughlin (1990) notes that Stewart‟s (1984) programme accountability is 
remarkably similar to performance accountability as they both relate to achieving 
goals.  It is possible that the required standards under performance accountability 
mirror the objectives under programme accountability; therefore, achieving the 
standard can also promote the achievement of an objective.  Given the similarity, 
for the purpose of this study, performance accountability and 
programme/effectiveness accountability is combined.  To assess the 
performance/programme/effectiveness, taxpayers need benchmarks for expected 
performance as well as reporting on actual achievement. 
 79 
 
In the case of wastewater services, local authorities discharge their 
performance/programme/effectiveness accountability by disclosing both actual 
service performance achievement (for example, 90 percent compliance with 
resource consent conditions) and their target set in the LTCCP (for example, 100 
percent compliance with resource consent conditions).  Such comparisons will 
enable taxpayers to assess their local authority‟s wastewater services, in particular 
their compliance with resource consents, and whether agreed targets have been 
met. 
Policy accountability is concerned with responsibility of public-sector entities for 
formulating a policy that meets voters‟ expectations and for ensuring the policy is 
pursued (Stewart, 1984).  This type of accountability is appropriate to superior 
parts of governmental agencies – both central and local – which are responsible 
for policy-setting and have no set standards to follow in the formulation of policy.  
Once policy has been set, the government is accountable to the public for both the 
policies it has pursued and those it has failed to pursue (Stewart, 1984).  For 
example, under the Local Government Act 2002, local authority councillors are 
responsible for, inter alia, setting up revenue and financing policy for wastewater 
services and, in particular, may decide that the council‟s capital expenditure 
should be funded by a loan for the life of the investment.  Once the policy is 
adopted through the special consultative procedure, councillors must ensure that 
the loan was raised for the appropriate purpose.  The chief executive is not 
responsible for policy development, but rather, for day-to-day operations, such as 
providing community services.  Policy accountability is therefore not applicable 
to the chief executive. 
 80 
 
3.4 Accountability expectations for wastewater services 
Given the different accountability bases derived from the literature, Laughlin 
(1990) argues that depending on the type of accountability relationship not all the 
bases of accountability will be discharged in order to ensure the assessment of 
performance by the public and the adequacy of accountability by public-sector 
entities.    In the case of wastewater services by local authorities, it can be argued 
that local authorities are expected to be accountable to the public on four bases for 
the services, being: probity, legality, process/efficiency, and 
performance/programme/effectiveness.  These four bases form the accountability 
expectations for wastewater services, which are desirable characteristics of 
wastewater disclosures. 
Jackson (1982) remarks that traditionally, accountability for probity and legality 
has been the primary focus of public accountability while efficiency and 
effectiveness accountability was recently added.  Taylor and Rosair (2000) also 
note that the addition of efficiency and effectiveness accountability is pertinent to 
a public-sector entity discharging its accountability.  The inclusion of 
process/efficiency, performance/programme/effectiveness accountabilities appears 
to be consistent with the public-sector reform principle, particularly concerning 
the pursuit of efficiency and effectiveness (as discussed in chapter 2).   
Wastewater disclosures that are consistent with an accountability expectation are 
expected to enable taxpayers to evaluate a local authority‟s wastewater services 
performance.  If so, a local authority‟s public accountability in relation to its 
wastewater services being adequately discharged would contradict the OAG‟s 
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(2008) criticism, as discussed in chapter 2.  The disclosures can reflect, to a 
limited degree, the success or otherwise of the promotion of reform themes 
concerning the adoption of private-sector practices. 
3.5 Summary 
The literature provides an analysis of accountability concept as theoretical 
foundation to SSP reporting in order to understand the potential role of SSP 
reporting in discharging accountability obligation, regarding wastewater services 
of New Zealand local authorities.  Conceptually, local authorities‟ SSPs arise 
from the accountability relationship between the public and local authorities.  
Under the New Zealand constitution, the public delegates responsibility for 
management of taxes and rates for the provision of services to the chief executive 
responsible for the local authority.  Consequently, the local authority has an 
obligation (accountability) to provide information about its service performance 
(SSPs) to the public.  This obligation is reinforced by the Local Government Act 
2002. 
Past theoretical literature has attempted to define the possible characteristics of 
suitable information for public-sector entities so as to adequately discharge their 
accountability obligations.  Among them, Stewart (1984) identifies four normative 
bases of accountability for public-sector entities, which provide a platform for 
understanding accountability expectations applicable for wastewater disclosures.  
They are probity, legality, process/efficiency, 
performance/programme/effectiveness accountability.  It is expected that 
wastewater disclosures, corresponding to these accountability expectations, would 
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enable the public to assess the performance of the local authority for its 
wastewater services provision.  Examination of the consistency of wastewater 
services with the accountability expectations will provide evidence on whether 
New Zealand local authorities disclose information in a manner which is suitable 
for evaluating the performance in accordance with accountability framework.  The 
result may then provide support on the suitability of accountability expectations as 
a model for SSP reporting. 
The incentives of local authorities to provide wastewater disclosures that are 
consistent with the authoritative requirements and accountability expectations 
may vary, depending on their particular circumstances. The next chapter will 
review empirical studies regarding SSPs and possible disclosure incentives, in an 
endeavour to deepen understanding of cross-sectional differences in the 
disclosures. 
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Chapter 4: Review of Empirical Work on Statements of Service 
Performance 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the empirical work on statements of service performance, 
and identifies the disclosure incentives as well as their influential factors 
applicable for wastewater disclosures within SSPs by New Zealand local 
authorities.  Section 4.2 discusses prior studies on service performance 
information in the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.  Section 4.3 
reviews prior studies on incentives of voluntary disclosures by public-sector 
entities.   This literature presents incentives for disclosures which are developed in 
the context of wastewater disclosures in section 4.4.  Section 4.5 provides a 
summary of the chapter. 
4.2 Prior research on service performance reporting 
A number of studies have examined public-sector entities‟ service performance 
information during the reform periods in various countries, for example, the 
United Kingdom (Banks, Fisher, & Nelson, 1997; Boyne & Law, 1991; Hyndman 
& Anderson, 1995, 1998; Pendlebury, Jones, & Karbhari, 1994; 2000), Australia 
(Herawaty & Hoque, 2007; Kloot, 2009; Lee, 2006; Nelson, Tower, Banks, & 
Fisher, 1997; Ryan, Stanley, et al., 2002), and New Zealand (Alves, et al., 2005; 
Coy, Dixon, Buchanan, & Tower, 1997; Coy, et al., 1994; K. Dixon, et al., 1991; 
Lonti & Gregory, 2007; Smith & Coy, 2000; Thompson, 1995; Tooley & Guthrie, 
2001; Wei, Davy, & Coy, 2008).  Regardless of the different research criteria used 
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in the examinations, public-sector entities in the United Kingdom, Australia, and 
New Zealand were in general seen as under-performing in their service 
performance reporting. 
Given non-mandatory service performance reporting, studies of performance 
reporting in the United Kingdom public-sector focused on performance 
indicators/performance measures and showed that performance reporting 
improved after the New Public Management reforms, but remained disappointing 
(Banks, et al., 1997; Boyne & Law, 1991; Hyndman & Anderson, 1995, 1998; 
Pendlebury, et al., 1994).  Boyne and Law (1991) investigated the performance 
indicators provided by 37 Welsh district councils on 13 services
56
 for the years 
1981/1982 – 1988/1989 and found that the number of performance indicators 
about output, outcomes, efficiency, and effectiveness were poor, while of those 
about inputs were popular. 
Pendlebury, Jones and Karbhari (1994) and Hyndman and Anderson (1995) 
analysed the performance indicators of the United Kingdom Executive Agencies 
(government agencies) in their 1991/1992 annual reports and found that few or no 
indicators were included about efficiency and effectiveness of services.  Hyndman 
and Anderson (1998) extended their investigation of Executive Agencies‟ 
performance reporting in 1990/1991 to 1993/1994 annual reports and found the 
numbers of performance indicators increased, and that there was a move away 
from simple indicators of inputs and outputs towards more sophisticated measures 
                                                 
56  These services included highways and transport, planning and economic development, 
environmental health, street cleaning, waste collection, waste disposal, housing: homelessness, 
housing: management and maintenance, housing: renovation grants, housing: benefits, leisure and 
recreation, parks and open spaces, and cemeteries.  
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of efficiency and effectiveness.  However, they contended that these changes were 
still inadequate.  Similarly, performance indicators in United Kingdom 
universities were found to improve over a period (1992-1994) but were still very 
poor.  For example, none of the universities reported information about targets 
(Banks, et al., 1997). 
Rutherford (2000) examined the presentation and characteristics of the 1996/1997 
performance indicators of the United Kingdom Executive Agencies and found that 
performance information was prominently disclosed.  However, the 
understandability of many performance indicators was questioned.  The United 
Kingdom studies showed that the merit in United Kingdom public-sector service 
performance reporting lay in its pursuit of accountability, in spite of its being non-
mandatory and the absence of accounting standards for such reports. 
Many studies in Australia have examined public-sector entities‟ annual report 
disclosures, including performance information (Herawaty & Hoque, 2007; Kloot, 
2009; Lee, 2006; Nelson, et al., 1997; Ryan, Stanley, et al., 2002).   Nelson, et al. 
(1997) studied university annual report disclosures from 1993–1995 and 
concluded that performance information was not adequate and was also not 
improving over time.  Similar results were reported by Ryan, Stanley, et al. (2002) 
after their study of the 1997-1999 annual report disclosures by Queensland local 
governments.  Lee (2006) examined the 1998–2002 performance information 
within annual reports of Australian government trading enterprises and found 
there were few service quality and efficiency measures, and that their use 
fluctuated over the years of the study.  Although most entities stated their business 
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targets, they did not discuss how or whether such targets were achieved.  In 
contrast, Herawaty and Hoque (2007) found that performance indicators were 
reported at a satisfactory level by government departments across Australia in the 
2005/2006 annual reports.  However, for the same period, Kloot (2009) found that 
fire-service departments did not provide adequate performance measures. 
In New Zealand, Dixon, Coy and Tower (1991) examined the annual reporting 
practices of the seven universities in New Zealand from 1985 to 1989, which was 
a period of reform and initial impetus for greater accountability.  Disclosure of 
service performance was non-existent in 1985 although increased over the study 
period (by three universities).  However, none of the universities provided 
information about targets to enable comparison with actual achievements.  Coy, 
Tower, and Dixon (1994) expanded Dixon, et al.‟s (1991) study to the annual 
reports of tertiary education institutions (including polytechnics and colleges of 
education) from 1990–1992.  They found that the service performance 
information was poor, lagging behind other disclosures, and continued to be a 
problem, as was found earlier in Dixon, et al. (1991).  Ten years on from Coy, et 
al.‟s (1994) study, service performance reporting by universities is still weak.  
Alves, Dunmore & Dunstan (2005) studied the SSPs of eight universities in 2000, 
2002, 2003 and found that some universities did not provide past performance or 
targets for comparison with actual achievements.  They argued that some targets 
were vague and not quantitatively measurable. 
In the second year of SSP reporting requirement for local government, Thompson 
(1995) examined 11 local authorities‟ performance indicators in SSPs, based on a 
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single section analysis of public art galleries‟1991/1992 annual report.  Thompson 
(1995) found that the performance measures were not linked with stated 
objectives.  Smith and Coy (2000) study 15 city councils‟ 1996/1997 and 
1997/1998 annual report disclosures.  In respect of service performance reporting, 
Smith and Coy (2000) studied 15 city councils‟ annual report disclosures for 
1996/1997 and 1997/1998 years.  In respect to service performance reporting, 
Smith and Coy‟s (2000) study covered a wide range of activities, which were 
divided into four separate groups of activities: roads, parking etc; water, refuse 
etc; arts, culture and recreation; and other.  They found, overall, that performance 
measures were rated well (above average), however, performance measures for 
water and refuse activities (including wastewater services) were rated the lowest. 
Lonti and Gregory (2007) conducted a longitudinal study, examining the 1992-
2002 annual reports of five government departments.  They found the average 
number of performance indicators per output class increased substantially 
between 1992 and 1997, then decreased marginally by 2002.  Performance 
indicators about input were nil, while those about efficiency were almost absent, 
and outcomes and effectiveness measures (comparing actual results and targets) 
were very few in most departments.  Performance indicators disclosed were 
primarily about outputs.  These results seem to mirror the reform agenda, where 
public-sector entities are held accountable for outputs. 
Most research examining the SSPs of New Zealand public-sector entities tends to 
focus on the education sector (for example, Alves, et al., 2005; Coy, et al., 1994; 
K. Dixon, et al., 1991) rather than government entities.  With only a few existing 
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research studies of government entities‟ SSPs, the research on central government 
is more up-to-date (Lonti & Gregory, 2007).  However, in respect of local 
government, the most recent study was Smith and Coy (2000).  Further, in Smith 
and Coy‟s (2000) study, while SSP disclosures were considered, they were one 
part of the whole annual report disclosures being studied, and thus the analysis of 
the SSP disclosures was scant. 
4.2.1 Research using authoritative requirements 
The research studies discussed above used a number of different criteria to 
examine service performance reporting.  Among them, authoritative requirements 
or recommendations (if the disclosures are voluntary) applicable for the 
jurisdiction studied were the most popular measure used.  For United Kingdom 
studies, Boyne and Law (1991) used the Government‟s code of practice, and 
recommendations from the Audit Commission and the National Consumer 
Council.  Pendlebury, Jones and Karbhari (1994) used Treasury‟s (1992) 
guideline: A Guide to Setting Targets and Measuring Performance.  Rutherford 
(2000) used qualitative characteristics of financial reporting information 
developed by accounting professions.  Hyndman and Anderson (1995, 1998) used 
criteria from a prior study by Brace, Elkin, Robinson, and Steinberg (1980). 
Australian studies by Ryan, Stanley, and Nelson (2002) based their evaluation 
criteria on Coy, Tower, and Dixon‟s (1994) study, which originated from Dixon, 
et al. (1991), and guidelines (for example, from the Municipal association of 
Victoria).  Banks, Fisher, and Nelson (1997) also used Coy, et al.‟s (1994) method 
of evaluation.  Kloot (2009) used common reporting benchmarks suggested by the 
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Productivity Commission.
57
  Lee (2006) uses existing government documents 
such as from the Productivity Commission, and the International Federation of 
Accountants. 
The New Zealand study by Dixon, Coy and Tower (1991) used primarily the 
accounting requirements by NZICA and a prior study of Gray and Haslam (1990) 
to develop evaluation criteria.  Thompson (1995) used Statement of Concepts for 
General Purpose Financial Reporting issued by NZICA (1993).  Lonti and 
Gregory (2007) used the Public Finance Act 1989.  However, Smith and Coy 
(2000) used a prior research by Coy, Tower, and Dixon (1994), who modified a 
measure of Dixon, Coy and Tower‟s (1991) study.   
4.2.2 Research using accountability expectations 
Although many studies recognised some of the components of accountability 
expectations in some ways (Hyndman & Anderson, 1995; Kloot, 2009; Lee, 2006; 
Ryan, Stanley, et al., 2002; Taylor & Rosair, 2000), no study to date has used all 
of the components of accountability expectations as their basis for examining 
service performance disclosures by public-sector entities.  The closest study was 
conducted by Taylor and Rosair (2000), using an exposition of the descriptive 
accountability literature by Davis, Weller, and Lewis (1989) and Sinclair (1995).  
They developed a quantitative measure for fiduciary and managerial 
accountability-based information within annual report disclosures, including 
performance indicators, of an Australian government department.  Taylor and 
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  The Productivity Commission is an Australian Government body which provides independent research 
and advisory services on a range of economic, social and environmental issues affecting the welfare of 
Australians (Productivity Commission, 2011). 
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Rosair (2000) used fiduciary and managerial accountability and examined if they 
were reflected in annual report disclosures of Australian government departments.  
Arguably, fiduciary could be broken down to legality and probity accountability, 
and managerial accountability to efficiency and effectiveness accountability.  
However, their results were aggregated and could not identify whether the 
components of accountability expectations were reflected in the documents, and 
service performance information is a small part of their annual report disclosures 
they examined. 
4.3 Prior research on incentives for service performance reporting 
Some prior research (discussed above) goes further to discuss the incentives that 
may affect service performance disclosures, and it identifies influential factors to 
the disclosure incentives, so as to examine cross-sectional differences in the 
disclosures.  However, the number of studies which investigate disclosure 
incentives for mandatory service performance information by public-sector 
entities is limited.  The literature examined in this study extends to voluntary 
disclosures by public-sector entities. 
The prior research‟s incentives can be categorised into four main possible 
disclosure incentives of public-sector entities.  These are the public‟s demand for 
information, agent‟s awareness of political costs, the agent capability, and agent‟s 
awareness of funding benefits.  Each of the incentives can be influenced by a 
number of factors. 
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4.3.1 The public’s demand for information:   
Ingram (1984) argued that the extent of state government disclosure was affected 
by the demand for information by constituents.  Zimmerman (1997) identified that 
the lack of incentives for voters to monitor (or demand for information from) 
politicians resulted directly in the current incomplete accounting disclosures of 
US local authorities.  Specifically, he stated “we do not observe consolidated, full 
accrual fund statements because there is little demand for them” (page 136).  
Steccolini (2004) agreed that the lack of citizens‟ interest in reading annual 
reports limited the quality of government‟s disclosures (including service 
performance information).  Ingram (1984) asserted that the greater the demand for 
information by constituents, the more accounting information that government 
would provide. 
According to the literature, a number of factors influence the public‟s demand for 
information from public-sector entities and, hence, their disclosures.  Some 
researchers argue that the greater the political competition, the greater the 
incentive for the public to demand more information to monitor incumbent 
politicians (Baber & Sen, 1984; Evan & Patton, 1987; Giroux, 1989; Ingram, 
1984; Zimmerman, 1997).  Baber (1983) defined political competition as the 
strength of opposing political parties that a politician expects to encounter in 
future elections.  In political competition, political rivals may give ex ante 
promises to constituents of greater benefits at lower costs, and claim irresponsible 
management of incumbents (Baber & Sen, 1984).  It can be expected in scenarios 
of strong political competition that the opposition political party will convince 
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constituents to watch the incumbent politicians.  This will increase constituents‟ 
(alliance voters or opposite voters) incentives to monitor incumbent politicians for 
their actions and demand information to facilitate their monitoring (Baber & Sen, 
1984; Giroux, 1989).  Therefore, the incumbents will attempt to satisfy voters‟ 
demands (assuming their primary objective is to win the next election and that 
political competition is strong) and to demonstrate their commitment to efficient 
management by using accepted reporting practices (Baber & Sen, 1984; Giroux, 
1989). 
The studies based on the US government system most found positive, significant 
relationships between political competition and disclosures (Baber, 1983; Baber & 
Sen, 1984; Evan & Patton, 1987; Giroux, 1989; Ingram, 1984; Zimmerman, 
1997).  However, the examination of voluntary internet financial disclosures by 
New Zealand local authorities found no significant relationships between political 
competition and the disclosures (Laswad, et al., 2005). 
The public‟s demand for information can also depend on size of the constituency.   
Assuming that constituents are likely to wish to maximize benefits from their 
share of taxes and to form shared interest groups which seek/pursue/lobby for 
specific service benefits (for example, the demands of Lyall Bay surfers that only 
clean sewage should be discharged from Moa Point wastewater treatment plants), 
they can demand or lobby for information to gauge resource availability and use 
(Ingram, 1984).  The greater the size of a constituent group, the more coalitions 
they can form to pressure a local authority to provide a wide array of information 
(Ingram, 1984).  This is synonymous with the private-sector, where larger firms 
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with a wider range of shareholders are exposed to greater demands and pressure 
for information (Cooke, 1989). 
Studies of government authorities found mixed results for the relationship 
between constituency size and governmental disclosures.  Schneider & Samkin, 
(2008); Ingram, (1984); Robbins & Austin, (1986); Evan and Patton (1987) found 
no significant relationship between constituency size and governmental 
disclosures.  This contrasts with Baber (1983), Ingram and DeJong, (1987), and 
Christiaens, (1999) who provided evidence of a significant relationship between 
constituency size and governmental disclosures. 
In addition to political competition and size of constituency, the sophistication of 
constituents has been argued to influence the level of the demand for 
accountability information.  Ingram (1984) contends that constituents who are 
more sophisticated (for example, higher education and/or income) are more likely 
to be more aggressive in demanding or lobbying the authority for more 
information than less sophisticated constituents.  It is possible they could be active 
in using different means (for example, hearings, submissions, media) to lobby for 
more disclosures. 
In the US, Ingram (1984) and Robbins and Austin (1986) examined the 
association between constituency sophistication and disclosures of state 
government and local councils, respectively.  While Ingram (1984) found 
positive, significant associations, Robbins and Austin (1986) found no significant 
relationship. 
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4.3.2 The agent’s awareness of political costs 
Public-sector entities that are more aware of potential political costs are likely to 
make more voluntary information disclosures in their annual reports, compared 
with those who are less aware, in order to reduce undesirable political costs (Lim 
& McKinnon, 1993).  „Political costs‟ refers to the intervention of the government 
and its regulatory agencies or other interest groups of the entity which may affect 
redistributions of wealth (Whittred & Zimmer, 1990).  Any deficiencies of a 
statutory authority‟s management could result in intervention by a government 
through a reduced appropriation of a department‟s resources to other departments, 
and replacement of key senior staff, diminution of an authority‟s functions, 
removal of price subsidies, and the disallowance of price increases (Corbett, 1985; 
Pratt, 1982; Whittred & Zimmer, 1990). 
Employees of statutory authorities can also impose political costs, such as 
employee strikes, increased wages, and improved working conditions (Moore, 
1985; Pratt, 1982).  Employees are a workforce group dependent on the statutory 
authority for their income.  Typically they are highly unionised, and trade unions 
are powerful interest groups (in Australia).  They scrutinise the fairness of work 
and pay conditions and provide support for their members (Simms & Singleton, 
1993). 
Political visibility is a factor that may give rise to political costs to an entity.  Lim 
and McKinnon (1993) state that: “At a general level, an entity which is politically 
visible (or politically sensitive or exposed) may be described as one which attracts 
a disproportionate share of scrutiny by politicians, organized groups such as trade 
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unions, and the general public, making it a potential target for the imposition of 
political costs” (page 192).  The political visibility of local authorities may stem 
from, for example, the monopoly position occupied by an authority, the essential 
nature of its services (for example, polluting the natural environment), and/or the 
number of customers and employees of authorities (Lim & McKinnon, 1993).  
Due to different environments and management, some authorities are more 
politically visible or attract more attention than others from government, trade 
unions, the public and the media (Pratt, 1982). 
The more politically visible a local authority, the greater its awareness of political 
costs, and the more disclosures an authority will make in order to improve its 
public image and reduce any political costs (Lim & McKinnon, 1993).  Similarly, 
private-sector entities which are subject to greater scrutiny are more likely to 
disclose information than those subjected to less scrutiny, in order to reduce 
political costs (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978).  Consistent with this hypothesis, Lim 
and McKinnon (1993) found a positive correlation between the political visibility 
of local authorities and the level of voluntary disclosures. 
4.3.3 The agent’s capability  
The agent‟s capability is another disclosure incentive which can be influenced by 
a number of factors.  The main constraints on the production of service 
performance information by United Kingdom local authorities were the lack of 
staff to prepare reports, a lack of financial resources to cover the costs of 
producing them, and a lack of data (Boyne, et al., 2002; Boyne & Law, 1991).  
The lack of data may be due to the use of new performance measures, making it 
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difficult to access data, particularly when compared over time (Lee, 2008), or the 
diversiveness of non-financial service performance information, making it more 
difficult to measure and assess (Admiraal, Nivra, Turksema, & Netherlands Court 
of Audit, 2009).  Arguably, lack of accounting guidance may also limit the quality 
of the reports. 
Christiaens (1999) found positive, significant associations between number of 
accounting employees and disclosures by Belgian municipalities.  However, 
Boyne and Law (1991) found the relationship between size of staff (scale) and the 
disclosures was not significant.   
Ingram (1984) and Christiaens (1999) also supported that the personal attributes 
or expertise of accounting officers could also influence the extent of local 
government reporting.  Where accounting system administrators are well 
positioned to influence accounting practices, their personal education, business 
working experience and training can make a difference to accounting reporting 
(Christiaens, 1999; Ingram, 1984).  While Ingram (1984) found a significant 
relationship between the extent of disclosures and personal attributes of staff, 
Christiaens (1999) found mixed results. 
In the private-sector, the reporting capability of an entity depends on the financial 
resources of the firm.  Wealthy firms are more likely to afford highly skilled 
accounting officers and efficient information systems which enable them to 
provide an extensive range of information (Buzby, 1975; Singhvi & Desai, 1971).  
Singhvi and Desai (1971), Buzby (1975), Cooke (1989), Bozzolan, O‟Regan, and 
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Ricceri (2006) found a significant, positive relationship between firms‟ financial 
resources and annual report disclosures in the private-sector. 
4.3.4 The agent’s awareness of funding benefits 
The greater the debt or federal funds that an authority seeks, the more incentive a 
local authority will have to prepare a report that is consistent with GAAP (Baber 
& Sen, 1984; Christiaens, 1999; Ingram, 1984; Ingram & DeJong, 1987).  This 
idea appears to be based on implicit assumptions that, first, an entity relies 
substantially on the resource, and that secondly, the resource provider uses the 
report for its decision-making.  Baber and Sen (1984), Ingram (1984) and 
Christiaens (1999) argued that public authorities seeking debt financing (for 
example, from bond-holders) would have increased incentives to provide 
compliance with a GAAP.  This is because they are aware the report can signal to 
debt providers about the quality of management (no default on bonds) which will 
gain increased confidence from the resource provider (Evan & Patton, 1987), 
thereby reducing the cost of debt and increasing the resources available for other 
public goods (Ingram & DeJong, 1987).  This idea also applies to federal fund 
resourcing (Ingram, 1984). 
Studies in public-sector reporting give mixed results on the association between 
debt and disclosures.  Robbins and Austin (1986), Ingram and DeJong (1987) and 
Evans and Patton (1987) found a positive, significant relationship between debt 
and disclosures.  However, Baber (1983), Baber and Sen (1984), Laswad, et al. 
(2005), and Christiaens (1999) found no association between them.  
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The agent‟s seeking of funds (for example, easier marketability of securities, 
greater ease in financing, increased investors‟ confidence) also motivated private-
sector entities to provide information (Buzby, 1975; Singhvi & Desai, 1971).  
Buzby (1975) and Singhvi and Desai (1971) argued that larger firms, which are 
more reliant on these benefits, tended to provide fuller or better reports, while 
smaller firms did not raise funds in the securities market and may not have wanted 
to provide fuller disclosures of their affairs, as they might endanger their 
competitive advantage over larger firms in their industry.  Buzby (1975), Singhvi 
and Desai (1971), and Cooke (1989) found significant, positive relationships 
between the potential benefits and the extent of reporting in the private-sector.   
As discussed above, the four disclosure incentives of the public-sector and their 
corresponding influencing factors are summarised in the Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Disclosure incentives and their influential factors of 
 public-sector entities 
Disclosure incentives  Influential factors 
Public‟s demand for information -political competition 
-size of constituents 
-constituency sophistication 
Agent‟s awareness of political cost -political visibility 
Agent‟s capability -staff availability 
-personal attributes of accounting staff 
-financial resource availability 
Agent‟s awareness of funding benefits -debt reliance 
-government funds reliance 
 
From Table 4.1, each of these four disclosure incentives can be related to the 
accountability concept, discussed in chapter 3.  The public‟s demand for 
information is similar to the delegator call for the information from the acceptor 
about the performance.  The agent‟s capability is assumed in the accountability 
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relationship, whereby it is expected that an acceptor is sufficiently capable (has 
enough time, knowledge, and systems) to prepare the performance information.  
The agent‟s awareness of funding benefits and any political costs can be related to 
an acceptor‟s awareness of possible rewards or sanctions in the accountability 
relationship.  Such awareness of funding benefits or rewards can motivate a 
public-sector entity to provide quality disclosures (Baber & Sen, 1984; 
Christiaens, 1999; Ingram, 1984; Ingram & DeJong, 1987).  However, the 
awareness of sanctions may provide incentives for an acceptor to distort or bias 
the information in order to avoid possible sanctions (Fandt & Ferris, 1990; 
Normanton, 1971; Patton, 1992; Perks, 1993), as discussed in chapter 3.  
Arguably, the awareness of political costs can motivate a public-sector entity to 
provide full disclosures in order to reduce political costs (Lim and McKinnon, 
1993). 
From another point of view, the public‟s demand for information and the agent‟s 
awareness of political costs are based on external pressures on the agent to be 
responsible to constituents (or stakeholders), while the agent‟s awareness of 
benefits comes from an internal need by the agent.  These pressures can determine 
what public-sector entities would like to disclose.  However, the agent‟s capability 
can be seen as a limitation on what they disclose. 
4.4 Incentives applicable for wastewater disclosures  
New Zealand local authorities are unique in nature and their incentives for SSP 
disclosure have not yet been investigated in prior research in the public-sector.  In 
essence, New Zealand local authorities rely very little on debt and government 
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funding, but rely mostly on taxes, including rates.  As described in chapter 3, 
government grants and subsidies to local authorities, in 2009, accounted on 
average for only 10.96 percent of total revenue, and debt was 7.59 percent of total 
assets, while local taxes amounted to 61.1 percent of total revenue.  Government 
is most likely to use its legislative report (the budget), and financial institutions 
are most likely to use specific reports, such as asset management plans and 
financial and funding policy, rather than SSP disclosures, when making decisions 
on funding.  Hence, the awareness of funding benefits will not be a relevant 
incentive for SSP reporting by a New Zealand local authority, and therefore are 
not included in the study. 
Therefore, the incentives of local authorities in New Zealand to disclose 
information in SSPs are: public demand for the disclosure; awareness of political 
costs; and the local authority‟s capability.  Their corresponding influential factors, 
discussed above, will also apply.  Table 4.2 summarises the disclosure incentives 
and influential factors applicable for wastewater disclosures in an SSP by New 
Zealand local authorities.  
Table 4.2: SSPs wastewater disclosure incentives and influential factors 
of New Zealand local authorities 
Disclosure incentives  Influential factors 
Public‟s demand for SSP disclosures -political competition 
-size of constituency 
-constituency sophistication 
Local authority‟s awareness of political cost -political visibility 
Local authority‟s capability -staff availability 
-personal attributes of accounting 
staff 
-financial resource availability 
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The public‟s demand for wastewater disclosures can be caused by heightened 
political competition where candidates for council persuade the public of the need 
to monitor incumbent councillors in relation to wastewater management.  Further, 
the large population size of a territorial authority, in which people wish to 
maximise the benefits of their taxes paid, may form coalitions which lobby the 
territorial authority for better wastewater services.  Similarly, more sophisticated 
constituents who are interested in wastewater performance of their territorial 
authority may use various means to exert pressure on the territorial authority to 
provide more accountable wastewater disclosures.  As discussed, the effect of the 
public‟s demand for wastewater disclosures is consistent with the OAG‟s (2008) 
view that a lack of public demand may result in poor SSP reporting (Office of the 
Auditor-General, 2008). 
Where territorial authorities operate the wastewater operation, they can expect 
potential intervention from the regulator as by nature wastewater operation 
pollutes the environment.  If they do not comply with the legal requirements (for 
example, under the Resource Management Act 1991), they may be subject to 
public criticism, enforcement order from the regional council, and tighter 
regulations imposed by other oversight bodies.  Therefore, they may choose to 
provide more comprehensive information on their wastewater performance in 
order to avoid any intervention.  However, Neale and Anderson (2000) argued 
that public-sector entities reported less of their service performance information in 
order to avoid public attention that could have potential political costs. 
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A local authority‟s capability (for example, lacking an efficient information 
system) may be a constraint on what can be disclosed about wastewater services.  
It is possible that territorial authorities with more staff, staff expertise, and the 
financial resources with which to compile wastewater information are more likely 
to provide more comprehensive disclosures.  This argument is consistent with 
Neale and Anderson‟s (2002) argument that poor SSP reporting may be caused by 
a lack of resources to prepare the report, as mentioned in chapter 2.  Although 
number of staff and financial resources of local authorities may be limited, staff 
expertise may be increased through education and comprehensive accounting 
guidance supported by regulators and accounting professions. 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter provides details from the empirical work on service performance 
information, and identifies disclosure incentives as well as their influential factors 
applicable to wastewater disclosures by New Zealand local authorities.  As found 
in the United Kingdom and Australia, New Zealand public-sector entities do not 
satisfactorily report on their service performance information.  Studies on SSP by 
New Zealand local authorities are very limited.  Among public-sector studies, no 
studies have used the current authoritative requirements or all of the components 
of accountability expectations, derived from literature, to examine SSP reporting 
by New Zealand local authorities. 
Given the limited prior research on service performance information, the literature 
reviewed in this study extends to voluntary disclosures by public-sector entities in 
order to identify disclosure incentives and their influential factors that are 
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applicable for wastewater disclosures.  According to the prior research and the 
particular setting of New Zealand local government, three possible incentives are 
identified.  These are the public‟s demand for information, agent‟s awareness of 
political costs, and the agent capability.  Each of the incentives is influenced by a 
number of factors as listed in Table 4.2.  Provided that these incentives of SSPs by 
New Zealand local governments have not been empirically tested, the third 
objective of this study is to examine the influential factors that may explain cross-
sectional differences of wastewater disclosures. 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 provides basis for the study‟s objectives.  The next chapter 
will discuss the methodology used for examining wastewater disclosures 
according to the objectives of the study. 
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Chapter 5: Methodology for Examining Statements of Service 
Performance 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the methodology for measuring the consistency of 
wastewater disclosures with authoritative requirements and accountability 
expectations, and for investigating the association of influential factors with SSPs.  
Section 5.2 outlines the appropriate methods used in this research – disclosure 
indices and multiple regression analysis.  Section 5.3 explores the development of 
indices for wastewater disclosures, according to authoritative requirements and 
accountability expectations.  The independent variables applicable for the research 
and used in the regression analysis are reviewed in section 5.4.  Section 5.5 
presents the data source, and section 5.6 summarises the chapter. 
5.2 The methods of analysis  
To address the first and second research objectives concerning the consistency of 
wastewater disclosures in SSPs with the authoritative requirements and 
accountability expectations, disclosure indices will be developed.
58
  The indices 
will enable cross sectional comparability and statistical analysis of the association 
of the influential factors with the SSPs. 
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 Beattie, McInnes, Fearnley. (2004) point out that an index is a partial form of content analysis.  
Content analysis makes inferences about the text examined by classifying words, phrases, 
sentences or other units in the text into content categories and/or items, each of which is presumed 
to contain units of similar meanings web(Weber, 1985).  Once units of the text have been assigned 
to particular categories or items, analysis can be undertaken.  However, there is no one right 
approach to the analysis (Weber, 1985); indeed, it can vary from qualitative and verbally 
descriptive methods to quantitative methods that permit statistical analysis (Beatie, et al., 2004).  
An index makes an inference about the text in a quantitative format. 
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A disclosure index is a popular instrument used by various researchers to measure 
the extent of particular information in annual reports of organisations (Marston & 
Shrives, 1991) (See Appendix B for examples for studies using disclosure indices 
to assess the different types of information within annual reports.)  A number of 
studies use indices to examine both financial and non-financial disclosures 
(Buzby, 1975; Cooke, 1989; Coy, et al., 1994; Robbins & Austin, 1986; Ryan, 
Stanley, et al., 2002; Smith & Coy, 2000; Stanley, Jennings, & Mack, 2008; 
Taylor & Rosair, 2000).  Some studies use disclosure indices for specific 
disclosures – for example, disclosures about the entity‟s environmental 
performance (Clarkson, Li, Richardson, & Vasvari, 2008; Hughes, Anderson, & 
Golden, 2001; Wiseman, 1982), intellectual capital (Bozzolan, O'Regan, & 
Ricceri, 2006; Schneider & Samkin, 2008; Williams, 2001) and service 
performance information (Boyne & Law, 1991). 
To investigate the relationship between the disclosures and the influential factors, 
as discussed in chapter 4, multiple regression analysis will be used.   Multiple 
regression analysis is a statistical tool that can be used to examine/determine the 
relationship between a single dependent variable and several independent 
variables (Field, 2005).   Numerous accounting research studies in both private 
and public-sector s use multiple regression analysis to test the association between 
their disclosure indices and other designated variables (Baber, 1983; Baber & Sen, 
1984; Boyne & Law, 1991; Bozzolan, et al., 2006; Buzby, 1975; Christiaens, 
1999; Cooke, 1989; Evan & Patton, 1987; Giroux, 1989; Ingram, 1984; Ingram & 
DeJong, 1987; Laswad, et al., 2005; Lim & McKinnon, 1993; Robbins & Austin, 
1986; Singhvi & Desai, 1971). 
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5.3 Index Development 
Given the two different measures of SSPs in this study, two indices will be 
developed – an Authoritative Requirement (AR) index and an Accountability 
Expectation (AE) index.  Marston and Shrives (1991) reviewed the development 
of an index, and found it generally involved three steps, namely: (i) selection of 
items to be included in the index; (ii) the allocation of weights to the items (if 
appropriate); and (iii) the development of a scoring system.  In this study, items of 
the two indices will be selected from wastewater disclosures, based on two 
different criteria and sharing the same weight allocation and scoring system for 
consistency of the results. 
5.3.1 Item selection  
As the number of items disclosed in the documents studied could be very large, 
researchers select a certain set of items, based on various criteria (Beatie, et al., 
2004).  Item selection for the index may be based on statutory requirements, 
guidance and recommendations by authoritative bodies, best practice, an expert‟s 
suggestions, and literature.  For example, Clarkson, et al. (2008) selected 95 items 
based on guidelines from the „Global Reporting Initiative‟, published in 2002, and 
recommendations from an expert in environmental reporting.  Buzby (1975) 
selected 39 items based on the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
requirements.  Cooke (1989) based his 224 items on previous similar studies, 
recommendations by the International Accounting Standards Committee and 
Foreningen Auktoriserade Revisorere, statutory requirements, and consultation 
with the Swedish practising accountants for the pilot study.  Stanley, Jennings and 
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Mack (2008) selected 11 items based on a Local Government Finance Standard 
(1994), a bulletin released by the Queensland Government Department of Local 
Government and Planning, and research reports on „Popular Reporting and 
Performance Reporting‟, prepared by the Government Accounting Standard 
Board.  A number of studies (Banks & Nelson, 1994; Coy & Dixon, 2004; Fisher, 
Nelson, & Banks, 1996; Nelson, et al., 1997; Ryan, Stanley, et al., 2002; Smith & 
Coy, 2000; Tooley & Guthrie, 2001) based their item selection on Coy, et al. 
(1994).  Thus, the number of index items in prior studies has ranged from 11 
items (Stanley, et al., 2008) to 224 (Cooke, 1989).  Further, the items selected 
may be classified under different categories.  For example, Wiseman (1982) 
classified the items across four categories (economic factors, environmental 
litigation, pollution abatement items, and other environmentally related items). 
5.3.1.1 Authoritative Requirement (AR) index items 
The selection of AR index items of wastewater disclosures is based on the 
authoritative requirements derived from statutory requirements (Local 
Government Act 2002, Schedule 10, Part 3 (15(e))) and relevant GAAP (NZ IAS 
1, NZ Framework), as discussed in chapter 2.  In short, they are: 
1. contains audited information on the comparison between targets (set out in 
LTCC) and actual levels of service; performance; as well as explanations 
for any significant variance from the comparison  (Local Government Act, 
2002, Schedule 10, part 3 (15(e)); 
2. reports on quantity, quality, time, location, and cost of the output or 
service delivery, if relevant (NZ IAS 1, para 126.4); and 
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3. be relevant, reliable, comparable, and understandable (NZ Framework, 
paras 25-42 and TPA-9, paras 5.10-5.39). 
Figure 2.1 illustrating the connection between the components of the authoritative 
requirements in the context of wastewater disclosures provides a model for the 
selection of the AR index items which are shown in Table 5.1.  From Table 5.1, 
the AR items selected comprise 64 items in total, which are categorised according 
to the qualitative characteristics of relevance, comparability, understandability and 
reliability.  There are 15 items categorized under relevance, 45 under 
comparability, 3 under understandability, and 1 under reliability.  Relevance and 
comparability categories contain the details of each of the wastewater service‟s 
dimensions (quantity, quality, location, time, and cost). 
 
 
 109 
 
Table 5.1: Categories and items of the AR index 
Categories/Items 
Relevance Comparability 
Actual Quantity Target Quantity Explanation of sig.var. of Quantity, if any Past Quantity 
Actual quantity of wastewater collection  Target quantity of wastewater collection  Explnt‟n of sig var of quantity of collection  Past quantity of wastewater collection  
Actual quantity of wastewater treatment Target quantity of wastewater treatment Explnt‟n of sig var of quantity of treatment  Past quantity of wastewater treatment 
Actual quantity of wastewater disposal Target quantity of wastewater disposal Explnt‟n of sig var of quantity of disposal Past quantity of wastewater disposal  
    
Actual Quality Target Quality Explanation of sig.var. of Quality, if any Past Quality 
Actual standards to be met  Target standards to be met Explnt‟n of sig var of standards to be met Past standards to be met 
Actual reliability of the service Target reliability of the service  Explnt‟n of sig var of reliability of the service  Past reliability of the service 
Actual customers‟ satisfaction Target customers‟ satisfaction Explnt‟n of sig var of customers‟ satisfaction Past customers‟ satisfaction 
    
Actual Location Target Location Explanation of sig.var. of Location, if any Past Location 
Actual location of wastewater collection  Target location of wastewater collection  Explnt‟n of sig var of location of collection  Past location of wastewater collection  
Actual location of wastewater disposal Target location of wastewater disposal Explnt‟n of sig var of location of treatment Past location of wastewater treatment 
Actual location of wastewater treatment Target location of wastewater treatment Explnt‟n of sig var of location of disposal Past location of wastewater disposal 
    
Actual Time Target Time Explanation of sig.var. of Time, if any Past Time 
Actual time compliance with milestones Target time compliance with milestones Explnt‟n of sig var of time compliance with milestones Past time compliance with milestones 
Actual time response to incidents Target time response to incidents Explnt‟n of sig var of time response to incidents Past time response to incidents 
Actual time of service availability Target time of service availability Explnt‟n of sig var of time of service availability Past time of service availability 
    
Actual Cost Target Cost Explanation of sig.var. of Cost, if any Past Cost 
Actual total cost of wastewater Target/budget total cost of wastewater Explnt‟n of sig var of total cost of wastewater Past total cost of wastewater 
Actual cost of wastewater by direct/indirect cost Target cost of wastewater by direct/indirect cost Explnt‟n of sig var of wastewater by direct/indirect  cost  Past cost of wastewater by direct/ indirect 
cost 
Actual cost of wastewater by system Target cost of wastewater by system Explnt‟n of sig var of cost of wastewater by system Past cost of wastewater by system 
 
Understandability 
Separate heading for wastewater disclosures 
Use of visual aids (tables or graphs) 
Explanation of technical terms, if any 
 
Reliability 
Unqualified audit statement for SSP 
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Quantity of wastewater service is based on the three main operations of the 
wastewater system – wastewater collection, treatment, and disposal.  Its items 
relate to: 
1. length of reticulated pipe or number of pump stations; 
2. number of treatment plants or capacity, amount of wastewater that a plant 
can take; and 
3. amount of treated wastewater discharged to an outfall. 
Quality of wastewater activity concerns the activity meeting the standards or legal 
requirements, reliability of the service provisions, and residents‟ satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction (complaints).  Its items relate to: 
1. level of compliance with relevant resource consent conditions; 
2. number of blockages or overflows; and 
3. number of complaints relating to odours from wastewater treatment 
facilities, or percentage of customer satisfaction with the service. 
Location of wastewater activity refers to places where their collection, treatment, 
and disposal occur.  Its items relate to: 
1. suburb of wastewater pipelines or pump stations being installed or 
maintained;  
2. suburb of wastewater treatment plants; and 
3. river where treated wastewater is disposed. 
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Time of wastewater activity is about the date of completion regarding wastewater 
activity, response time for a service, time availability of service.  Its items relate 
to: 
1. completion date to upgrade pipelines or pump stations; 
2. percentage of emergency repairs attended to within one hour; and/or hours 
used to clear all sewer blockages; and 
3. hours of service available or unavailable. 
Cost of wastewater activities can be total operating expenses of wastewater, and 
their details, by direct or indirect costs, for the different operations of the 
wastewater system.  Its items relate to: 
1. total expenditure for wastewater activities; 
2. overheads, interest, and depreciation expenses of wastewater activities; 
and 
3. collecting, treating, and disposing expenses of wastewater activities or 
wastewater expenses of plants A, B, and C. 
Using these wastewater dimensions, relevance and comparability items are 
formed.  Understandability and reliability items will be based on all the 
wastewater disclosures. 
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Relevance requires actual (present) performance of the reporting year.
59
  
Therefore, the disclosure items relating to quantity, quality, location, time, and 
costs of wastewater activities are in their actual terms for the reporting year.  
Given three items in each dimension, there are 15 items in this category. 
Comparability requires the presentation of target performance, explanation of 
significant variance, if any, between actual and target performance, and past 
performance.  Targets of the 15 disclosure items relating to quantity, quality, 
location, time, and costs of wastewater activities are accounted for.  Explanation 
is also needed of significant variance of the 15 disclosure items, relating to 
quantity, quality, location, time, and costs of wastewater activities.  Variance 
arises when there are differences between the actual achievement and the target.  
Note that a difference above 10 percent is considered significant, for which 
explanation should be presented (Garrison, Noreen, & Brewer, 2006).  Past 
performance of the 15 disclosure items, relating to quantity, quality, location, 
time, and costs of wastewater activities, is also accounted for.  Note that in this 
research, „past‟ means prior year(s) beyond the year of the report.  Given three 
aspects of comparability (targets, explanation of variance, and past) to be 
considered for each wastewater items, there is a maximum of 45 items in this 
category. 
Understandability deals with the format and presentation of the information.  
Understandability items are a separate heading for wastewater services, and 
                                                 
59
 Actual performance information provides more objective ground for relevant information than 
deciding on the logical link with an entity‟s objective, and if the information meets the demand of 
stakeholders.   
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include visual aids (such as tables or graphs) for wastewater disclosures, and an 
explanation of technical terms, if any.  Rutherford (2000) and Stanley, Jennings 
and Mack (2008) support that visual aids such as tables and graphs are found to be 
useful for annual report disclosures by public-sector entities. 
Reliability can be assured by unqualified audit statements for SSPs.  The 
reliability item is the audit statement that „service provision information presents 
fairly‟ in the audit report.  Smith and Coy (2000), and Admiraal, Nivra and 
Turksema (2009) support that an audit report can provide a high level of 
assurance on the reliability of information.  There is one item for this category.   
5.3.1.2 Accountability Expectation (AE) index items 
As discussed in chapter 3, the four accountability expectations (probity, legality, 
process/efficiency, performance/programme effectiveness) derived from literature 
form the bases for desired characteristics of wastewater disclosures.  The AE 
index items are selected and categorised according to these accountability 
expectations.  Because of the broad terms of the accountability expectations, the 
study‟s specific focus on wastewater disclosures, and absence of prior research on 
the disclosures, a list of AE index items were identified, based on best practice.  In 
order to identify items for each of the categories (components of accountability 
expectations), the researcher looked at all the wastewater disclosures of all 73 
territorial authorities.  Wastewater disclosures of 10 territorial authorities that 
were considered to be reasonably representative as best disclosures of the category 
were selected.  Therein, the most commonly used performance measures or 
information applicable for the category.  Since there were four categories of AE 
 114 
 
index, four rounds of consideration were undertaken.  Table 5.2 sets out the items 
selected for AE index across the categories. 
Table 5.2: Categories and items of the AR index 
Categories/Items 
Probity accountability 
Actual operating expenditure for wastewater services 
Target operating expenditure for wastewater services 
Actual capital expenditure for wastewater services 
Target capital expenditure for wastewater services 
 
Legality accountability 
Compliance with the Resource Management Act 1991 
Compliance with the Health Act 1956 
 
Process/efficiency accountability  
Actual operating expenditure and actual quantity 
 
Performance/programme/ effectiveness accountability  
Performance measure (actual and target) about compliance with  resource consent 
conditions 
Performance measure (actual and target) about compliance with resource consent 
conditions by plants or consent types 
Performance measure (actual and target) reliability of the service 
Performance measure (actual and target) reliability of the service 
Performance measure (actual and target) response time to 
blockages/overflows/accidental discharges that occurred 
Performance measure (actual and target) response time to 
blockages/overflows/accidental discharges that occurred 
Actual and target project 
Actual project achievement by sites 
 
Probity accountability items are cost disclosures relating to actual operating 
expenditure, target operating expenditure, actual capital expenditure, and target 
expenditure for wastewater services.  Funds can be spent on both operating 
expenditures and capital expenditure.  To facilitate the assessment of whether 
funds were spent as planned, the actual and the target expenditures of operating 
expenditure and capital expenditure were included.  There are four items in this 
category. 
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Legality accountability items relate to compliance with the Resource Management 
Act 1991 and the Health Act 1956 (the two primary pieces of legislation 
governing wastewater services of local authorities).  The item relating to the 
Resource Management Act 1991 is about compliance with the resource consent 
conditions.  The item relating to the Health Act 1991 is about reliability of the 
services (for example, occurrence of blockages/overflows is none) or the time 
response to incidents (for example, response to blockages, made within one hour).  
There are two items in this category – one for each Act. 
Process/efficiency accountability item requires the presence of both actual 
operating expenditure and actual quantity.  From best practice, an efficiency ratio 
is not provided.  There is one item for this category. 
Performance/programme/ effectiveness accountability items are performance 
measures (with actual achievements and targets) relating to compliance with the 
resource consent conditions; reliability of wastewater service; and response time 
to incidents.  Details by plants or consent types for compliance with the resource 
consent conditions, and the addition of a performance measure relating to 
reliability and response time are also included.  Information about actual 
achievements and targets of the project and details of the project achievement 
(such as by sites) are also included.  Note that targets used are required to be clear 
– quantitatively measurable (Alves, et al., 2005; Pendlebury, et al., 1994).  There 
are eight items in this category. 
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As discussed above, there are total of 15 items for the AE index across four 
categories: four items for probity, two for legality, one for process/efficiency, 
eight for performance/programme/ effectiveness accountability. 
5.3.2 Weights determination 
Some studies weigh their disclosure items and some do not.  In this study, the 
items of both indices were not weighted.  The disclosures are reported to the 
public at large, which comprises diverse interest groups.  It is expected that 
different people will assign different weights to the items (Cooke, 1989).  To 
assign weight without empirical support might impact on the validity of the 
results.  Non-weighting is chosen as the most conservative way to avoid bias 
created through instrumentation. 
Different disclosure items may have varying levels of importance for users of 
entities‟ annual reports and, in order to recognise these different levels of 
importance, the index items may be weighted appropriately (Marston & Shrives, 
1991).  Typically, different levels of importance accorded to index items by users 
are identified by conducting an attitude survey among relevant user groups 
(Marston & Shrives, 1991).  For example, Schneider and Samkin (2008), Buzby 
(1975), Robbins and Austin (1986), Taylor and Rosair (2000) assigned weights to 
their index items based on the average weight score derived from survey 
responses.  Adopting a different stance, Coy, et al. (1994) and Smith and Coy 
(2000) assigned weights on a 3-point scale based on their perception of the 
relative importance of the index items.  Their weighting system was adopted by 
Bank and Nelson (1994); Coy, et al. (1994), Banks, et al. (1997), Fischer, et al. 
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(1996), Nelson, et al. (1997), Ryan, Stanley, et al. (2002), Smith and Coy (2000), 
and Tooley and Guthrie (2001).  However, Cooke (1989) argued that different 
groups in, or segments of, the wider public are likely to accord different levels of 
importance to different disclosure items, and their varying opinions are likely to 
average each other out.  As a result, the index items included could be regarded as 
of equal importance; hence, weighting of the index items would not be necessary.  
Arguably, by not weighting, an item could be biased for giving equal weight to 
items that are not of equal importance (Wei, et al., 2008).  By weighting or not 
weighting the index items, certain degree of subjectivity is involved.  However, 
weighting items can run more risk of subjectivity due to the involvement of more 
parties. 
5.3.3 Scoring development  
The final step of index development is to decide on the scoring of items in the 
index.  The simplest form of scoring for evaluating the index item is dichotomous 
scoring – to score as 1 if present; 0 if absent.  Such scoring is unweighted and has 
been used in various studies, for example, by Clarkson, et al. (2008), Williams 
(2001), and Cooke (1989).  Williams (2001) points out that this dichotomous 
method avoids “potential issues of subjectivity that tend to arise when a weighted 
scoring is applied” (p. 196). 
Some researchers have developed a wider range of scale beyond dichotomous 
scoring as the scoring criteria may be more complicated and abstract.  For 
example, quantitative information may be scored most highly (say with 4), with 
progressively lower scores being assigned to qualitative or descriptive information 
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(for example, 3), vague/obscure information (2), the absence of relevant 
disclosures (1) and the absence of any information (0).  Wiseman (1982), Hughes, 
et al. (2001), Bozzolan, et al. (2006) and Schneider and Samkin (2008) have each 
used such a system.  However, the criteria are questionable for their subjectivity 
as to why quantitative information is more important than qualitative information.  
Bozzolan, et al. (2006) argues that this way of scoring (scaling) can be seen as 
another kind of weighting, based on the type of measure (qualitative vs 
quantitative) associated with the information disclosed. 
In this research, dichotomous scoring is used to avoid any possible bias (Williams, 
2001).  A score of 1 is assigned to an item if it is present in the disclosure.  A 
score of 0 is assigned if the item is absent in the disclosure.  Some AR index 
items, relating to explanation of significant variance, if any, and the explanation 
of technical terms, if any, may not be relevant and are allocated as N/A (missing).  
In the case of explaining significant variance, if any, there may not be any 
variance, or the variances incurred are not significant.  In the case of explanation 
of technical terms, if any, there may not be any technical term disclosed.  
Therefore, the most conservative way of treating this item is to not assign any 
score.  For AE index items, all items can be assigned a score of 1 or 0 as there is 
no „if any‟ item. 
After scores were assigned to each item, to calculate an entity‟s index the scores 
are multiplied by weight, if any, for each item of an entity.  The weighted (or 
unweighted) scores for all items are then aggregated to obtain a total index score 
for an entity (Boyne & Law, 1991; Clarkson, et al., 2008; Coy, et al., 1994; 
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Hughes, et al., 2001; Ryan, Stanley, et al., 2002; Schneider & Samkin, 2008; 
Smith & Coy, 2000; Stanley, et al., 2008; Wiseman, 1982).  Alternatively, an 
index could be expressed in terms of a percentage of the total maximum score 
(Bozzolan, et al., 2006; Coy, et al., 1994; Robbins & Austin, 1986).  Buzby 
(1975) and Cooke (1989) took a slightly different angle by dividing the total 
aggregated scores with the scores expected to be earned for a given entity, rather 
than the maximum possible score, as some items of disclosure were not relevant 
to the entity and, consequently, the entity should not be penalised for its non-
disclosure of an item that was not relevant. 
In this study, for each local authority, the scores assigned for all the items are first 
aggregated.  The aggregated scores were then divided by a maximum score for the 
council to form a percentage score (an index).  For the AE index, the maximum 
score for each council is 15 corresponding to 15 items.  However, for the AR 
index, the maximum score across councils varies according to the number of 
relevant items, for which a score (of 1 or 0) can be assigned.  By dividing by a 
council‟s maximum possible score (AR index), an authority is not penalised for 
non-disclosure of those items not relevant to its situation (Buzby, 1975; Cooke, 
1989). Authorities with a high percentage index score indicate a high consistency 
or correspondence of disclosure with the authoritative requirements (AR index) 
and the accountability expectation (AE index). 
The AR and AE indices can be ranked cross-sectionally; however, they cannot 
identify the degree of difference.  A disclosure index (whether weighted or non-
weighted) achieves an ordinal measurement, but is unlikely to achieve an interval 
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measurement (Beatie, et al., 2004; Coy, et al., 1994; Marston & Shrives, 1991).  
This means that an item rated as a 4 is deemed to be better than that with 1, but 
not necessarily four times better than an item rated 1 (Coy, et al., 1994; Marston 
& Shrives, 1991). 
5.4 Independent variables for multiple regression analysis 
Corresponding to the incentives and their influential factors applicable for 
wastewater disclosures, as discussed in chapter 4, five independent variables – 
population, median income of constituents, number of staff, revenue and total 
assets – are used to test their association with the disclosure indices (AR and AE 
indices).  These independent variables were chosen, based on prior research and 
their accessibility in the New Zealand local government context.  Table 5.3 
provides a summary of the empirical results of the multiple regression analysis 
between the disclosure index and independent variables, which derived from the 
same basis as the study‟s influential factors (political competition, size of 
constituents, sophistication of constituents, staff availability, staff attributes, 
financial resources availability, and political visibility), as discussed in chapter 4.
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Table 5.3: Summary of empirical results of influential factors affecting disclosures 
Influential factors and  
  Independent variables 
Singhvi 
&Desai 
(1971), 
Buzby 
(1975) 
Baber 
(1983) 
Baber&
Sen 
(1984) 
Ingram 
(1984) 
Robbins& 
Austin 
(1986) 
Evan& 
Patton 
(1987) 
Ingram& 
DeJong 
(1987) 
Giroux 
(1989) 
Cooke 
(1989) 
Boyne&
Law 
(1991) 
Lim& 
McKinnon 
(1993) 
Christiaens 
(1999) 
Lasward 
et al. 
(2005) 
Bozzolan   
et al. 
(2006) 
Political competition                
  Percentage vote of minority party   +Sig + Sig +Sig    Not Sig       
  Ratio of candidates to position              Not Sig  
 Size of constituents                
  Population    +Sig  Not Sig Not Sig Not Sig +Sig     +Sig   
Sophistication of constituents                
  Median school years     +Sig           
  Median income     Not Sig Not Sig          
Staff availability                
  No. of staff*           Not Sig  +Sig   
Staff attributes                
  Appointed by governor     +Sig           
  Level of education             Not Sig   
  Having training per              +Sig   
  Having business experience             Not Sig   
Financial Resources availability                
  Revenue*          +Sig     +Sig 
  Total assets* + Sig + Sig        + Sig     +Sig 
Political visibility                
  Revenue*            +Sig    
  Total assets*            +Sig    
  No. of staff*            +Sig    
  No. of pages an    
  authority is cited in the  
  Hansard Report 
           +Sig    
 
*This independent variable is repeated under other influential factors. 
+Sig and Not Sig indicate positively significant relationship and insignificant relationship, respectively, based on p<.05.
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„Percentage vote of minority party‟ is a popular variable used to proxy political 
competition and found mostly to be positively significant to the disclosure in US 
public-sector studies (Baber, 1983; Baber & Sen, 1984; Giroux, 1989; Ingram, 
1984).  This percentage vote of minority party variable is suitable in a jurisdiction 
where there are only a few minority parties to which candidates can belong.   
However, it is not applicable in New Zealand local government elections, where 
candidates are independent of political parties.  Further, there are a number of 
candidates running for various positions.  Therefore, percentage vote of minority 
individuals may exceed the percentage vote of winning candidates.  Laswad, et al. 
(2005) used „number of candidates‟ to „positions available‟ and found an 
insignificant relationship with the internet disclosure by a New Zealand local 
government study.  However, this variable may not be an effective proxy for 
political competition and, hence, may explain the Laswad, et al. (2005) result.  A 
local authority with a smaller number of candidates to positions available may 
have stronger political competition than that of a larger number of candidates to 
positions available.  Therefore, this variable is not considered in this study.  Given 
New Zealand‟s unique local government setting, a variable that is suitable for 
representing the level of political competition needs further development. 
Population is a typical variable used to proxy size of constituents by public-sector 
studies.  However, the relationship between population and disclosures is 
inconsistent across studies (Baber, 1983; Christiaens, 1999; Evan & Patton, 1987; 
Ingram, 1984; Robbins & Austin, 1986).  This may be due to the fact that the 
population in some jurisdictions may be more aggressive in maximising its share 
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of benefits from tax money and therefore forms groups of shared interests that 
seek/pursue/lobby for specific service benefits. 
Median school years of constituents and median income of constituents are used 
to proxy constituency sophistication (Ingram, 1984; Robbins & Austin, 1986).  
However, the information about median school years of constituents in each local 
authority in New Zealand is not accessible.  Hence, median income of constituents 
is used as an independent variable for sophistication of constituents in this study. 
In terms of measuring staff availability, Boyne and Law (1991) used number of 
staff within the authorities, while Christiaens (1999) specifically used number of 
„accounting‟ staff who can potentially prepare reports.  Although the number of 
„accounting‟ staff is more likely to be varied proportionately with the number of 
an authority‟s staff, Boyne and Law‟s (1991) and Christiaens‟ (1999) results are 
contradictory.  The number of „accounting‟ staff seems to be more closely related 
to local authority‟s capability of preparing SSPs.  However, owing to the 
accessibility of the information, this research uses number of staff of an authority. 
Personal attributes of accounting staff can be proxied by a number of variables.  
Ingram (1984) uses a selection process of recruiting accounting staff (elected, 
appointed by legislature, jointly appointed by governor and legislature, or 
appointed by governor), which is thought to proxy personal attributes of the 
accounting staff.  A governor is more able to select well-experienced staff who are 
more capable of providing rigorous reports (Ingram, 1984).  Ingram (1984) found 
a significant relationship between appointed staff by a governor and the extent of 
disclosure.  Arguably, this variable is a weak proxy to staff‟s personal attributes, 
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as a governor can be biased in his/her selection.  However, in New Zealand the 
selection of accounting system administrators (as well as other staff) is only 
through appointment by the chief executive.  Therefore, this proxy is not 
applicable in the New Zealand local government context or this study. 
Personal attributes of accounting staff can also be proxied by the level of the 
accounting staff‟s education, whether or not accounting staff have training via 
other accounting staff and business experience (Christiaens, 1999).  Christiaens 
(1999) found that only having training experience is positively associated with the 
disclosure.  In spite of the merit of Christiaens‟ (1999) variable to proxy staff‟s 
personal attributes, the information regarding these attributes is not accessible in 
New Zealand. 
Revenue and/or total assets are widely used to proxy the availability of firms‟ 
financial resources and are commonly found to be significantly and positively 
associated with the extent of disclosures (Bozzolan, et al., 2006; Buzby, 1975; 
Cooke, 1989; Singhvi & Desai, 1971).  In spite of this research being based on 
corporate entities, the revenue and total assets offered valid comparisons for local 
authorities in New Zealand.  It is possible that wealthier authorities will have 
financial resources to provide the necessary support (effective information 
management systems) for collecting data for SSP reporting.  
A number of variables can be used to proxy political visibility.  Revenue and total 
assets are two possible variables (Lim & McKinnon, 1993).  Each of them has 
different links to political visibility.  The total assets give a measure of total 
resources that an authority controls, and mirrors the monopoly position occupied 
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by an authority.  Revenue provides a measure of the number of customers who 
may criticise the authority for its services (Lim & McKinnon, 1993). 
Lim and McKinnon (1993) also use „number of staff‟ as one proxy for political 
visibility.  They argue that the larger the number of employees or staff a local 
authority has, the greater the possibility that the authority will be politically 
visible to unions and may be subject to political costs imposed by employees.  
This argument can also apply in New Zealand local government. 
Lim and McKinnon (1993) also use number of pages in the Hansard Report as a 
proxy for political visibility.  The occurrence of issues about statutory authorities 
in parliamentary debates can reflect political visibility.  However, this method is 
not seen as an appropriate method to measure political visibility of the New 
Zealand local government, as many issues are settled locally before they reach 
Parliament.  The Ministry for the Environment (2009) surveyed resource 
management of local authorities 2007/2008, and found that approximately 45 
percent of detected instances of non-compliance with resource consent conditions 
under the Resource Management Act 1991 were resolved by informal means; 54 
percent were resolved by formal means (such as by abatement notices, 
infringement notices, prosecution, enforcement orders).  Therefore, it is less likely 
that much evidence will be found in the Hansard Report concerning local 
authorities‟ wastewater issues in New Zealand. 
The above discussion identifies the variables of influential factors used in the 
study – population, constituents‟ median income, number of staff, revenue, and 
total assets as independent variables in this study.  Some variables can proxy for 
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more than one influential factor.  „Number of staff‟ can proxy both staff 
availability and political visibility.  Revenue and total assets can proxy for both 
financial resources availability and political visibility.  Population and median 
income of constituents individually represents the size of constituents and 
constituency sophistication, respectively.  Table 5.4 extends Table 4.2 with the 
inclusion of the variables used in this study to proxy their influential factors for 
wastewater disclosures. 
Table 5.4: Variables used to proxy influential factors for  
wastewater disclosures 
Disclosure 
incentives 
Influential factors Variables 
Public‟s  demand  for 
SSP disclosures 
 -  Political competition 
 -  Size of constituency 
 -  Constituency   
    sophistication 
 -  Not accessible 
 -  Population 
 -  Median income 
Local authority‟s 
awareness of political cost 
 -  Political visibility  -  Revenue  
 -  Total assets 
 -  No of staff 
Local authority‟s 
capability 
 -  Staff availability 
 -  Personal attributes of  
    accounting staff 
 -  Financial resource        
    availability 
 -  No of staff 
 -  Not accessible 
 
-  Revenue  
-  Total assets 
 
 
5.5 Data sources and collection 
The 2007/2008 annual reports have been selected for this study as they represent 
the first year that local authorities had to comply with the New Zealand 
Equivalent to International Financial Reporting Standards (NZ IFRS).  Since all 
territorial authorities in New Zealand operate wastewater activities, all 73 
city/district councils‟ wastewater disclosures within the annual report were 
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collected.  Most councils provide their annual reports on their websites, from 
which the wastewater disclosures of SSPs and audit reports were printed out.  
Those who did not provide annual reports on websites were sent email requests, 
and in due course they forwarded hard copies of annual reports.  The audit reports 
in annual reports were collected for an analysis of reliability of the information as 
one of the AR index items. 
The data of independent variables were collected from the websites by Local 
Government New Zealand and Statistics New Zealand, as presented in Appendix 
A.  Table 5.5 lists the independent variables and the data sources. 
Table 5.5: Independent variables and the data sources 
Independent variables Data source 
Revenues 
Total assets 
Population 
Number of staff 
Median income of constituents 
Statistics New Zealand website 
Statistics New Zealand website 
Statistics New Zealand website 
The Department of Internal Affairs website 
The Department of Internal Affairs website 
 
Where the data regarding total operating revenue, total assets, population were 
collected from the Statistics New Zealand website, the „number of staff‟ and 
„median income‟ was from the Department of Internal Affairs website.  Revenues 
are operating revenues of local authorities, which include rates, regulatory 
income, all government grants and subsidies received, investment income, and 
sales of goods and services, and all other income for the year ended 30 June 
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2008.
60
  Total assets of local authorities include cash and bank deposits, other 
current assets, land and buildings, other construction, other fixed assets, 
investment, and other non-current assets as at 30 June 2008.  „Population‟ is 
estimated resident population, as at 30 June 2008.  Number of staff and median 
income of constituents were based on 2004 and 2006 years, as they were the latest 
updates by the Department of Internal Affairs at the time of data collection in 
early 2009. (See Appendix A for the data of these variables.) 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter has outlined the use of index for measuring the consistency of 
wastewater disclosures with authoritative requirements and accountability 
expectations, and the use of multiple regression analysis for investigating the 
association of influential factors with SSPs.  The items for both disclosures 
indices – Authoritative Requirement index and Accountability Expectation index 
– were identified.  For the AR index, there were 64 items across four categories 
while AE index items comprised 15 items across four categories.  The items for 
both indices were assigned dichotomous scoring without any weighting.  The total 
index score was then presented as a percentage of the total possible maximum 
score.  The independent variables for multiple regression analysis used in this 
study are operating revenue, total assets, population, number of staff, and median 
income per capita.  The results of indices and multiple regression analysis will be 
provided in the following chapters. 
 
                                                 
60
 Statistics NZ uses the term „income‟ which, in accounting point of view, is considered to be 
revenue. 
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Chapter 6: Results and Discussion of the Extent of Disclosures 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the results from the measurement of the consistency of 
wastewater disclosures with authoritative requirements and accountability 
expectations.  Section 6.2 outlines the findings regarding the form and content of 
statements of service performance.  Section 6.3 discusses results of the 
Authoritative Requirement index, while section 6.4 discusses results of the 
Accountability Expectation index as measures of the extent of disclosures.  
Section 6.5 provides a comparison of the two indices, and section 6.6 summarises 
the overall results. 
6.2 Form and content of wastewater disclosures  
Title of the statement: No uniform title is used for SSPs, which disclose 
wastewater services, across territorial authorities, while they did all present the 
service performance information in a separate section in their annual reports.  
Although the majority of authorities (17) use the heading „statement of service 
performance‟, some authorities title it under various different headings, such as 
„significant activity statement‟, „group of activities‟, „infrastructure,‟ or „water 
service group.‟ 
Presently, four territorial authorities outsource their wastewater services, as 
discussed in chapter 2.  However, those authorities use different titles for the 
service performance information for disclosing their wastewater services. Two 
territorial authorities (Auckland CC and Manukau CC) use the titles „council 
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organisation‟ and „council family‟, as their council controlled organisations 
(Metrowater Ltd and Manukau Water Ltd, respectively) operate their wastewater 
services.  However, two other authorities (Papakura DC and Wellington CC) 
which contract a company (United Water International Pty Ltd) to run their 
wastewater services, report on their wastewater services performance under the 
titles „statement of service performance‟ and „environment‟ respectively. 
Title of wastewater services: Within SSPs or other titles, wastewater services are 
referred to by various names but mostly: wastewater (53 authorities) and sewerage 
(13), sanitary (1), and sewage (1). 
Wastewater section: Twelve authorities
61
 combine wastewater services with other 
services, such as stormwater, water supply, solid waste, and/or roading and use 
aggregated headings such as „water wastewater stormwater and roading‟, 
„wastewater services‟, „infrastructure.‟  Regardless of the different headings and 
aggregation, wastewater service performance information typically comprises 
three parts: narrative introduction, performance measures, and financial 
information.  The narrative introduction includes the service‟s objectives, 
introductory factual description, and outcomes influenced by the service.  While 
the majority of authorities specify their objectives for the service, 22 authorities 
did not.  Objectives given mostly concern the promotion of community health 
and/or the natural environment. 
Performance measures are commonly used and presented with actual results, 
targets, and past performance information. The number of performance measures 
                                                 
61 They are Buller DC, Central Otago DC, Far North DC, Gore DC, Kaikoura DC, Selwyn DC, 
South Taranaki, Wellington CC, Whakatane DC, Whangarei DC, Auckland CC, and Manukau CC. 
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for the service varies from two to thirteen.  Note that there is no generic term for 
performance measures used, which is consistent with Rutherford (2000).  Some 
authorities use „performance indicator,‟ or „what we measure.‟ 
Wastewater financial information is provided by almost all authorities (except 
Hamilton CC).  It is mostly reported under the title of „statement of cost of 
service‟, „infrastructure service statement‟, or „activity cost‟.  However, ten 
authorities
62
 did not have a title for their financial information as opposed to 
service performance information.  The financial information generally contains 
revenue, operating expenses (expenditure), and capital cost of the service under 
three periods (actual, target, and past).  Many authorities (53 authorities) also 
report on cost of projects progressed during the year. 
Most authorities use tables to disclose performance measures and financial 
information.  However, some tables are not in normal format with a heading in 
each column.  Two local authorities
63
 combine actual and target performance in 
one column.  Two authorities
64
 use sideways (horizontal) tables to present their 
performance measures, placing headings in the first column of the table.  Eight 
authorities
65
 do not provide tables for performance measures and three
66
 present 
instead their performance measures in graphs.  One local council (Tasman DC) 
                                                 
62
 They are South Wairarapa DC, Buller DC, Waitaki DC, Chatham Island Council, Nelson CC, 
Hamilton CC, Kaipara DC, Thames-Coromandel DC, Wanganui DC, and Tasman DC. 
63
 They are Gore DC, Stratford DC. 
64 They are Palmerston North CC, Taupo DC. 
65 They are Clutha DC, Kawerau DC, North Shore DC, Queenstown-Lakes DC, South Taranaki 
DC, Waimate DC, Wanganui DC, and Wellington CC. 
66 They areNorth Shore DC, Wanganui DC, and Wellington CC. 
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provides a table without headings.  All 73 local authorities present their financial 
information in tables, but two of them
67
 present the table horizontally. 
Overall, the form and content of service performance reporting, in particular for 
wastewater disclosures, differ greatly across authorities.  This inconsistency of the 
form and content of performance information has been noted by other researchers 
(Alves, et al., 2005; Rutherford, 2000) as well.  Earlier researchers suggest that 
the diverse form and content may be due to the absence of specific instructions in 
guidance information (Rutherford, 2000).  This explanation seems to provide a 
valid reason for the differing form and content of SSPs in New Zealand. 
6.3 Authoritative requirement index 
6.3.1 AR index by items 
The results of AR index scores for each item and category are provided in Table 
6.1.   
The mean scores of items relating to quantity of wastewater are low.  Actual 
quantity items have the highest mean score of 23.77 percent.  The mean score of 
target quantity is close to zero – 1.37 percent.  The mean score of past quantity is 
also near zero – 0.93 percent.  This result is due to the fact that quantity of 
wastewater is mostly disclosed in terms of its actual capacity in the descriptive 
introduction.  Only two authorities
68
 express the items in terms of performance 
measures, comparing actual with targeted quantity.  Only one authority
69
 of the 
                                                 
67 They are Christchurch CC and Hurunui DC. 
68
They are Waipa DC and New Plymouth DC. 
69
 It is Waipa DC. 
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two authorities reports about the past quantity of wastewater collection and 
treatment.  The low score of quantity items is consistent with Boyne and Law‟s 
(1991) result.  Lee (2008) surveyed the perception of Australians on performance 
information in Australian government agencies, and found that quantity is not 
regarded as an important disclosure item. 
The items relating to quality of wastewater have relatively high mean scores.   
Actual and target quality of wastewater have mean scores of 72.17 percent and 
63.93 percent respectively.  The mean score of explanation of significant variance 
of quality items is also relatively high – 62.79 percent.  On the contrary, past 
quality had the lowest mean score of 14.13 percent.  The quality items are 
expressed in performance measures, comparing actual quality with targets.  Most 
variances incurred were not significant but few authorities who incurred 
significant variances were able to provide an explanation.  Performance measure 
on standard to be met is the most popular quality measure, followed by reliability 
of wastewater services and customer satisfaction.  This result relates to Lee 
(2006), who found that the water service‟s quality measures were relatively highly 
reported by water enterprises in Australia.  However, Boyne and Law (1991) 
found little disclosure about these items.  
The items relating to location of wastewater have low mean scores.  Actual 
location of wastewater shows a mean score of 45.3 percent, while target location 
has a mean score of 8.7 percent.  Explanation of significant variance of location 
has a mean score of 100 percent as only two authorities incurred changes and 
provided the explanation.  It is difficult to quantitatively determine if the change 
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of location is significant.  In this study it is assumed that any change in location is 
considered significant.  Past location is not disclosed, so had a mean score of 
zero.  Similar to quantity, location was mostly addressed in the descriptive 
introduction.  Location of wastewater treatment (plant) was the most popular item 
compared to location of wastewater collection and disposal as the names of 
wastewater treatment plants indicate the locations. 
The low score of location may be due to the fact that location of a wastewater 
system is intuitively known.  TPA-9 (para 5.35) describes location in SSPs, as 
follows: “Frequently location is implicit and does not need to be stated 
explicitly.....for services such as health, education, border control or regional 
development, location is likely to be an important factor” (page 37).  Since 
wastewater service is not a health service, disclosing its location is deemed to be 
less important. 
The mean scores of items relating to time are relatively low.  Actual and target 
time items have similar mean scores of 27.2 percent and 27.37 percent.  
Explanation of significant variance of time has a mean score of 62.5 percent, 
given few authorities who incurred significant variance.  The item past time has a 
mean score near to zero – 1.83 percent.  The analysis identifies that the time items 
are expressed in terms of performance measures, however they fluctuate widely.  
Time response to incidents had most disclosures (around 60 percent for both 
actual and target) while the time of service availability items are few (around 13 
percent) and time compliance with milestones is almost none.  However, Lee 
(2006) found that timeliness of service (time response to incidents) was not highly 
 135 
 
reported by water enterprises in Australia.  Boyne and Law (1991) found 
disclosure about timeliness of service was almost non-existent by Welsh district 
authorities in the United Kingdom.  
The mean scores of items relating to cost are consistently high.  The cost of 
wastewater is mostly disclosed – 94.5 percent for actual cost, 93.2 percent for 
target cost, and 91.8 percent for past cost, followed by cost by direct/indirect cost 
(around 40 percent) and cost by wastewater system (approximately 20 percent).
70
  
The mean score of explanation of significant variance is relatively low – 31.58 
percent, given a number of authorities incurred significant variance. 
Cost appears to be the most popular dimension of output.  This result is consistent 
with Herawaty and Hoque (2007), and Kloot (2009) who found that cost 
information was well reported as part of the performance reporting by Australian 
public-sector entities.  Similarly, Boyne and Law (1991) found that cost 
information was highly reported by Welsh district authorities in the United 
Kingdom.  Lee (2008) found that Australian government entities perceived cost 
information as highly important and reported on it.  This may be due to the fact 
that local authorities must provide financial information (Lee, 2008).  However, 
while cost items are often reported, explanation for significant variance is scant.  
This contradicts Lee (2006, 2008), who found that narrative analysis of financial 
performance was perceived as relatively important and was well reported.  The 
absence of explanation for significant variance, as there is, indicates non-
                                                 
70
 Although some authorities aggregate wastewater cost with other activities (such as stormwater 
and water supply), the score of „1‟ is assigned to the aggregated cost item.  It appears that by some 
means wastewater costs are provided for. 
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compliance with the Schedule 10, Part 3 (15(e)) of the Local Government Act 
2002. 
From the results discussed above, it can be seen that relevance items (disclosures 
about actual dimensions) fluctuate across the dimensions – high on quality and 
cost, and low for other dimensions (quantity, location, time).  Similarly, 
comparability items relating to target quality and cost dimensions are disclosed 
more than other dimensions.  However, past items are only popular for cost 
dimension while those of other dimensions are almost none.  Explanation of 
significant variance of cost is far less mature than are other items. 
The item understandability has a moderately high mean score of 62.4 percent.  
Both separate headings and visual aids have the same score (83.6 percent).  The 
aggregation of wastewater services with other services necessitates extra effort to 
identify the disclosure for wastewater services.  Such aggregation also raises a 
concern about the reduced decision-usefulness of the disclosures by Smith and 
Coy (2000).  Thus, a score of „0‟is assigned for a separate heading item for those 
authorities which aggregate wastewater disclosures with others.  Most of the 
authorities are able to provide visual aids (tables or graphs) regardless of the 
format.  The score for explanation of technical terms is reasonably low (20 
percent). Most authorities (68) do not use technical terms; however, of those (5) 
which used them, only one provided explanations.
71
  These results are slightly 
higher than those of Stanley, Jennings and Mack (2008) who looked at the format 
                                                 
71
 New Plymouth DC, Rangitikei DC, Upper Hutt CC, Waimakariri DC, Waitakere CC are the 
authorities which used technical terms, but Upper Hutt CC is the only one which provided an 
explanation of the technical terms used. 
 137 
 
and the provision of technical jargon in community financial reports by 
Queensland local authorities, and found the score slightly above half. 
Reliability has a score of 100 percent.  All authorities were issued an unqualified 
audit opinion for 2007/2008 service performance information – “service provision 
information presents fairly”.  Thus, wastewater disclosures are regarded as 
unqualified, and would be awarded a full score (1) for the reliability item. 
In short, given the varying fluctuation of item sores, the results seem to indicate 
that local authorities may have some difficulty expressing (non-financial) 
dimensions to meet comparability characteristics.  This supports the OAG (2008) 
and Webster‟s (2007) criticism on the authoritative requirements being focused on 
financial reports of private-sector entities and pitched at higher or more 
conceptual level.  This may be due to the fact that the authoritative requirements 
were developed based on the economic framework highlighting the decision-
usefulness purpose of private-sector reporting, which is not suitable for public-
sector reporting (Mack, 2003; Parker & Gould, 1999). 
While cost is well reported, however the explanation of significant variance of 
cost is not.  This indicates the non-compliance with the statutory requirement, and 
which was not addressed in the audit report.  This raises the concern not only on 
the local authorities‟ reporting but also the audit report in providing insightful 
understanding whether the statutory reporting requirements is being followed. 
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Table 6.1: AR index scores by categories and items  
Categories/Items 
Relevance Comparability 
Actual Quantity                                     score(%) Target Quantity                                       score(%) Explanation of sig. var. of Quantity, if any           score(%) Past Quantity                                                score(%) 
Actual quantity of wastewater collection   27.4 Target quantity of wastewater collection      1.4 Explnt‟n of sig var of quantity of collection                       n/a Past quantity of wastewater collection                1.4 
Actual quantity of wastewater treatment   32.9 Target quantity of wastewater treatment       2.7 Explnt‟n of sig var of quantity of treatment                        n/a Past quantity of wastewater treatment                 1.4 
Actual quantity of wastewater disposal     11.0 Target quantity of wastewater disposal         0.0 Explnt‟n of sig var of quantity of disposal                          n/a Past quantity of wastewater disposal                   0.0 
                          Mean                                 23.77                   Mean                                           1.37                            Mean                                                         n/a                           Mean                                         0.93 
Actual Quality Target Quality Explanation of sig. var. of Quality, if any Past Quality 
Actual standards to be met                         93.2 Target standards to be met                           76.7 Explnt‟n of sig var of standards to be met                         70.5972 Past standards to be met                                      13.7 
Actual reliability of the service                 72.6 Target reliability of the service                    68.5 Explnt‟n of sig var of reliability of the service                  77.7873 Past reliability of the service                               12.3 
Actual customers‟ satisfaction                   50.7 Target customers‟ satisfaction                     46.6 Explnt‟n of sig var of customers‟ satisfaction                   40.0074 Past customers‟ satisfaction                                16.4 
                          Mean                               72.17                   Mean                                         63.93                           Mean                                                        62.79                           Mean                                        14.13 
Actual Location Target Location Explanation of sig. var. of Location, if any         Past Location 
Actual location of wastewater collection  42.5 Target location of wastewater collection      9.6 Explnt‟n of sig var of location of collection                       10075 Past location of wastewater collection                 0.0 
Actual location of wastewater treatment   71.2 Target location of wastewater treatment     15.1        Explnt‟n of sig var of location of treatment                        100 76 Past location of wastewater treatment                  0.0 
Actual location of wastewater disposal     21.9 Target location of wastewater disposal         1.4 Explnt‟n of sig var of location of disposal                           n/a Past location of wastewater disposal                    0.0 
                        Mean                                   45.2                 Mean                                             8.7                          Mean                                                           100                            Mean                                          0.0 
Actual Time Target Time Explanation of sig. var. of Time, if any Past Time 
Actual time compliance with milestones    8.2 Target time compliance with milestones      6.8 Explnt‟n of sig var of time compliance with milestones    10077 Past time compliance with milestones                 1.4 
Actual time response to incidents               59.7 Target time response to incidents                63.0 Explnt‟n of sig var of time response to incidents                  2578 Past time response to incidents                            4.1 
Actual time of service availability              13.7 Target time of service availability               12.3 Explnt‟n of sig var of time of service availability                 n/a Past time of service availability                           0.0 
                       Mean                                    27.2               Mean                                            27.37                         Mean                                                             62.5                          Mean                                          1.83 
Actual Cost Target Cost Explanation of sig. var. of Cost, if any Past Cost 
Actual total cost of wastewater                  94.5 Budgeted total cost of wastewater               93.2 Explnt‟n of sig var of total cost of wastewater                   27.5979 Past total cost of wastewater                              91.8 
Actual cost by direct/indirect cost             41.1 Budgeted cost by direct/indirect costs        39.7 Explnt‟n of sig var of cost by direct/indirect costs             21.0580 Past cost by direct/indirect costs                        38.4 
Actual cost of wastewater by system        19.2 Budgeted cost of wastewater by system     19.2 Explnt‟n of sig var of cost of wastewater by system         46.1581 Past cost of wastewater by system                     16.4 
                       Mean                                   51.6              Mean                                             50.70                          Mean                                                           31.58                          Mean                                        48.87 
Understandability 
Separate heading  for wastewater disclosures                 83.6 
Use of visual aids (tables or graphs)                               83.6 
Explanation of technical terms, if any                             2082 
                                                                                                                                                                                         Mean                                        62.4 
                                                                                                                                                                                                Reliability 
Unqualified audit statement for SSP                              100 
                                                 
72 This item is applicable for17 authorities who incur significant variances. 
73 This item is applicable for 9 authorities who incur significant variances. 
74 This item is applicable for 5 authorities who incur significant variances. 
75 This item is applicable for 2 authorities who incur significant variances. 
76 This item is applicable for 2 authorities who incur significant variances. 
77 This item is applicable for 5 authorities who incur significant variances. 
78 This item is applicable for 8 authorities who incur significant variances. 
79 This item is applicable for 29 authorities who incur significant variances. 
80 This item is applicable for 19 authorities who incur significant variances. 
81 This item is applicable for 13 authorities who incur significant variances. 
82 This item is applicable for five authorities which used technical terms. 
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6.3.2 AR Index by local authorities 
This section discusses the AR index scores of the local authorities.  Table 6.2 
presents the index score by local authorities in descending order, from highest to 
lowest. 
Table 6.2: AR index scores by local authorities 
  Local Authorities 
AR 
index 
  
Local Authorities 
AR 
index 
1 Waipa DC 55%  38 Buller DC 33% 
2 Tauranga CC 50%  39 Hastings DC 33% 
3 Grey DC 47%  40 Invercargill CC 33% 
4 New Plymouth DC 44%  41 Mackenzie DC 33% 
5 South Wairarapa DC 44%  42 Manawatu DC 33% 
6 Hamilton CC 43%  43 Otorohanga DC 33% 
7 Masterton DC 43%  44 Palmerston North CC 33% 
8 Southland DC 43%  45 Carterton DC 32% 
9 Kapiti Coast DC 42%  46 Kaipara DC 32% 
10 Thames-Coromandel DC 41%  47 Matamata-Piako DC 32% 
11 Hutt CC 40%  48 Westland DC 32% 
12 Nelson CC 40%  49 Opotiki DC 31% 
13 Christchurch CC 39%  50 Queenstown-Lakes DC 31% 
14 Western Bay of Plenty DC 39%  51 Rodney DC 31% 
15 Tararua DC 38%  52 Waitaki DC 31% 
16 North Shore CC 38%  53 Horowhenua DC 31% 
17 Rotorua DC 38%  54 South Waikato DC 31% 
18 Marlborough DC 37%  55 Tasman DC 31% 
19 Porirua CC 37%  56 Wellington CC 31% 
20 Timaru DC 37%  57 Rangitikei DC 30% 
21 Ashburton DC 36%  58 Waimakariri DC 29% 
22 Franklin DC 36%  59 Chatham Island DC 28% 
23 Hauraki DC 36%  60 Wairoa DC 28% 
24 Ruapehu DC 36%  61 Kaikoura DC 27% 
25 Stratford DC 36%  62 Taupo DC (west) 26% 
26 Clutha DC 36%  63 Wanganui DC 26% 
27 Far North DC 35%  64 Whangarei DC 26% 
28 Selwyn DC 35%  65 Gore DC 26% 
29 Napier CC 35%  66 Kawerau DC 24% 
30 Upper Hutt CC 35%  67 Waimate DC 24% 
31 Gisborne DC 35%  68 Waitomo DC 24% 
32 Central Hawke's Bay DC 34%  69 Central Otago DC 23% 
33 Dunedin CC 34%  70 Hurunui DC 18% 
34 Waikato DC 34%  71 Auckland CC 16% 
35 South Taranaki DC 33%  72 Manukau CC  12% 
36 Waitakere CC 33%  73 Papakura DC 12% 
37 Whakatane DC 33%   Average 33.33% 
 
From Table 6.2, the average AR index score is relatively low – 33.33 percent.  
The highest score is 55 percent (Waipa DC), which is slightly over half the total 
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score.  Only two local authorities are scored above or equal to 50 percent.  The 
lowest score is 12 percent (Manukau CC, and Papakura DC).  A frequency 
distribution of the AR index is displayed in a Histogram, in Figure 6.1. 
                        Figure 6.1: Histogram of the AR index 
      
From Figure 6.1, it can be seen that very few (three) authorities scored above 45 
percent.  Most scores are clustered between 30-40 percent.  The number of local 
authorities whose score below 30 drops sharply.  The bottom (four) authorities‟ 
scores, which are the lowest group, range between 10-20 percent.  Note that three 
authorities (Manukau CC, and Papakura DC, Auckland CC) of the lowest group 
outsourced their wastewater services.  The distribution of the AR index is not 
normal.  The Shapiro-Wilk normality test shows statistic of .961 (p = .023), which 
supports the conclusion that the AR index is not normally distributed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
                                     AR index scores 
         
 
 141 
 
The scores by local authorities indicate a low level of correspondence of SSP 
disclosures with the authoritative requirements.  This may be because of the 
unsuitability of authoritative requirements to evaluate SSPs, as discussed earlier. 
6.4 Accountability expectation index 
6.4.1 AE index by items 
Table 6.3 provides index scores based on accountability expectations by items. 
Table 6.3: AE index scores by categories and items  
Categories/Items Scores 
(%) 
Probity accountability  
Actual operating expenditure for wastewater services 98.6 
Target operating expenditure for wastewater services 97.3 
Actual capital expenditure for wastewater services 84.9 
Target capital expenditure for wastewater services 84.9 
              Mean 91.4 
Legality accountability  
Compliance with the Resource Management Act 1991 93.2 
Compliance with the Health Act 1956 89.0 
              Mean 91.1 
Process/efficiency accountability   
Actual operating expenditure and actual quantity 50.7 
Performance/programme/effectiveness  accountability   
Performance measure (actual and target) about compliance with  resource consent 
conditions 
75.3 
Performance measure (actual and target) about compliance with resource consent 
conditions by plants or consent types 
12.3 
Performance measure (actual and target) reliability of the service 64.4 
Performance measure (actual and target) reliability of the service 31.5 
Performance measure (actual and target) response time to 
blockages/overflows/accidental discharges that occurred 
57.5 
Performance measure (actual and target) response time to 
blockages/overflows/accidental discharges that occurred 
28.8 
Actual and target project 72.6 
Actual project achievement by sites 27.4 
              Mean 46.2 
 
The items relating to probity accountability have a relatively high mean score of 
91.4 percent.  Almost all authorities were able to provide actual operating 
expenditure for wastewater services (with the score of 98.6 percent) and target 
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operating expenditure (97.3 percent).
83
  Actual and target capital expenditures 
(84.9 percent) are provided for equally, slightly less than those for operating 
expenditure.
84
  Overall, the score for this category is very high. This result is 
consistent with Herawaty and Hoque (2007), Kloot (2009), who found that cost 
information is well reported as part of the performance reporting by Australian 
public-sector entities.  Similarly, Boyne and Law (1991) found that cost 
information was highly reported by Welsh district authorities in the United 
Kingdom.  Lee (2008) found that government agencies perceived cost information 
as highly important and chose to disclose more information.  This may be due to 
the fact that cost information is mandated as traditional information and 
complemented with specific accounting guidance, and local authorities are 
thoroughly familiar with reporting on it.  
The items relating to legality accountability have a high mean score of 91.1 
percent.  Most authorities
85
 provide information about their compliance with the 
Resource Management Act 1991 (with the mean score of 93.2 percent).  Items 
relating to the Heath Act 1956 are slightly less reported on than that relating to the 
Resource Management Act 1991 (89 percent).
86
 
                                                 
83
 This result is consistent with Taylor and Rosair (2000), who found items relating to compliance 
with legislation were highly reported. One council (Auckland CC) did not disclose operating 
expenditure, and two authorities (Auckland CC, Manukau, CC) did not report on target operating 
expenditure. 
84
 Eleven authorities did not provide disclosure items about actual capital expenditure and target 
capital expenditure. 
85 All local authorities except Nelson CC, North Shore CC, Papakura DC, Rangitikei DC, Upper 
Hutt CC provide information about their compliance with the Resource Management Act 1991. 
86 All local authorities except Carterton DC, Central Otago DC, Chatham Island DC, Grey DC, 
Manukau CC, Papakura DC, Selwyn DC, South Taranaki DC do not provide items relating to 
Health Act 1956. 
 143 
 
Items relating to process/efficiency accountability have a mean score of 50.7 
percent, which is slightly above half the maximum score.  No council provided an 
efficiency ratio.  Almost all of the authorities (72) provided actual operating 
expenditure, but half of those authorities (36) failed to provide quantity 
information.  The absence of quantity prevents the efficiency ratio from being 
assessed.  Lee (2008) notes that government agencies perceived the quantity item 
as not sufficiently important information to be disclosed.  The poor disclosures of 
efficiency measures in service performance disclosures were also evident in 
studies by Boyne and Law (1991), Hyndman and Anderson (1995), Lonti and 
Gregory (2007) and Steccolini (2004).  Lee (2006) found Australian government 
trading enterprises in water industries provided no efficiency measures over the 
four years (1998-2002) of study. 
The items relating to performance/programme/effectiveness accountability have a 
mean score of 46.2 percent, which is slightly less than half the maximum score.  
The disclosure of the performance/programme/effectiveness category is ranked 
lowest among the accountability expectation categories.  Performance measures in 
relation to compliance with resource consent conditions are the most popular 
items (75.3 percent).  However, their performance measures about the compliance 
by plants or consent types are few (12.3 percent).  Performance measures about 
reliability of the service are moderately high (64.4 percent), while half the 
authorities report a similar type of the item again (31.5 percent).  This result is in 
contrast to Boyne and Law (1991), who found the reliability performance 
measures were low, but consistent with Lee (2006) who found that the reliability 
measures of water agencies were highly reported (71 percent).  Performance 
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measures about response time to incidents were the least disclosed, but the score 
was slightly above half (57.5 percent).  The result contradicts Boyne and Law 
(1991), who found that timeliness measures were poorly reported.  Slightly more 
than half the authorities reporting on response time, disclosed the same type of 
measures again (28.8 percent).  The result contradicts Pendlebury, Jones and 
Karbhari (1994), who found that about three-quarters (75 percent) of agencies 
reported on the timeliness performance measures more than once.  In short, the 
results of performance/programme/effectiveness measures reporting is not so far 
behind Herawaty and Hoque (2007), who found effectiveness performance 
measures are moderately reported by Australian government departments, with a 
mean of 64 percent.  In contrast, Lonti and Gregory (2007) found five New 
Zealand government departments provided very little reporting on effectiveness 
measures, mostly 9 percent.  Actual and target project item was highly reported 
(72.6 percent), following compliance performance measures.  However a few 
authorities (20) provided details of the actual project achievement by site (27.4 
percent).  As discussed, it can be seen that the mean score of 
performance/programme/effectiveness has been weighted down by the second 
measures, or the mean score would otherwise have been much higher – 
approximately 65 percent. 
Overall, probity accountability and legality accountability received the highest 
score, which is nearly 100 percent, while process/efficiency accountability and 
performance/programme/effectiveness accountability scores were about half as 
high.  This suggests that the traditional focus relating to disclosures still prevails. 
Given that all four accountability expectations are important for public-sector 
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entities to discharge their accountability to the public (Jackson, 1982; Taylor & 
Rosair, 2000), the failure to communicate any of them would be seen as their 
accountability being undermined.  This provides an indication that local 
authorities‟ accountability to the public has not yet been adequately discharged. 
6.4.2 AE index by local authorities 
The index scores based on accountability expectations by local authorities, in 
descending order from highest to lowest, are shown in Table 6.4. 
Table 6.4: AE index scores by local authorities 
 Local Authorities 
AE 
Index 
  
Local Authorities 
AE 
Index 
1 Southland DC 93%  38 Waitaki DC 67% 
2 Hamilton CC 87%  39 Wanganui DC 67% 
3 Kapiti Coast DC 87%  40 Western Bay of Plenty DC 67% 
4 Stratford DC 87%  41 Westland DC 67% 
5 Taupo DC  87%  42 Dunedin CC 60% 
6 Waikato DC 87%  43 Grey DC 60% 
7 Waitakere CC 87%  44 Hauraki DC 60% 
8 Buller DC 80%  45 Kawerau DC  60% 
9 Christchurch CC 80%  46 Matamata-Piako DC 60% 
10 Clutha DC 80%  47 Opotiki DC 60% 
11 Far North DC 80%  48 South Taranaki DC 60% 
12 Mackenzie DC 80%  49 Tasman DC 60% 
13 North Shore CC 80%  50 Wairoa DC 60% 
14 Otorohanga DC 80%  51 Waitomo DC 60% 
15 Rodney DC 80%  52 Whangarei DC 60% 
16 Whakatane DC 80%  53 Gisborne DC 53% 
17 Ashburton DC 73%  54 Gore DC 53% 
18 Franklin DC 73%  55 Horowhenua DC 53% 
19 Hastings DC 73%  56 Kaikoura DC 53% 
20 Hutt CC 73%  57 Masterton DC 53% 
21 Invercargill CC 73%  58 New Plymouth DC 53% 
22 Manawatu DC 73%  59 Porirua CC 53% 
23 Nelson CC 73%  60 Rotorua DC 53% 
24 Rangitikei DC 73%  61 Tararua DC 53% 
25 South Wairarapa DC 73%  62 Waimakariri DC 53% 
26 Tauranga CC 73%  63 Wellington CC 53% 
27 Thames-Coromandel DC 73%  64 Carterton DC 47% 
28 Waimate DC 73%  65 Central Otago DC 47% 
29 Waipa DC 73%  66 Kaipara DC 47% 
30 Central Hawke's Bay DC 67%  67 Selwyn DC 47% 
31 Marlborough DC 67%  68 Upper Hutt CC 47% 
32 Napier CC 67%  69 Chatham Island DC 40% 
33 Palmerston North CC 67%  70 Hurunui DC 33% 
34 Queenstown-Lakes DC 67%  71 Auckland CC 33% 
35 Ruapehu DC 67%  72 Manukau CC  27% 
36 South Waikato DC 67%  73 Papakura DC 13% 
37 Timaru DC 67%   Average 64.55% 
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From Table 6.4, the average AE index score is relatively high – 64.55 percent.  
The highest scoring council scored 93 percent while the lowest scoring council 
scored 13 percent.  Almost all authorities (63) have an index score above 50 
percent.  Note that the three lowest scoring authorities (Papakura DC, Manukau 
CC, and Auckland CC) outsourced wastewater services.  Figure 6.2 provides a 
histogram of the AE index. 
                     Figure 6.2: Histogram of the AE index 
 
From Figure 6.2, it can be seen that the range of index scores spread widely and 
skewed to the left.  The Shapiro-Wilk normality test statistic of .953 (p = .008) 
confirms that the AE index is not normally distributed.  There are some gaps 
between bars, which have distinctive reporting characteristics.  The bar on the far 
left represents the lowest scoring local council (Papakura DC), which only 
reported on some items of probity.  The following group (27-33 percent) basically 
added on some of the legality items.  The next group (40-53 percent) largely 
reported fully on probity and legality items, introducing a few process/efficiency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                           AE index scores 
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and performance/programme/effectiveness items.  The next group (60-80 percent), 
which most scores are clustered, provided more on process/efficiency and 
performance/programme/effectiveness items.  The highest group on the far right, 
whose AE index score is above 80 percent, reported most of the items, missing 
some measures of performance/programme/effectiveness accountability.  This 
pattern supports the result of the AE index by categories and items that traditional 
probity and legality accountability items are more popular than the latter 
process/efficiency and performance/programme/effectiveness accountability 
items.  
From the AE index scores, it seems to appear that local authorities in New 
Zealand disclose information about wastewater services in a manner which is 
suitable for evaluating the performance in accordance with accountability 
expectations.  It suggests that the accountability expectations provide a suitable 
framework for evaluating SSPs by New Zealand local authorities. 
6.5 Comparing AR and AE indices 
Tables 6.2 and 6.4 show that the two indices have similar results in terms of the 
four lowest scored authorities (Papakura DC, Manukau CC, Auckland CC, and 
Hurunui DC).  The lowest score for the AR index is 12 percent, and for the AE 
index, 13 percent, which is the Papakura DC – providing very few disclosures.  
The remaining three authorities have slightly higher scores, ranging between 15 - 
17 percent for both indices.  Papakura DC, Manukau CC, and Auckland CC were 
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found to outsource their wastewater services to other organisations.
87
  It is 
possible that such outsourcing may reduce the ability of those authorities to obtain 
information from the outsourced authorities for reporting on their wastewater 
performances.  This raises the question of whether the authorities retain sufficient 
control over the operations of outsourced entities in order to provide adequate 
disclosures.  More interestingly, Auckland CC and Manukau CC are the largest 
and the third-largest authorities respectively in terms of population.  Ironically, 
they are among the lowest-reporting authorities, and they will probably be faced 
with increased expectations and demands for more information by their larger 
populations.  Table 6.5 provides a statistical descriptive of the AR and AE indices 
for 73 local authorities. 
Table 6.5: Statistical descriptives of the AR and AE indices of 73 local 
authorities 
 Mean 
(%) 
Median 
(%) 
Max 
(%) 
Min 
(%) 
Std. 
Dev 
Interquar
tile range 
Skewness Kurtosis 
AR 
index 
33.33 33 55 12 7.546 6 -.297 1.578 
AE 
index 
64.55 67 93 13 15.31 20 -.717 .944 
 
From Table 6.5, it can be seen that the mean and median of the AR index (33.33, 
33 percent) are twice as low than those of the AE index (64.55, 67 percent).  
Further, the AE index has a much higher maximum (93 percent) than the AR 
index.  However, the minimum of the AE index (13 percent) is almost as low as 
that of AR index (12 percent).  With a wider spread in the AE index, its standard 
                                                 
87
 Papakura DC and Wellington CC contracted United Water International Pty Ltd., Manukau CC 
and Auckland CC use council-controlled organisations (Manukau Water Ltd and Metro Water Ltd, 
respectively). 
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deviation (15.31), interquartile range (20), absolute skewness (.717) are higher 
than those of the AR index, which in turn has a higher kurtosis.  Consequently, the 
AR index is more tightly clustered than the AE index (see their histograms in 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2).  Figure 6.3 presents a box plot of AR and AE indices, which 
shows the difference in spread of the indices. 
             Figure 6.3: Box plot for the AR and AE indices 
  
Though the indices are different in many ways, Kendall‟s tau_b correlation 
indicates that they are positively significantly correlated with the correlation 
coefficient at .304 (p = .000).  Both indices move in the same direction, as they 
measure the same phenomena.  However, a degree of variation in each index 
exists, which is not explained by the other index. 
The distinctive differences between the two index items are that the AR index 
includes items relating to past performance, explanation of significant variance (if 
any), and location of wastewater services, while the AE index includes capital 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                AR index score                 AE index score 
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expenditure and project items.  While the AR index does poorly on those different 
items, the AE index does well on these different items.  As a result, the AR index 
is lower than the AE index (see Tables 6.1 and 6.3). 
Comparing the two indices, the results support the conclusion that local 
authorities disclose information about wastewater services in a manner which is 
suitable for evaluating the performance according with accountability 
expectations rather than authoritative requirements.  This may be due to the fact 
that the authoritative requirements are based on economic framework of reporting 
which focuses on financial information and may not be specific to SSP 
disclosures.  However, the accountability expectations, derived from the literature, 
are based on criteria which have been tailored more specifically to public-sector 
reporting, which local authorities seem to correspond to.  
6.6 Summary 
This chapter provides results and discussion from the measurement of the 
consistency of disclosures with authoritative requirements and accountability 
expectations, using the AR and AE indices.  The AR index has a relatively low 
correspondence with the mean score of 33.33 percent.  Most authorities are able to 
report well on relevant, comparable information in relation to quality and cost of 
wastewater, rather than quantity, location and time.  Past information on non-
financial dimensions (quantity, quality, location, time) scores the lowest.  This 
may indicate that the comparability requirement may not be applicable for the 
non-financial dimensions and, hence, support the OAG‟s (2008) and Webster‟s 
(2007) criticisms of the vague and financially focused authoritative requirements.  
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Further, while cost is an important information item (Lee, 2008) and well 
reported, the explanation significant variance of cost disclosed seems cryptic.  
The AE index has a relatively high correspondence with the mean score of 64.55 
percent, approximately twice higher than the AR index.  This result suggests that 
local authorities appear to disclose information about wastewater services in a 
manner which they are trying to address the accountability expectations.  This 
result also show that items about probity and legality accountability are 
appropriately disclosed (slightly more than 91 percent of local authorities) while 
process/efficiency and performance/programme/effectiveness accountability is 
relatively low (about 50 percent of local authorities).  The lower score may be 
associated with it being a new addition to the dimension of accountability 
expectations.  However, the deficiency of process/efficiency and 
performance/programme/effectiveness suggests that accountability of local 
councils to the public is not yet adequately discharged.  This may raise the 
concern on the success of the reform principle for greater accountability. 
Comparing the two indices, results show that local authorities disclose 
information about wastewater services in a manner which is suitable for 
evaluation according to the AE index, rather than the AR index.  Further, given 
the unsuitability of authoritative requirement for evaluating SSPs as opposed to 
accountability expectations framework, this suggests that the accountability 
framework provides an appropriate model for SSP reporting rather than economic 
framework. 
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Both indices showed the same four lowest-scored authorities, of which three local 
authorities outsourced their wastewater services to other organisations.  This may 
raise the question of whether the authorities retain sufficient control over the 
operations of outsourced entities to be able to provide adequate information for 
disclosures. 
The variation of both indices may be affected by a number of factors, as discussed 
in chapter 4.  The next chapter will provide the results and discussion of the 
relationship between factors and the extent of disclosures, according to the AR 
and AE indices, using regression analysis. 
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Chapter 7: Results and Analysis of the Factors Influencing 
Disclosures 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the results of multiple regression analysis carried out to 
investigate the relationship between the indices and influential factors.  Section 
7.2 summarises the descriptive statistics of the variables.  Section 7.3 explores 
linear regression analysis, for which the results are discussed in section 7.4, and 
section 7.5 summarises the chapter. 
7.2 Descriptive statistics 
As previously discussed in chapter 6, the AR index and AE index are the 
dependent variables used in this study‟s multiple regression analysis.  Independent 
variables are: number of staff, revenue, total assets, population, and medium 
income per capita.  Table 7.1 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables of 
the 73 local authorities. 
Table 7.1: Statistical descriptives of dependent and independent variables 
of 73 local authorities 
 
Variables Min Max Mean Standard 
Deviation 
AR index 12% 55% 33.33% 7.546 
AE index 13% 93% 64.55% 15.311 
Revenue ($000) $4,509 $571,493 $71,088.77 $93,695.192 
Total assets($000) $41,779 $9,633,020 $1,229,917.73 $1.655E6 
Population 640 438,100 58,465.34 82,368.551 
Number of staff 4 1666 242.07 337.963 
Medium income per capita($) $17,100 $32,500 $23,206.85 $2,982.790 
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7.3 Multiple regression analysis 
For the purposes of the third research objective, the standard multiple linear 
regression model was developed and analysed, using SPSS to run statistical tests 
of the relationship to test the assumptions of linear regression.  The standard form 
of this study‟s regression is: 
INDEXi = α + β1 REV i + β2 ASSET i + β3 POP i + β4 STAFF i + β5 MEDINC i + ε i 
Where 
INDEX  = AR index or AE index  
REV   = revenue 
ASSET  = total assets 
POP   = population 
STAFF  = number of staff 
MEDINC  = medium income per capita 
i   = local authority 
α,β  = constants or parameters 
ε  = errors 
 
Given the two dependent variables, each requiring a multiple linear regression 
analysis, two regression routines were run: one for the AR index and another for 
the AE index.  The basic assumptions underlying the multiple linear regression 
models needed to be tested.  If any assumptions were violated, then the estimates 
yielded by the regression model were possibly biased or misleading (Field, 2005).  
A number of ways could be used if necessary to alleviate violation.  The 
following section discusses the test for possible violations of the assumptions and 
modification of the multiple linear regression model used in this study. 
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7.3.1 Outliers 
Outliers (influential observations) are cases with extreme values or large residuals 
which could distort statistics, such as the mean and standard deviation (Field, 
2005; Garson, 2010; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  Outliers for a regression model 
with multiple variables (multivariate outliers) can be detected from the absolute 
value of standardised residuals above certain cut-off points (for example, 2, 2.5, 3) 
and/or a Cook‟s Distance of more than 1, or 4/(n-k-1), where n is the number of 
cases and k is the number of independent variables (Field, 2005; Garson, 2010).  
In this study‟s data, evidence of outliers were found in both regression models for 
AR and AE indices, for which the standardised residuals were above 2 and the 
Cook‟s Distance above 0.06 (4/(73-5-1)).  (Appendices C and D show the 
standardised residual and Cook‟s Distance values for the AR and AE indices.) 
To correct outliers, the researcher may remove and analyse extreme cases or 
outliers separately from the sample and/or transform the data to pull in 
outlier/extreme values (Field, 2005; Garson, 2010; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
7.3.2 Non-linearity 
Linear regression analysis tests a linear relationship only between dependent and 
independent variables.  A linear model cannot explain or predict data which are 
non-linear (Field, 2005; Nau, 2005).  Linearity between two variables can be 
roughly assessed by inspection of bivariate scatterplots (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007).  A plot of standardised residuals against standardised predicted values, 
which are regression outputs, can be used to detect the non-linearity relationship 
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involving more than one independent variable (Field, 2005; Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007).  The points should be symmetrically distributed around a horizontal zero 
line.  If it shows a bowed or curved pattern, then non-linearity is likely to exist 
(Field, 2005).  In this study, the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables is not linear.  The plots (in both models) of standardised 
residuals against standardised predicted values show an unusual distribution 
pattern – a cluster in one area.  (Appendices E and F show the plot of standardised 
residuals against standardised predicted values for AR and AE indices.) 
To correct the problem of a non-linearity relationship, transformation of 
dependent and/or independent variables may be used (Nau, 2005). 
7.3.3 Heteroscedasticity 
The assumption of homoscedasticity requires that the standard deviations of errors 
of prediction are approximately equal at each level of the predictor(s) (Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2007).  In contrast, heteroscedasticity occurs when the standard 
deviations of errors are not constant and can bias standard deviations of the 
residuals and the confidence interval of the regression (Garson, 2010; Nau, 2005; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  A scatterplot of the standardised predicted 
dependent variable by the standardised residuals is one option to detect 
heteroscedasticity.  To meet the assumption of homoscedasticity, the graph should 
form a symmetrical distribution around a horizontal zero line.  When the points 
form the shape of a funnel (close together at one end and widely spread at the 
other end) or a bowed or curved pattern, this shape indicates typical 
heteroscedasticity (Field, 2005).  In this study, the plots show an unusual 
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distribution pattern and heteroscedasticity may be a problem.  (See Appendices E 
and F.) 
One way to alleviate the problem of heteroscedasticity is to transform the data 
(both independent and dependent variables) (Nau, 2005). 
7.3.4 Non-normally distributed errors  
The assumption of normality of errors requires that errors of prediction are 
normally distributed for all predicted dependent variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007).  In many cases, the violation of a normal distribution of errors arises due to 
the presence of a few large outliers, significantly non-normally distributed 
dependent and/or independent variables, and a non-linear relationship between 
dependent and independent variables.  The non-normally distributed errors can be 
detected from the histogram of standardised residuals and also the Komogorov-
Shirnov and Shapiro-Wilks normality tests of standardised residuals.
88
  If the 
distribution of residuals were normal, the histogram should show a rough normal 
curve (Garson, 2010) and the results of the normality test should be non-
significant for residual (Field, 2005). In this study, the histogram of the 
standardised residuals (for both indices‟ regression models) does not show that the 
distribution of residuals differed markedly from a normal distribution. 
(Appendices G and H show a histogram of standardised residuals for AR and AE 
indices)  Further, statistics of the Shapiro-Wilk normality test is 0.195 for the AR 
index regression model and 0.27 for the AE index regression model, which 
support the conclusion that the residuals are normally distributed for both models.   
                                                 
88
 Shapiro-Wilk normality test is recommended for smaller samples (less than 2000), while 
Kolmogorov-Shirnov for larger samples (Garson, 2010). 
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7.3.5 Non-independence of errors 
Errors of prediction should be uncorrelated (or independent) with each 
independent variable (Field, 2005; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  The assumption 
can be tested by the Durbin-Watson test.  The test statistic can vary between 0 and 
4.  The Durbin-Watson statistic should be 2, or closer to 2 for independent errors.  
When the Durbin-Watson statistic is less than 1 or greater than 3, non-
independence of errors is a definite concern (Field, 2005).  In this study, the 
Durbin-Watson value is 2.102 and 2.054, which is close to 2, which supports that 
the errors are independent. 
7.3.6 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity exists when there is a linear relationship between two or more 
predictors (independent variables) in a regression or when the predictors are 
highly correlated (Field, 2005).  Common methods to detect multicollinearity in a 
regression are when the correlation coefficient between each pair of predictors is 
above 0.8, and the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
89
 is more than 10 (Field, 
2005).
90
  Table 7.2 presents a correlation matrix for dependent and independent 
variables, as well as for VIF values.  
 
 
 
                                                 
89
 VIF indicate whether a predictor has a strong linear relationship with other predictors (Field, 
2005). 
90
 Alternatively, tolerance value, which is the reciprocal of VIF, is less than 0.1 (Field, 2005). 
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Table 7.2: Kendall’s tau_b correlation coefficient among independent 
variables 
 AR 
Index 
AE 
Index 
Staff 
 
Revenue 
 
Asset 
 
Population Med. 
income 
VIF 
AR Index 1.000        
AE Index  .304** 1.000       
Staff .168* .097 1.000     15.846 
Revenue .176* .137 .779** 1.000    41.450 
Asset .222** .141 .712** .817** 1.000   29.066 
Population .179* .093 .775** .840** .768** 1.000  16.916 
Med.income ..087 .042 .225* .253** .277** .279** 1.000 1.204 
    ** Correlation is significant at the level 0.01 (2-tailed)  
 *   Correlation is significant at the level 0.05 (2-tailed) 
From Table 7.2, it is evident that multicollinearity exists between the independent 
variables in the standard regression model.  Variables for staff, revenue, assets, 
and population are highly intercorrelated, with the Kendall‟s tau_b correlation 
coefficients having values close to or higher than 0.8.  Further, VIF values of 
staff, revenue, assets, and population are beyond the thresholds of 10 (15.846, 
41.450, 29.066, and 16.916) which confirms the problem of  multicollinearity. 
In order to control the problem of multicollinearity, and as there is no overriding 
reason to choose one variable over another, a separate regression analysis 
including one of the highly correlated variables could be run alternately (Cooke, 
1989), or factor analysis
91
 could be used to derive factor score(s) as independent 
variable(s), replacing the highly correlated variables (Craig & Diga, 1998; 
Ingram, 1984). 
As discussed earlier in this study, outliers, non-linearity relationships, 
heteroscedasticity, and multicollinearity are the principal problems of the standard 
                                                 
91
 Factor analysis combines variables with similar characteristics into a group or a single factor.  
As a result, it  reduces a large number of independent variables to a subset of uncorrelated factors 
(Field, 2005). 
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regression analysis that need to be solved.  In order to tackle the first three 
violations, transformation and removal of outliers were considered.  Factor 
analysis and running regression models with an alternate correlated variable could 
be used to control multicollinearity. 
Numerous combinations of different types of transformation were regressed, and 
natural logarithms of both the AR and AE indices and of independent variables 
were found to provide the lower residual mean square error (RMSE). In using 
logarithmic transformation, the problems of heteroscedasicity and non-linearity 
were alleviated; however, outliers persisted.  The statistics of both regression 
models for the AR and AE indices show evidence of the outliers, with 
standardised residuals and Cook‟s Distance values of more than 2 and .06 
respectively.  (Appendices I and J show the standardised residual and Cook‟s 
Distance values for the logarithmic transformed AR and AE indices.)  These 
outliers were the four lowest-scored authorities (Papakura DC, Manukau CC, 
Auckland CC, and Hurunui DC).  Given the problem of outliers, removal of the 
four authorities was made for both models.  Consequently, the sample size 
reduced to 69 local authorities. 
When running a factor analysis to extract the explanatory contribution of highly 
correlated variables (revenue, total asset, population, and staff), one principal 
component was found (eigenvalue = 3.785) which accounted for 94 percent of 
total variance.  Factor loadings of the components show .984, .965, .984, and .957, 
for revenue, total assets, population, and number of staff respectively.  The 
equation to derive a factor score for these variables, collectively called size, is:  
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SIZE = .984*REV + .965*ASSET + .984*POP + .957*STAFF 
The size variable embraces, to certain degree, explanatory contribution of, the 
highly correlated variable, and the problem of an omitted variable is therefore 
avoided.  This size variable is another independent variable suitable for alleviating 
multicollinearity problems.  Since no theoretical reason exists on which of these 
independent variables (size derived from factor analysis, revenue, total assets, 
population, and number of staff) is best at capturing the effect on the disclosures 
and any multicollinearity problem, five regression models were developed, using 
each of the five variables alternately.  The models are: 
Model A : INDEXi = α +  β2 SIZEi + β2 MEDINC i + ε i 
Model B : INDEXi = α + β1 REVi  +  β2 MEDINC i + ε i 
Model C : INDEXi = α + β1 ASSETi +  β2 MEDINC i + ε i 
Model D : INDEXi = α + β1 POP i + β2 MEDINC i + ε i 
Model E : INDEXi = α + β1 STAFF i + β2 MEDINC i + ε i 
Where 
INDEX  = log of AR index scores and log of AE index  
SIZE  = size factor score derived from factor analysis 
STAFF  = log of number of staff 
REV   = log of revenue 
ASSET  = log of total assets 
POP   = log of population 
MEDINC  = log of medium income per capita 
i   = local authority 
α,β  = constants or parameters 
ε  = errors 
 
Note that each of these models applies for both indices.  As a result, ten models 
are run.  Commonly, all models include median income per capita.  Model A 
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includes the size variable derived from factor analysis, while Models B – E 
include one of the highly correlated variables. 
7.4 Multiple regression results 
Tables 7.3 and 7.4 report results (including the coefficients and t-statistics of 
intercept, and the independent variables, as well as adjusted R
2
, F-statistics, and 
significance of each model) for the AR index and AE index, respectively.  In 
addition, each regression model was tested for any violations of regression 
assumptions.  If any evidence of violation occurs, a remark will be provided.  
Table 7.3: Multiple regression results for the AR index 
   Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E 
  Predicted 
sign 
Coefficients 
(t-statistics) 
Intercept  2.014 
(1.176) 
1.295 
(.781) 
1.529 
(.949) 
1.350 
(.826) 
1.312 
(.790) 
Independent variables      
 Size + .057 
(2.622)* 
    
 Revenue +  .054 
(2.284)* 
   
 Assets +   .068 
(3.010)** 
  
 Population +    .052 
(2.601)* 
 
 Number of 
Staff 
+     .043 
(2.272)* 
 Medium 
Income 
+ .150 
(.882) 
.165 
(.951) 
.108 
(.632) 
.164 
(.968) 
.200 
(1.188) 
        
Regression Model      
    Adjusted R
2
 .117 .097 .143 .116 .096 
    F-Statistics 5.525 4.648 6.679 5.465 4.617 
    Significance .006 .013 .002 .006 .013 
** Significant at p < 0.01, two-tailed 
*   Significant at p < 0.05, two-tailed 
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Table 7.3 shows that all models report statistically significant explanatory powers 
of adjusted R
2
 (p<.01 for Model A and Model C, and Model D, and p<.05 for 
Model B and Model E).  Model C reports the highest explanatory power (adjusted 
R
2 
= 14.3 percent) and F-statistics (F = 6.679).  Models A and D report close 
explanatory powers (11.7 and 11.6 percent, respectively), and similarly, Models B 
and E report close explanatory powers (9.7 and 9.6 percent, respectively). 
Coefficients of all size variables in all models are also positively significant 
(p<.01 for Model C, and p<.05 for the remaining models) while that of median 
income per capita is not significant for any model.  Model C has the highest 
coefficient (.068), followed by Model A (.057), Model B (.054), Model D (.052), 
and Model E (.043).  This suggests that total assets is best at explaining the 
variability in the AR indices, followed by size factor score, population, revenue 
and number of staff, respectively, while median income per capita is not.     Note 
that all the models showed one outlier (standardised residual > 2 and Cook‟s 
Distance > .06), while other regression assumptions were satisfied. 
Similar to the results of multiple regression models for the AR index, Table 7.4 
below provides statistical details of the multiple regression models for the AE 
index. 
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Table 7.4: Multiple regression results for the AE index 
   Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E 
  Predicted 
sign 
Coefficients 
(t-statistics) 
Intercept  4.976 
(2.586)* 
4.331 
(2.345)* 
4.360 
(2.382)* 
4.241 
(2.304)* 
4.247 
(2.279)* 
Independent variables      
 Size + .060 
(2.477)* 
    
 Revenue +  .064 
(2.421)* 
 
 
  
 Assets +   .067 
(2.598)* 
  
 Population +    
 
.053 
(2.385)* 
 
 
 Number of 
Staff 
+  
 
   .046 
(2.183)* 
 Medium 
Income 
+ -.079 
(-.412) 
-.082 
(-.424) 
-.107 
(-.550) 
-.060 
(-.317) 
-.028 
(-.150) 
        
Regression Model      
    Adjusted R
2
 .062 .058 .070 .056 .044 
    F-Statistics 3.237 3.099 3.544 3.012 2.550 
    Significance .046 .052 .035 .056 .086 
** Significant at p  < 0.01, two-tailed  
*   Significant at p < 0.05, two-tailed 
 
From Table 7.4, only Models C and A report a significant explanatory power of 
adjusted R
2
 (p <.05).  Model C reports the highest explanatory power (adjusted R
2
 
= 7 percent) and F-statistics (F = 3.544, p = .035), followed by those of Model A 
(adjusted R
2
 = 6.2 percent, F = 3.237, p = .046).  The adjusted R
2 
scores of the 
remaining models are slightly lower (ranging from 4.4 - 5.8 percent) and 
insignificant (p>.05).   
As in the regression analysis for the AR index, coefficients of size variables in all 
the models are positively significant (p<.05) while that of median income per 
capita is not significant.  Model C also has the highest coefficient (.067), followed 
by Model B (.064), Model A (.060), Model D (.053), and Model E (.046).  This 
suggests that total assets is best at explaining the variation of the AE indices, 
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followed by, revenue, size factor score, population, and number of staff, 
respectively, while median income per capital does not.  This order is similar to 
that for the models of the AR index – except that revenue has a higher coefficient 
than size factor score in AE index models.  However, median income per capita is 
not significant to all the models or cannot explain any association with the 
disclosures.
92
  Note that Model C and Model E incur violation of a non-normal 
distribution of errors, as its Shapiro-Wilk test of normality reports a significant 
level at .032 and .047 (p < .05). 
When comparing the results of Table 7.3 and Table 7.4, the adjusted R
2
 for all 
models of the AE index are about half those for models of the AR index.  This 
suggests that the independent variables cannot explain as much about the AE 
index as for the AR index.  In particular, size variables (number of staff, revenue, 
total assets, population) can explain the disclosures to a certain degree for the AR 
index but to a lesser degree for the AE index.  No particular proxy for size stands 
out. 
The significant positive relationship between population and the extent of 
wastewater disclosures indicates that a larger size of constituents can have an 
impact on more wastewater disclosures.  It is possible that a larger population can 
form coalitions of stronger interest groups to demand more wastewater disclosures 
from the local authority.  The result is similar to Baber (1983), Ingram and 
DeJong (1987), and Christiaens (1999).  However, it contradicts findings of 
Ingram (1984), Robins and Austin (1986), and Evan and Patton, (1987). 
                                                 
92
Although not statistically significant, the coefficients of median income have negative signs, 
indicating that a possible inverse relationship exists between the extent of SSPs and constituency 
sophistication.    
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Because number of staff proxies both staff availability and political visibility, the 
positive relationship between number of staff and the extent of wastewater 
disclosures indicates that the more staff and political visibility an authority has, 
the more wastewater disclosures an authority would make.  It is possible that more 
staff increases the capability of local authorities to report on their wastewater 
services.  It can also reflect that a local authority is subject to more political costs 
from external oversight bodies and would therefore provide more comprehensive 
explanation about wastewater services to signal a fair performance.  While this 
result contradicts Boyne and Law (1991), who did not find a significant 
relationship between staff availability and the extent of disclosures, it is consistent 
with Christiaens (1999).  Lim and McKinnon (1993) found a significant positive 
relationship between political visibility (proxied by number of staff) and 
disclosures. 
The positive relationships between revenue and total assets with the extent of 
wastewater disclosures indicate that the greater the financial resources and 
political visibility, the more wastewater disclosures local authorities will make.  
Similar to number of staff, the more financial resources an authority has, the more 
capability the authority has to provide comprehensive disclosures about 
wastewater services.  It may also mean the local authority is subject to more 
political costs, from pollution to the wider environment, and would therefore tend 
to report wastewater disclosure to a greater extent, so as to signal a fair 
performance.  These results are consistent with Lim and McKinnon (1993) who 
found that the public-sector entity with greater revenue and assets is more 
politically visible and reports more quality information.  These results are also 
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consistent with Bozzolan, et al. (2006), Buzby (1975), Cooke (1989) and Singhvi 
and Desai (1971), who found that companies in the private-sector with larger 
financial resources would provide more disclosures. 
The insignificant relationship found between median income and wastewater 
disclosures could imply that the sophistication of constituents does not influence 
the disclosures.  It is possible that greater sophistication of constituents may not 
be associated with the necessary aggression to demand more wastewater 
information.  However, this may be due to the small sample size and/or there 
might be a better measure of constituency sophistication.  The result contradicts 
Ingram (1984) and Robbins and Austin (1986).   
It can be seen that the results of multiple regression found in this study and other 
studies are not consistent.  Laswad, et al. (2005) argued that the nature of the 
public-sector is very diverse across countries.  In other words, different 
jurisdictions have different local government objectives, structures, and regulatory 
environments, and the results of one jurisdiction may not be applicable to others.   
7.5 Summary 
Both indices (authoritative requirements and accountability expectations) 
employed to measure the extent of performance disclosures were found to be 
consistently associated with the size variables (number of staff, revenue, total 
assets, and population).  The size variables (number of staff, revenue, total assets, 
population) are significantly and positively associated to a limited degree with the 
AR index, but to a lesser degree with the AE index. 
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Overall, the results imply that larger local authorities tend to provide more 
extensive disclosures regarding wastewater services, and thus constituents in 
larger authorities are more likely to have more confidence in the disclosures than 
those based in smaller authorities.  This suggests that demand from the public for 
wastewater disclosures, local authorities‟ capability to gather wastewater 
information, and local authorities‟ awareness of political costs arising from the 
operation of wastewater services can provide incentives for local authorities to 
disclose comprehensive information. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides conclusions of the study.  Section 8.2 provides an overview 
of the objectives of the study.  The major findings are summarised in section 8.3.  
The implications of the study are discussed in section 8.4.  Sections 8.5 and 8.6 
discuss limitations of the study and some opportunities for future research. 
8.2 Objectives of the study 
The provision of statements of service performance (SSPs) by local government 
in New Zealand is a product of the economic reforms carried out in the late 1980s.  
A statement of service performance is regarded as an important document of New 
Zealand local government reporting.  It is statutorily required by the Local 
Government Act 2002 and complemented by accounting guidance provided by the 
New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants (NZICA), with the objective of 
strengthening accountability obligations (Local Government Act 2002, s. 98; 
NZICA, 2002). 
In spite of twenty years‟ experience in preparing statements of service 
performance, the Office of the Auditor-General (OAG) (2008) criticised that the 
quality of SSPs prepared by local authorities (and other public-sector entities) was 
poor.  A fundamental problem of statements of service performance reporting is 
the lack of comprehensive authoritative requirements on their preparation and 
presentation (Office of the Auditor-General, 2008).  Arguably, the present 
authoritative requirements have been written to cater for the needs of large, profit-
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oriented entities in the private-sector rather for the public-sector‟s specific needs 
for performance reporting and pitched at a higher or more conceptual level than is 
typically required for financial reporting standards (Office of the Auditor-General, 
2008, Webster, 2007).  This may be due to the fact that the current authoritative 
requirements, developed in early 1990s, have been influenced by the economic 
framework highlighting the decision-usefulness purpose of private-sector 
reporting, which is not suitable for public-sector reporting (Mack, 2003; Parker & 
Gould, 1999). 
Pallot (1992) points out that accountability is the preferred purpose for public-
sector reporting since the nature of the relationship between providers and users of 
government is non-voluntary.  Past theoretical literature has attempted to define 
the possible components of accountability that would be suitable for public-sector 
entities to adequately discharge their accountability.  Among them, Stewart (1984) 
has developed accountability bases, which provide a platform for understanding 
accountability expectations and, hence desirable characteristics of any 
accountability documents provided by public-sector entities for the public.  It is 
possible that accountability documents pertaining to these accountability 
expectations will enable the public-sector entities to adequately discharge their 
accountability. 
New Zealand local government is the important second tier of the New Zealand 
government sector.  Among a wide range of community services provided by 
New Zealand local authorities, wastewater services represent one of the most 
crucial services.  New Zealand constituents could be expected to be concerned not 
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only about the performance of wastewater services provided by their local 
authorities, but also with the disclosures about that performance.  However, the 
research on SSP wastewater disclosures by New Zealand local authorities is 
limited (Smith & Coy, 2000).  Given the criticism on the usefulness of 
authoritative requirements for SSP reporting and the recognition of accountability 
expectations in the literature, the first two objectives of this study are to examine 
the consistency of SSP disclosures, regarding wastewater services provided by 
New Zealand local authorities, with the existing authoritative requirements, and 
the accountability expectations, using the disclosure index as a measurement tool.  
To understand possible explanations for the cross-sectional differences on the 
extent of disclosures, according to the authoritative requirements and 
accountability expectations, the third objective of this study is to examine the 
influential factors of the disclosures, using multiple regression analysis. 
8.3 Summary of findings 
In addressing the first objective, the study applied a disclosure index based on the 
authoritative requirements (AR).  The AR index score is relatively low with the 
mean score of 33.33 percent.  The highest score is 55 percent while the lowest 
score is 12 percent.  The distribution of the scores is not normally distributed.  
Most scores are clustered between 30 – 40 percent and unevenly distributed to 
both ends.   
This finding indicates that local authority disclose information about wastewater 
services in a manner which does not correspond very well with the authoritative 
requirements.  In other words, the authoritative requirements may not provide a 
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suitable framework for evaluating the wastewater disclosures.  This therefore 
raises a concern whether the authoritative requirements are a suitable framework 
for public-sector SSP reporting. 
In particular, comparability items for non-financial information are very poorly 
reported.  Past quantity, quality, location, and time were scored 0.93, 14.13, 0.0, 
1.83 percent respectively.  Target quantity, location, and time – scoring 1.37, 8.7, 
27.37 percent respectively.  On the contrary, comparability items of financial 
dimensions (costs) are well reported on both their past and target terms. 
This finding supports Office of the Auditor-General‟s (2008) criticisms of the 
New Zealand Equivalents to International Financial Reporting Standards – 
particularly NZ Framework – for being focused on private-sector reporting and 
the private-sector reporting emphasises on financial statements.  This also 
supports the view that accounting guidance highlighting the decision-usefulness 
purpose is not suitable for public-sector reporting (Mack, 2003; Parker & Gould, 
1999).  It suggests that the current authoritative requirements are not suitable for 
the preparation of SSP reporting. 
The results also show that item scores for each dimension of wastewater vary 
widely.  Items relating to cost and quality are highly reported while of those to 
location, time, and quantity are not.  The total cost of wastewater is the most 
disclosed items at 94.5 percent, followed by the disclosure item of standard to be 
met at 93.2 percent.  Location of wastewater treatment is disclosed at 71.2 
percent, time response to incidents at 59.7 percent, and quantity of wastewater 
treatment at 32.9 percent. 
 173 
 
This indicates that the traditional focus of financial information still prevails in 
spite of the requirement for output‟s dimension reporting in NZ IAS 1 and TPA-9.  
Further, local authorities may have some difficulty expressing some non-financial 
output‟s dimensions to be reported than financial dimension (cost).  It is possible 
that the NZ IAS 1 and TPA-9 do not provide enough specific guidance to report 
about these non-financial output dimensions.  This seems to support Webster‟s 
(2007) conclusion that the authoritative requirements for SSPs are pitched at a 
higher or more conceptual level than financial reporting standards.  In other 
words, the current NZ IAS 1 and TPA-9 are not yet helpful enough in guiding 
local authorities to report on non-financial output‟s dimensions.  The OAG (2010) 
has provided some guidance through their discussion paper – Local Government 
Examples of Better practice in Setting Local Authorities’ Performance Measures 
– which specifically identifies performance measures for different services.   
While cost items are often reported, the explanation for its significant variance is 
scant.  In spite of the fact that some authorities incur significant variances for cost 
of wastewater services, only about 30 percent of them provide explanation of 
significant variance of cost.  The majority of local authorities are not providing an 
explanation for the significant variance although it is required in Schedule 10, Part 
3, (15(e)) of the Local Government Act 2002. 
This finding identifies the existence of non-compliance with the statutory 
requirement for SSP reporting, which was not addressed in the audit report.  This 
raises the concern not only on the local authorities‟ reporting but also the audit 
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report in providing insightful understanding on the local authority‟s reporting 
compliance with all statutory reporting requirements. 
In addressing the second objective, the study created an index based on the 
accountability literature.  This index was found to provide a useful means of 
comparing the extent of disclosures made by local authorities.  Using AE index, 
the average score of the index is moderately high – 64.55 percent.  The highest is 
93 percent while the lowest is 13 percent.  The dispersion of the scores are not 
normally distributed – clustered between 63 – 67 and skewed to the left percent.  
Although there is a wide range from the lowest to the highest, the majority of 
disclosures have a relatively high level of correspondence with the accountability 
expectations. 
The finding identifies that local authorities seem to be able to disclose 
performance information in a manner which is suitable for evaluating the 
performance in accordance with accountability expectations.  This provides an 
indication that accountability expectations derived from the accountability 
literature, can afford a suitable framework for SSP reporting.   
The finding supports the work in progress of the International Public Sector 
Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB) in issuing Conceptual Framework for 
General Purpose Financial Reporting by Public Sector Entities (which the 
Accounting Standards Review Board intends to adopt).  Given the framework‟s 
focus on public-sector entities and the inclusion of an accountability objective, the 
new framework might be expected to recognise the complexities of public-sector 
environment and accountability needs. 
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This study finds that that the four accountability expectations are not equally 
addressed.  Probity and legality accountability were more concentrated than 
process/efficiency, performance/programme/effectiveness accountability.  The 
average scores of probity and legality accountability are 91.4 percent and 91.1 
percent while those of process/efficiency, performance/programme/effectiveness 
accountability are 50.7 percent and 46.2 percent. 
The result indicates that traditional types of accountability (probity and legality) is 
better reported than the newly added types of accountability (process/efficiency, 
performance/programme/effectiveness).  Given that all four accountability 
expectations are important for public-sector entities to adequately discharge their 
accountability to the public (Jackson, 1982; Taylor & Rosair, 2000), the failure to 
communicate any of them would be seen to undermine accountability.  Although 
on average local authorities provided disclosures consistent with the 
accountability expectations, the components of process/efficiency, 
performance/programme/effectiveness accountability were not well applied.  This 
implies that accountability of local councils to the public is not yet adequately 
discharged, and hence the reform principle for greater accountability has not yet 
been widely applied. 
In essence, the four lowest-scored authorities for both indices are the same.  They 
are Papakura DC, Manukau CC, Auckland CC, and Hurunui DC of which their 
AR and AE index scores range between 12 – 18 percent, and 13 – 33 percent.   
These four authorities all outsource their wastewater services.  It might be 
expected that disclosures for theses authorities are especially important to enable 
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constituents to assess the performance of the agent.  It is also possible that such 
outsourcing reduces the capacity of those authorities to control, and access the 
necessary information in order to report on their wastewater performance although 
it is required by the Local Government Act 2002 (s. 36) for outsourcing councils 
to remain in control of the outsourced water related operation.  This highlights the 
weakness of the outsourcing local authorities and, hence their reporting on the 
outsourced operations. 
In addressing the third objective, the regression analysis shows that size variables 
(number of staff, revenue, total assets, and population) are significantly and 
positively associated with the AR index and, to a lesser degree, with the AE 
index.  No particular proxy for size dominates.  The coefficients of size variables 
of AR index models varies between 0.043 – 0.068 while those of AE index 
models fluctuate between 0.06 – 0.067.  However, there is no evidence that the 
median income per capita is significantly associated with the indices. 
This result indicates that larger local authorities tend to provide more 
comprehensive disclosures on wastewater services, and thus their constituents are 
likely to have more confidence in the disclosures than those in smaller authorities.  
The results support the conclusion that size of constituents, staff availability, 
financial resource availability, and political visibility of a local authority can 
influence the manner in which the local authority chooses to disclose information 
in their SSPs.  Although sophistication of the constituency, proxied by median 
income, does not provide any significant relationship with the disclosures, this 
may be due to the inappropriate proxy (median income per capita) used or the 
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small sample size.  In essence the association supports three possible incentives - 
the demand from the public, local authorities‟ awareness of political costs, and 
local authorities‟ capability to prepare the report. 
Overall the findings of the study‟s objectives indicate that the authoritative 
requirements are not a suitable framework for SSP reporting but the 
accountability expectations are.  The study supports the current development of 
more specific accounting guidance by the OAG (2010) and the International 
Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (2010) which seems to move towards 
direction addressing the property of accountability expectations.  Additionally, the 
study highlights the local authorities‟ non-compliance with the statutory 
requirement and the absence of audit report comments on such non-compliance.  
There are also concerns raised on the control of the outsourcing local authorities 
over their outsourced operations, and the reporting of smaller local authorities to 
provide more comprehensive disclosures on their service performance. 
8.4 Implications of the study 
The findings of this study provide three immediate implications for the 
improvement of the SSPs provided by local authorities in New Zealand.  The first 
implication deals with the development of accounting guidance for SSP reporting, 
the second implication concerns the detail of the audit report on SSP reporting, 
and the third implication challenges the reporting improvement of some special 
local authorities.   
The current development of accounting guidance by the OAG (2010) and the 
International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (2010) is moving 
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forward in a positive direction where there has been virtually no development for 
20 years.  The authoritative requirements relating to SSP reporting within the 
Local Government Act 2002, NZ Framework, NZ IAS 1, and TPA-9 have not 
been significantly changed since their first development.  From the study, it has 
been identified that, authoritative requirements remain at a high conceptual level 
with financial-focus and are not helpful for local authorities to report on their 
SSPs.  The study supports the current improvement of SSP reporting guidance and 
suggests that accountability expectations provide a model suitable for the SSP 
guidance which standard-setters may consider. 
According to the study results, local authorities could improve on their reporting 
about process/efficiency and performance/grogramme/effectiveness 
accountability, of which the latter is reflected in wastewater performance measure 
examples addressed in the OAG‟s (2010) discussion paper – Local Government 
Examples of Better practice in Setting Local Authorities’ Performance Measures.  
As this paper focus on 2012-22 LTCCP, it is possible that it could have an impact 
on local authorities‟ SSP disclosures for the 2012 forward.  However, 
process/efficiency accountability should also be emphasised.  It is suggestive that 
the office of the Auditor-General would consider including performance measures 
relating to process/efficiency (for example, efficiency ratio) in their discussion 
paper. 
Given its specific accountability objective of financial reporting for public-sector 
entities, the Conceptual Framework for General Purpose Financial Reporting by 
Public Sector Entities (International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board, 
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2010), it is expected this will encourage the public-sector entities to pay more 
attention on their reporting particularly on their non-financial reports which are an 
important tool for their discharge of accountability.  However, in order to ensure 
that all of the components of the accountability expectations are incorporated in 
the accountability information, it is suggested that the standard setter may 
consider including further details of different components of accountability 
expectations in the objective.  It is possible that accounting guidance of SSPs that 
is more specific at practical level would provide better direction for public-sector 
entities in their preparation of the statements. 
The lack of any comment in any of the audit report of the local authority 
regarding non-compliance with Schedule 10, Part 3 (15(e) of the Local 
Government Act 2002 suggests that the OAG needs to pay greater attention in this 
area.  The increased attention by the OAG may increase incentives for local 
authorities to report more comprehensively on their SSP reporting. 
The relatively low extent of performance disclosures made in the SSPs of 
outsourcing local authorities might suggest to regulators (the Minister of Local 
Government and the Minister for the Environment) that they should ensure that 
disclosures are adequate to report comprehensively about the operation.  Further, 
given the tendency of smaller authorities to provide less comprehensive SSPs, this 
provides suggestions to a regulator (the Ministry of Local Government) to 
consider ways to encourage the authorities to provide more comprehensive SSPs.  
The regulator may consider (i) the imposition of tighter regulation to smaller 
authorities so as to increase their awareness of political cost, and/or (ii) the 
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provision of education for smaller authorities in preparing SSP reporting.  
However, without comprehensive accounting guidance for SSP reporting to 
facilitate the education provided, the local authorities‟ capability to prepare the 
reports may not yet be as effective. 
In sum, the whole environment of SSP reporting of New Zealand local authorities 
has potentially moved to a positive direction from its first introduction to the time 
of the study.  However, it appears that there is still a need for improvement of SSP 
by local authorities, which requires collaboration from several parties.  This study 
provides suggestions useful to standard-setters about the ways to improve SSP 
reporting guidance, to the OAG for their comments in the audit report regarding 
non-compliance with the Schedule 10, Part 3 (15(e)) of the Local Government Act 
2002, and to a regulator for increased attention on the SSP reporting of 
outsourcing and smaller local authorities.  By doing so, it is expected that New 
Zealand local authorities may lead the world in providing comprehensive SSPs, 
which enable them to adequately discharge their accountability and, hence in 
reaching a reform principle for greater accountability. 
8.5 Limitations of the study  
This study has provided an empirical understanding of SSP reporting by New 
Zealand local authorities as well as the factors that might influence the reports.  
Moreover, it has identified the inappropriateness of current authoritative 
requirements for SSP reporting and the usefulness of accountability expectations 
that have been derived from literature.  However, in any research study some 
limitations are always involved.  This study has two limitations. 
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The first limitation concerns the study‟s focus on wastewater disclosures, which 
limits the ability to generalise from the results to disclosures of other services.  
However, wastewater services are considered a critical service of local authorities 
on which disclosures are commonly reported by all 73 New Zealand local 
authorities.  Therefore, focusing on wastewater disclosures has enabled the sample 
size to be maximised. 
The second limitation lies in the inevitable subjectivity of index construction 
(Marston & Shrives, 1991).  However, this study uses unweighted items and 
dichotomous scoring which possibly minimises the subjectivity of the index. 
8.6 Future research  
The study reports on local authorities‟ disclosures in the period that little guidance 
was provided, which can provide a base for future study on the impact of the new 
accounting guidance.  The Office of the Auditor-General‟s (2010) discussion 
paper and the International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board‟s (2010) 
exposure draft could have an impact on local authorities‟ SSP disclosures in the 
future.  Future research could investigate its impact on the future SSPs by 
comparing findings with this study.  Results may provide more understanding of a 
way in which SSPs can be improved.  
The AE index, developed from literature, proved a useful tool for evaluating 
accountability documents.  Future research may use this method to investigate 
SSP disclosures of other core activities (such as roading, water supply, libraries, 
and building control) of New Zealand local authorities.  This would enable an 
extension of the database and generalisability of the results of the study. 
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Given the relatively low adjusted R
2
, it is possible that other independent 
variables have not been included in the regression model.  This provides an 
opportunity for future research to investigate other variables that are appropriate 
to proxy the influential factors (for example, sophistication of constituents, and 
political competition).  This may provide more understanding of the factors that 
influence the disclosures. 
While this study has provided insights into the extent of performance disclosures 
made by local authorities, it has not directly measured the quality of those 
disclosures.  Future research might directly address the usefulness of disclosures 
for the discharge of accountability by making reference to the needs of the 
constituency. 
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Appendices: 
Appendix A: Local authorities’ profile between 2004-2008 
Local authorities Area 
(km2) 
Pop Median 
income 
No. of 
staff 
Opert’g 
revenue 
Opert’g 
expense 
Total assets Total 
liabilities 
Ashburton DC  6188.74 28700 $24,400 117 32,540 $32,053 $543,124 $21,799 
Auckland CC 668.53 438100 $28,100 1666 571,493 $600,954 $9,633,026 $721,074 
Auckland RC 16,316 1,414,800    $26,800 519 $169,374 $113,004 $1,153,166 $127,964 
Bay of Plenty RC 21,835 269,900    $22,600 278 $59,888 $52,362 $454,763 $81,907 
Buller DC 7954.94 9950 $18,000 48 19,908 $18,327 $300,365 $16,944 
Canterbury RC 56,788 552,800    $23,500 529 $104,850 $103,389 $600,508 $16,437 
Carterton DC 1180.04 7360 $22,200 30 8,684 $103,389 $138,783 $2,659 
Central Hawke‟s Bay DC 3327.95 13300 $23,500 34 21,124 $20,015 $674,507 $13,431 
Central Otago DC 9957.81 17700 $23,000 58 25,984 $27,772 $504,394 $4,630 
Chatham Islands CC  640 $24,900 4 4,509 $4,038 $41,779 $1,246 
Christchurch CC 1609.91 368900 $23,400 1559 399,049 $387,866 $6,552,658 $223,408 
Clutha DC 6363.14 17350 $23,300 68 32,100 $29,009 $788,681 $5,754 
Dunedin CC  3341.60 122900 $19,400 601 165,664 $179,188 $2,662,121 $191,498 
Far North DC 7323.84 57900 $19,200 196 84,135 $98,395 $1,615,268 $108,819 
Franklin DC 2187.92 63200 $27,800 110 63,827 $61,252 $1,168,439 $74,232 
Gisborne DC 8355.08 45900 $20,600 234 60,989 $64,175 $1,729,782 $36,988 
Gore DC 1251.59 12250 $22,400 65 15,194 $14,386 $314,750 $12,636 
Grey DC 3516.76 13650 $21,100 51 21,717 $20,217 $312,137 $11,962 
Hamilton CC  98.55 138500 $24,000 726 138,881 $164,519 $3,181,858 $246,281 
Hastings DC 5217.46 73800 $22,600 360 84,534 $78,888 $1,302,942 $52,333 
Hauraki DC 1187.77 17750 $19,600 106 27,326 $29,811 $442,602 $12,561 
Hawkes Bay RC 21,399 152,700    $22,600 179 33,223 $29,755 $403,955 $13,894 
Horowhenua DC 1063.63 30600 $18,500 58 26,543 $29,986 $385,894 $24,935 
Hurunui DC 8660.48 10850 $23,000 105 22,875 $23,669 $275,641 $4,788 
Hutt CC  376.59 101600 $27,300 303 106,104 $108,803 $1,082,464 $110,297 
Invercargill CC  491.32 51600 $22,000 260 63,425 $62,173 $651,295 $54,892 
Kaikoura DC 2046.47 3760 $21,800 26 7,625 $6,741 $133,208 $6,076 
Kaipara DC 3117.19 18600 $20,100 43 33,451 $32,510 $442,685 $35,223 
Kapiti Coast DC 731.31 48400 $23,000 190 45,456 $44,490 $744,801 $78,501 
Kawerau DC 21.95 7050 $17,100 52 7,131 $7,735 $53,279 $2,090 
Mackenzie DC 7439.55 3950 $22,800 24 7,961 $8,983 $172,024 $2,564 
Manawatu DC 2624.13 29300 $24,200 73 33,288 $29,912 $537,765 $17,081 
Manawatu Wanganui RC 25,306 229,200    $21,600 250 42,662 $39,648 $308,292 $9,788 
Manukau CC 682.81 362000 $24,200 1025 291,351 $300,732 $6,199,042 $355,081 
Marlborough DC 12494.05 44500 $23,300 180 75,801 $65,562 $972,710 $15,881 
Masterton DC 2298.80 23100 $21,700 73 23,301 $25,809 $588,200 $18,529 
Matamata-Piako DC 1753.96 31400 $25,600 150 32,816 $33,288 $533,907 $30,740 
Napier CC 105.60 56900 $22,700 364 81,850 $71,816 $1,287,915 $27,366 
Nelson CC 443.31 44700 $23,100 168 68,346 $59,893 $1,075,812 $50,115 
New Plymouth DC 2205.92 71800 $22,800 430 89,153 $102,605 $2,188,333 $114,439 
North Shore CC 129.77 223000 $29,100 720 236,736 $238,640 $4,305,541 $327,641 
Northland RC 30,110 154,700    $20,900 148 21,299 $17,251 $132,220 $4,552 
Opotiki DC 3090.04 9060 $17,400 43 9,513 $8,595 $172,719 $5,988 
Otago RC 38,478 154,700    $21,600 132 31,656 $25,079 $435,672 $5,834 
Otorohanga DC 2063.46 9220 $24,100 36 13,852 $12,484 $201,850 $16,068 
Palmerston North CC 335.55 79300 $23,100 469 81,851 $93,101 $1,327,214 $174,700 
Papakura DC 118.58 48300 $26,500 126 31,616 $34,085 $559,085 $49,976 
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Local authorities Area 
(km2) 
Pop Median 
income 
No. of 
staff 
Opert’g 
revenue 
Opert’g 
expense 
Total assets Total 
liabilities 
Porirua CC  182.42 51000 $26,300 280 52,129 $55,234 $1,105,161 $32,156 
Queenstown Lakes DC 9357.74 26400 $31,000 52 54,920 $62,973 $797,302 $75,742 
Rangitikei DC 4479.46 14950 $21,700 45 25,316 $22,712 $472,149 $4,664 
Rodney DC 2426.98 96400 $26,600 374 121,273 $138,719 $1,639,596 $300,598 
Rotorua DC 2614.88 68000 $23,900 455 87,520 $90,820 $882,331 $110,143 
Ruapehu DC 6730.39 13650 $21,100 63 27,998 $26,289 $335,506 $32,481 
Selwyn DC 6555.47 37500 $28,100 150 36,752 $44,938 $836,523 $11,014 
South Taranaki DC 3575.53 26700 $24,500 101 41,208 $39,038 $723,578 $14,168 
South Waikato DC 1816.94 22800 $20,900 130 24,375 $23,185 $342,502 $7,368 
South Wairarapa DC 2457.20 9190 $24,100 26 12,271 $13,240 $348,180 $10,672 
Southland DC 30979.19 29100 $25,800 152 53,741 $52,617 $1,244,596 $15,157 
Southland RC 55,049 93,000    $23,200 103 15,786 $18,728 $70,084 $2,482 
Stratford DC 2163.35 9100 $22,400 32 12,590 $10,364 $266,748 $6,034 
Taranaki RC  12,700 107,500    $23,200 109 16,189 $13,590 $71,914 $3,057 
Tararua DC 4360.69 17750 $23,000 62 27,819 $25,693 $768,202 $14,750 
Tasman DC 14812.64 46500 $21,600 150 67,229 $69,591 $1,086,308 $93,543 
Taupo DC 6955.11 33500 $24,500 288 68,186 $58,115 $1,166,264 $83,721 
Tauranga CC 168.27 110500 $23,200 365 119,378 $117,188 $2,727,647 $269,120 
Thames-Coromandel DC 2297.25 26800 $20,300 176 60,326 $58,669 $1,013,915 $61,107 
Timaru DC 2735.63 43900 $21,200 166 56,954 $54,821 $741,468 $44,848 
Upper Hutt CC 539.85 40200 $26,900 140 34,078 $35,874 $528,111 $25,146 
Waikato DC 3188.79 46800 $25,700 156 58,134 $47,887 $909,247 $22,035 
Waikato RC  34,711 402,200    $24,100 368 94,262 $90,066 $479,528 $15,658 
Waimakariri DC 2218.82 46100 $24,000 135 50,824 $43,609 $953,015 $27,896 
Waimate DC 3582.25 7450 $18,900 40 9,785 $10,011 $327,923 $4,792 
Waipa DC 1469.24 44700 $26,500 153 45,701 $46,642 $958,941 $25,727 
Wairoa DC 4119.22 8480 $20,100 32 18,082 $17,239 $191,471 $3,982 
Waitakere CC 367.42 201400 $26,100 765 199,983 $240,883 $2,580,344 $444,186 
Waitaki DC 7213.62 20700 $19,700 16 35,834 $35,304 $620,221 $9,774 
Waitomo DC 3546.91 9600 $23,300 25 17,511 $20,002 $277,357 $36,597 
Wanganui DC 2372.66 43400 $19,800 196 56,760 $56,129 $826,771 $82,609 
Wellington CC 290.15 192800 $32,500 1440 325,228 $326,270 $6,154,063 $341,003 
Wellington RC 15,943 473,700    $28,000 424 162,309 $169,195 $703,185 $92,804 
West Coast RC 36,335 32,300    $20,400 48 15,150 $14,751 $57,514 $4,045 
Western Bay of Plenty DC 2120.78 44400 $22,600 120 52,464 $59,473 $985,072 $113,532 
Westland DC 11880.18 8760 $22,700 35 13,286 $13,516 $354,743 $8,974 
Whakatane D C 4456.78 34400 $21,700 170 43,838 $40,588 $565,002 $20,136 
Whangarei DC 2855.43 78200 $22,500 230 110,284 $116,847 $1,254,963 $137,706 
 
Area (km2)  as at July 2006 (The Department of Internal Affairs, 2009a) 
 
Pop (Population estimates) as at July 2008 (Statistics New Zealand, 2009a) 
 
Median income  (Median income of population) for the year ended July 2006 (The Department of Internal Affairs, 2009a) 
 
No. of staff (number of council employees) as at July 2004 (The Department of Internal Affairs, 2009a) 
 
Opert’g revenue (Operating revenue) for the year ended July 2008 (Statistics New Zealand, 2009b) 
 
Opert’g expense (Operating expense) for the year ended July 2008 (Statistics New Zealand, 2009b) 
  
Total assets as at July 2008 (Statistics New Zealand, 2009b) 
 
Total liabilities as at July 2008 (Statistics New Zealand, 2009b) 
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Appendix B: Examples of prior studies using disclosure indices  
Studies Types of disclosures Entities studied 
Wiseman 
(1982)  
Voluntary environmental disclosures in annual 
reports 
26 polluting companies  
Hughes, 
Anderson and 
Gordon (2001)  
Voluntary environmental disclosures within 
president‟s letter, management‟s discussion and 
analysis, and financial statement notes section 
for their 1992 and 1993 annual reports 
51 manufacturing firms in 
United States      
Clarkson, P.M., 
Li, Y., 
Richardson, G., 
and Vasvari, F. 
(2008) 
Voluntary environmental disclosures in the 
2004 website and social responsibility reports 
191 firms from the five 
most polluting industries in 
United States   
Bozzolan, S., 
O‟Regan, P, 
Ricceri, F. 
(2006)  
Voluntary intellectual capital disclosure in 2001 
annual reports 
60 listed companies in Italy 
and United Kingdom.   
Schneider and 
Samkin (2008) 
Voluntary intellectual capital disclosure in 
2004/2005 annual reports 
82 local authorities in New 
Zealand.   
Williams, S. 
(2001) 
Voluntary intellectual capital disclosure in 
1996-2000 annual reports  
31 companies in United 
Kingdom 
Buzby, S. 
(1975)  
Mandatory disclosures in 1970 annual reports 88 listed companies in 
United States.   
Cooke (1989)  Mandatory disclosures in 1985 annual reports 90 companies in Sweden 
Robbins and 
Austin (1986)  
Voluntary disclosures in 1981/1982 annual 
reports  
99 city councils in United 
States   
Stanley, 
Jennings and 
Mack (2008)  
Mandatory disclosures in 2002/03 annual 
reports 
105 Queensland local 
government authorities in 
Australia  
Taylor and 
Rosair (2000)  
Mandatory disclosures in annual reports  48 governmental 
departments in Australia  
Boyne and Law 
(1991)  
Voluntary service performance (on 13 services) 
information in 1981/1982 – 1988/1989 annual 
reports 
37 Welsh district councils 
in United Kingdom 
Ryan, Stanley, 
and Nelson 
(2002)  
Mandatory disclosures within 1997-1999 
annual reports 
36 Queensland local 
government councils in 
Australia 
Smith and Coy 
(2000)  
Mandatory disclosures in 1996/97 – 1997/98 
annual reports 
15 local authorities New 
Zealand   
Coy, Tower, 
and Dixon 
(1994)  
Mandatory disclosures in 1990-1992 annual 
report  
Tertiary education entities 
in New Zealand.   
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Appendix C: Standardised residual and Cook’s Distance values for the 
AR index scores 
    Standardised Cook's  
  Territorial authorities residual Distance 
1 Ashburton DC 0.2415 0.00023 
2 Auckland CC  -1.1166 1.12673 
3 Buller DC    0.04322 0.00002 
4 Carterton DC -0.26151 0.00024 
5 Central Hawk DC -0.04675 0.00002 
6 Central Otago DC -1.43106 0.00694 
7 Chatham Island C -0.88474 0.00463 
8 Christchurch CC 1.35018 0.23548 
9 Clutha DC    0.2427 0.00034 
10 Dunedin CC   0.317 0.00189 
11 Far North DC 0.44181 0.0029 
12 Franklin DC  0.40844 0.00291 
13 Gisborne DC  0.07095 0.0001 
14 Gore DC      -1.08944 0.00401 
15 Grey DC      1.81761 0.01303 
16 Hamilton CC  0.91262 0.03884 
17 Hastings DC  -0.06 0.00002 
18 Hauraki DC   0.35078 0.00079 
19 Horowhenua DC -0.11557 0.00013 
20 Hurunui DC   -2.18178 0.01932 
21 Hutt CC      1.15964 0.045 
22 Invercargill DC 0.00534 0 
23 Kaikoura DC  -0.92953 0.00313 
24 Kaipara DC   -0.04035 0.00001 
25 Kapiti Coast DC 1.11489 0.00496 
26 Kawerau DC   -1.17776 0.02055 
27 Mackenzie DC -0.17055 0.0001 
28 Manawatu DC  -0.0644 0.00002 
29 Manukau CC   -2.08122 3.14502 
30 Marlborough DC 0.60557 0.00274 
31 Masterton DC 1.22971 0.00639 
32 Matamata-Piako DC -0.36739 0.00089 
33 Napier CC    0.08727 0.00005 
34 Nelson CC    0.95447 0.00394 
35 New Plymouth DC 1.09448 0.02266 
36 North Shore CC 0.99601 0.02953 
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    Standardised Cook's  
  Territorial authorities residual Distance 
37 Opotiki DC -0.24383 0.00077 
38 Otorohanga DC -0.17127 0.00012 
39 Palmerston North CC -0.25798 0.00122 
40 Papakura DC  -2.93092 0.10713 
41 Porirua CC   0.16648 0.00029 
42 Queenstown-Lake DC -0.44523 0.00854 
43 Rangitikei DC -0.44895 0.00079 
44 Rodney DC    -0.17447 0.00037 
45 Rotorua DC   0.48121 0.00719 
46 Ruapehu DC   0.37936 0.00066 
47 Selwyn DC    -0.06245 0.00006 
48 South Taranaki DC -0.12123 0.00006 
49 South Waikato DC -0.36881 0.00072 
50 South Wairarapa DC 1.25907 0.00762 
51 Southland DC 1.05853 0.01173 
52 Stratford DC 0.26712 0.00024 
53 Tararua DC   0.50417 0.00153 
54 Tasman DC    -0.15686 0.00014 
55 Taupo DC     -1.23586 0.01114 
56 Tauranga CC  2.29299 0.0958 
57 Thames-Coromandel DC 1.02859 0.00934 
58 Timaru DC    0.6143 0.00186 
59 Upper Hutt CC 0.06071 0.00004 
60 Waikato DC   0.06562 0.00002 
61 Waimakariri DC -0.56937 0.0012 
62 Waimate DC   -1.25976 0.01381 
63 Waipa DC     2.71413 0.05992 
64 Wairoa DC    -0.66089 0.00247 
65 Waitakere CC 0.36649 0.0098 
66 Waitaki DC   -0.12461 0.00016 
67 Waitomo DC   -1.30643 0.00633 
68 Wanganui DC  -0.86996 0.00499 
69 Wellington CC -1.21706 1.27619 
70 Western Bay DC 0.82504 0.00268 
71 Westland DC  -0.29511 0.00033 
72 Whakatane DC -0.04617 0.00001 
73 Whangarei DC -0.54213 0.00604 
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Appendix D: Standardised residual and Cook’s Distance values for the 
AE index scores 
    Standardised Cook's  
  Territorial authorities residual Distance 
1 Ashburton DC 0.5085 0.001 
2 Auckland CC  -1.50883 2.05733 
3 Buller DC    0.90034 0.00886 
4 Carterton DC -1.19699 0.00501 
5 Central Hawke‟s Bay DC 0.29652 0.00061 
6 Central Otago DC -1.12473 0.00429 
7 Chatham Island C -1.64749 0.01607 
8 Christchurch CC 1.03105 0.13732 
9 Clutha DC    1.09275 0.00697 
10 Dunedin CC   -0.41775 0.00327 
11 Far North DC 1.12266 0.01874 
12 Franklin DC  0.74614 0.00972 
13 Gisborne DC  -0.47557 0.00448 
14 Gore DC      -0.78695 0.00209 
15 Grey DC      -0.36936 0.00054 
16 Hamilton CC  1.71066 0.13647 
17 Hastings DC  0.41189 0.00095 
18 Hauraki DC   -0.39617 0.00101 
19 Horowhenua DC -0.78302 0.00601 
20 Hurunui DC   -2.19252 0.01951 
21 Hutt CC      0.33434 0.00374 
22 Invercargill DC 0.26169 0.00067 
23 Kaikoura DC  -0.81556 0.00241 
24 Kaipara DC   -1.20409 0.01011 
25 Kapiti Coast DC 1.40333 0.00785 
26 Kawerau DC   -0.44367 0.00292 
27 Mackenzie DC 0.9512 0.00322 
28 Manawatu DC  0.5482 0.00125 
29 Manukau CC   -1.27746 1.18491 
30 Marlborough DC  0.018 0 
31 Masterton DC -0.68308 0.00197 
32 Matamata-Piako DC -0.35557 0.00083 
33 Napier CC    -0.02409 0 
34 Nelson CC    0.51946 0.00117 
35 New Plymouth DC -0.54987 0.00572 
36 North Shore CC 1.46327 0.06373 
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    Standardised Cook's  
  Territorial authorities residual Distance 
37 Opotiki DC -0.38277 0.0019 
38 Otorohanga DC 0.93786 0.00372 
39 Palmerston North CC -0.039 0.00003 
40 Papakura DC  -3.27929 0.13412 
41 Porirua CC   -0.72431 0.00555 
42 Queenstown-Lake DC 0.19309 0.00161 
43 Rangitikei D 0.53794 0.00114 
44 Rodney DC    0.86191 0.00892 
45 Rotorua DC   -1.21984 0.04621 
46 Ruapehu DC   0.03796 0.00001 
47 Selwyn DC    -1.03624 0.01575 
48 South Taranaki DC -0.28888 0.00035 
49 South Waikato DC 0.02458 0 
50 South Wairarapa DC 0.58036 0.00162 
51 Southland DC 1.97354 0.04076 
52 Stratford DC 1.42436 0.0069 
53 Tararua DC   -0.62346 0.00234 
54 Tasman DC    -0.28956 0.00046 
55 Taupo DC     1.31188 0.01255 
56 Tauranga CC  1.00067 0.01825 
57 Thames-Coromandel DC 0.4597 0.00187 
58 Timaru DC    0.03333 0.00001 
59 Upper Hutt CC -1.15824 0.01498 
60 Waikato DC   1.44414 0.0118 
61 Waimakariri DC -0.66661 0.00164 
62 Waimate DC   0.53717 0.00251 
63 Waipa DC     0.65178 0.00346 
64 Wairoa DC    -0.40711 0.00094 
65 Waitakere CC 1.17353 0.1005 
66 Waitaki DC   0.19093 0.00037 
67 Waitomo DC   -0.33124 0.00041 
68 Wanganui DC  0.03551 0.00001 
69 Wellington CC -0.81098 0.56664 
70 Western Bay of Plenty DC 0.24328 0.00023 
71 Westland DC  0.17077 0.00011 
72 Whakatane DC 0.8409 0.00303 
73 Whangarei DC -0.47491 0.00463 
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Appendix E: The scatterplot of standardised residuals against 
standardised predicted value for the AR index 
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Appendix F: The scatterplot of standardised residuals against 
standardised predicted value for the AE index 
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Appendix G: Histogram of standardised residuals for the AR index 
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Appendix H: Histogram of standardised residuals for the AE index 
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Appendix I: Standardised residual and Cook’s Distance value of the 
logarithmic transformed AR index scores 
    Standardised Cook's  
  Territorial authorities residual distance 
1 Ashburton DC 0.47861 0.00118 
2 Auckland CC  -2.70847 0.19337 
3 Buller DC    0.04395 0.00003 
4 Carterton DC 0.12427 0.00021 
5 Central Hawke‟s Bay DC -0.15659 0.00055 
6 Central Otago DC -1.31769 0.00731 
7 Chatham Island C -0.34689 0.02595 
8 Christchurch CC 0.60878 0.00734 
9 Clutha DC    0.14111 0.00021 
10 Dunedin CC   0.07483 0.00013 
11 Far North DC 0.10919 0.00021 
12 Franklin DC  0.44532 0.00414 
13 Gisborne DC  -0.05895 0.00007 
14 Gore DC      -0.84129 0.00659 
15 Grey DC      1.46716 0.01094 
16 Hamilton CC  0.87052 0.00952 
17 Hastings DC  0.11243 0.00007 
18 Hauraki DC   0.37967 0.00126 
19 Horowhenua D 0.00115 0 
20 Hurunui DC   -2.01961 0.08855 
21 Hutt CC      1.12322 0.02871 
22 Invercargill DC 0.34529 0.00148 
23 Kaikoura DC  -0.66661 0.00732 
24 Kaipara DC   0.02888 0.00001 
25 Kapiti Coast DC 1.05809 0.00701 
26 Kawerau DC   -0.53068 0.02687 
27 Mackenzie DC -0.03657 0.00002 
28 Manawatu DC  0.17485 0.00024 
29 Manukau CC   -3.80121 0.27291 
30 Marlborough DC 0.57684 0.00236 
31 Masterton DC 0.91026 0.00925 
32 Matamata-Piako DC 0.08729 0.00008 
33 Napier CC    0.27253 0.00057 
34 Nelson CC    0.77382 0.00238 
35 New Plymouth DC 0.88627 0.01068 
36 North Shore CC 0.55752 0.00478 
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    Standardised Cook's  
  Territorial authorities residual distance 
37 Opotiki DC -0.11996 0.00035 
38 Otorohanga DC 0.23324 0.00051 
39 Palmerston North CC 0.11181 0.00011 
40 Papakura DC  -3.47181 0.36817 
41 Porirua CC   0.44971 0.0024 
42 Queenstown-Lake DC -0.0812 0.0003 
43 Rangitikei DC -0.35667 0.00081 
44 Rodney DC    -0.03861 0.00001 
45 Rotorua DC   0.86745 0.01295 
46 Ruapehu DC   0.51624 0.00255 
47 Selwyn DC    0.25691 0.00112 
48 South Taranake DC 0.04938 0.00001 
49 South Waikato DC 0.01157 0 
50 South Wairarapa DC 0.94431 0.01654 
51 Southland DC 0.82414 0.0086 
52 Stratford DC 0.3409 0.00095 
53 Tararua DC   0.31425 0.00115 
54 Tasman DC    -0.18865 0.00021 
55 Taupo DC     -0.91325 0.01526 
56 Tauranga CC  1.41753 0.01853 
57 Thames-Coromandel DC 0.71514 0.01003 
58 Timaru DC    0.61765 0.00238 
59 Upper Hutt CC 0.50344 0.00475 
60 Waikato DC   0.26248 0.00036 
61 Waimakariri DC -0.4153 0.0008 
62 Waimate DC   -1.44634 0.07579 
63 Waipa DC     1.93444 0.03305 
64 Wairoa DC    -0.33108 0.00177 
65 Waitakere CC 0.22864 0.00069 
66 Waitaki DC   -0.23979 0.00676 
67 Waitomo DC   -1.05502 0.01171 
68 Wanganui DC  -0.773 0.005 
69 Wellington CC -0.30889 0.00481 
70 Western Bay of Plenty DC 0.64528 0.00219 
71 Westland DC  -0.2481 0.00079 
72 Whakatane DC 0.22763 0.00031 
73 Whangarei DC -0.65176 0.0056 
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Appendix J: Standardised residual and Cook’s Distance value of the 
logarithmic transformed AE index scores  
    Standardised Cook's  
  Territorial authorities residual distance 
1 Ashburton DC 0.74896 0.00289 
2 Auckland CC  -2.23479 0.13165 
3 Buller DC    0.46002 0.00337 
4 Carterton DC -0.58564 0.00476 
5 Central Hawke‟s Bay DC 0.10784 0.00026 
6 Central Otago DC -0.90996 0.00348 
7 Chatham Island C -1.60683 0.55672 
8 Christchurch CC 0.57721 0.0066 
9 Clutha DC    0.60306 0.00381 
10 Dunedin CC   -0.56579 0.00731 
11 Far North DC 0.38289 0.00258 
12 Franklin DC  0.84124 0.01478 
13 Gisborne DC  -0.89273 0.01577 
14 Gore DC      -0.39486 0.00145 
15 Grey DC      -0.14186 0.0001 
16 Hamilton CC  1.00016 0.01257 
17 Hastings DC  0.4967 0.00133 
18 Hauraki DC   -0.30688 0.00082 
19 Horowhenua D -0.43688 0.00598 
20 Hurunui DC   -2.08218 0.09413 
21 Hutt CC      0.89774 0.01834 
22 Invercargill DC 0.60796 0.00458 
23 Kaikoura DC  -0.51397 0.00435 
24 Kaipara DC   -1.11324 0.02138 
25 Kapiti Coast DC 1.28823 0.01039 
26 Kawerau DC   0.22307 0.00475 
27 Mackenzie DC 0.81494 0.01181 
28 Manawatu DC  0.74735 0.0044 
29 Manukau CC   -2.7897 0.14699 
30 Marlborough DC 0.12995 0.00012 
31 Masterton DC -0.46539 0.00242 
32 Matamata-Piako DC 0.22251 0.00049 
33 Napier CC    0.09982 0.00008 
34 Nelson CC    0.40655 0.00066 
35 New Plymouth DC -0.74208 0.00748 
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    Standardised Cook's  
  Territorial authorities residual distance 
36 North Shore CC 0.93985 0.01359 
37 Opotiki DC -0.11355 0.00031 
38 Otorohanga DC 1.07899 0.01091 
39 Palmerston North CC 0.28879 0.0007 
40 Papakura DC  -4.487 0.61496 
41 Porirua CC   -0.30437 0.0011 
42 Queenstown-Lake DC 0.4288 0.00832 
43 Rangitikei DC 0.39083 0.00097 
44 Rodney DC    0.94496 0.0078 
45 Rotorua DC   -0.40234 0.00279 
46 Ruapehu DC   0.09732 0.00009 
47 Selwyn DC    -0.54434 0.00504 
48 South Taranake DC -0.1054 0.00004 
49 South Waikato DC 0.39839 0.00172 
50 South Wairarapa DC 0.647 0.00776 
51 Southland DC 1.15733 0.01696 
52 Stratford DC 1.19237 0.01162 
53 Tararua DC   -0.68142 0.00542 
54 Tasman DC    -0.29775 0.00052 
55 Taupo DC     0.87331 0.01396 
56 Tauranga CC  0.37474 0.00129 
57 Thames-Coromandel DC 0.02606 0.00001 
58 Timaru DC    0.19332 0.00023 
59 Upper Hutt CC -0.38526 0.00278 
60 Waikato DC   1.26247 0.00823 
61 Waimakariri DC -0.41703 0.0008 
62 Waimate DC   0.31072 0.0035 
63 Waipa DC     0.77975 0.00537 
64 Wairoa DC    -0.22813 0.00084 
65 Waitakere CC 1.24461 0.02035 
66 Waitaki DC   -0.05644 0.00037 
67 Waitomo DC   -0.07223 0.00005 
68 Wanganui DC  0.05996 0.00003 
69 Wellington CC -0.57425 0.01662 
70 Western Bay of Plenty DC 0.22471 0.00027 
71 Westland DC  0.22347 0.00064 
72 Whakatane DC 0.85981 0.00438 
73 Whangarei DC -0.20149 0.00054 
     
 
